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Introduction
In many distribution problems of daily life, inequality is intuitively associated with
injustice. If the individuals involved in a distribution problem are equals in terms
of the personal characteristics relevant to the problem,1 then there is no reason for
giving a particular individual more than another particular individual since any
valid reason has to refer to differences in the personal characteristics of the given
individuals. In other words, every inequality is in a sense ethically unjustifiable. It
seems evident, therefore, that equality of ethically relevant personal characteristics
should translate ideally into an equal division of the ‘thing’ to be distributed.2
In the economic literature on income distribution3—with which this disser-
tation is concerned—it is assumed that individuals are identical with respect to
all ethically relevant personal characteristics, or, alternatively, that the ‘income’
concept has been defined such that it corrects for differences in these personal
characteristics.4 In accordance with the argument presented above, an appeal to
equality of incomes is clearly present in the literature. It should be stressed that
the argument does not imply, however, that any equal division should be con-
sidered better than any unequal one. Each theory of distributive justice specifies
additional concerns that may override the preference for equality. A popular such
overriding concern is that of Pareto efficiency, which says that moves towards
more inequality are allowed if everyone benefits. For another example, note that
it is conventional in the literature on income distribution to assume that welfare
depends only on two variables, i.e., mean income and the level of income in-
equality. The additional concern of mean income is hence adopted in terms of
a trade-off—only sufficiently significant increases of mean income can justify a
given increase in inequality.
The outlined perspective places the main topics of this dissertation—the mea-
surement of inequality and the measurement of inequality aversion—at the centre
1Needs, effort levels and rights are examples of such characteristics that could be deemed
relevant.
2See Kolm (1997) for an especially thorough exposition of this argument.
3See Cowell (2000) and Lambert (2001) for overviews.
4Besides the term ‘income,’ we will sometimes use the terms ‘utility’ or ‘well-being’ through-
out this dissertation.
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of the problem of distributive justice. For choices between income distributions
which are undistinguishable with respect to additional concerns (in the example of
the size-distribution representation of welfare, choices between income distribu-
tions with the same mean incomes) the problem of distributive justice reduces to
an exercise of inequality minimization, thus giving rise to the need for a theory of
inequality measurement. For choices between income distributions which differ
in terms of the additional concerns (in the example of the size-distribution rep-
resentation, choices between income distributions with different mean incomes)
it becomes important to assess how important these concerns are relative to the
inequality concern, i.e., to determine the degree of inequality aversion.
1
The social welfare functions conventionally used to evaluate income distributions
are natural analogues of models studied in the literature on decision under risk,
viz., the expected utility (EU) model, the Yaari (1987) model and, generalizing
the previous two, the rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) model.5 Without
a doubt, the EU social welfare function has received the most attention in the lit-
erature on income distribution. The key axiom underlying the EU social welfare
function is separability, which says, roughly speaking, that the income level of
any individual with the same income in two income distributions should not in-
fluence the evaluative ranking of the given income distributions. The Yaari and
RDEU social welfare functions do not in general satisfy separability. In Part I of
this dissertation, we critically examine how well these three social welfare func-
tions describe the opinions of questionnaire respondents, and to what extent the
inequality measures corresponding to them are sufficiently flexible to allow for all
plausible inequality judgements with respect to the specific question of how the
relative numbers of poor people and rich people should affect inequality.
In Chapter 1, we present the results of a questionnaire study that takes as
a starting point Harsanyi’s (1953, 1955) impartial observer theory, which links
preferences under risk with social preferences. Harsanyi claims that income dis-
tributions ought to be ranked as they would be ranked by a rational individual
behind the so-called ‘veil of ignorance.’ Behind this veil of ignorance, an individ-
ual is confronted with the income distributions reinterpreted as lotteries: for every
income distribution, the individual has an equal probability of ending up with the
income of each of the members of society. The supporters of this approach ar-
gue that an individual behind the veil of ignorance has the correct perspective to
make choices from a moral point of view since she will be both impartial and
sympathetic towards the members of society. The questionnaire used in Chapter 1
5See the overview by Gajdos (2001).
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confronts respondents with eight choices over pairs of income distributions. In the
first version, respondents are asked to state their direct ethical preference over each
of the pairs. In the second and third versions, the income distributions in the eight
pairs are reinterpreted as lotteries, and respondent are put behind a veil of igno-
rance (choices affect the incomes of everyone in society) or in a purely individual
risk situation (choices affect only the own income), respectively. The results re-
veal that, although there are important similarities between the three types of pref-
erences, the direct ethical preferences and the purely individual risk preferences
of the respondents form two extremes, while the veil of ignorance preferences lie
in between the other two. An important question is whether the responses are
consistent with the EU, Yaari and RDEU social welfare functions. For all three
questionnaire versions, the results reveal many violations of the separability ax-
iom, and hence inconsistencies with the EU social welfare function. Moreover,
the direction in which separability is violated by the respondents does not corre-
spond to the direction prescribed by the Yaari and RDEU social welfare functions.
By contrast, respondents’ choices turn out to be well described by certain simple
concepts from the literature on decision under risk that have not been studied in
the context of the evaluation of income distributions. The most important example
in this respect is that the respondents reveal a positive attitude to mixing income
distributions—an income distribution is a mixture of two given income distribu-
tions if it is obtained by convexly combining the relative frequencies (at the same
income level) of those given income distributions, e.g., the income distribution
of a country is a mixture of the income distributions of its regions—whereas the
EU social welfare function implies neutrality to mixing, and the Yaari and RDEU
social welfare functions imply averseness to mixing.
Taking as an inspiration the importance of attitudes to mixing income distribu-
tions in describing respondent’s choices, we provide in Chapter 2 a formal exami-
nation of the behaviour of inequality measures with respect to mixing. It is shown
that virtually all inequality measures commonly considered in the literature on in-
come distribution—i.e., the inequality measures corresponding to a social welfare
function of the EU, Yaari or RDEU form, as well as the class of decomposable
inequality measures—satisfy a quasi-concavity property, which implies, roughly
speaking, that mixing income distributions increases inequality. The relevancy of
this quasi-concavity property lies in the fact that it has direct consequences for
the question of how inequality judgements ought to depend on the relative group
sizes of the poor and rich. In order to understand this, note that an income distri-
bution, say A, in which the number of poor and the number of rich are equal, is a
mixture of (i) an income distribution B in which there are many poor and few rich,
and (ii) an income distribution C in which there are few poor and many rich. By
consequence, all common inequality measures tend to indicate higher inequality
for A than for B or C since they all satisfy the quasi-concavity property. However,
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it has been argued by Fields (1987, 1993), among others, that it would be at least
as plausible to consider A less unequal than B and C. It can be shown, moreover,
that such an alternative view is not inconsistent with basic inequality axioms as
those underlying the well known Lorenz inequality criterion. Again, a possible
conclusion is that the standard approach in the literature on income distribution is
too restrictive.
2
To make comparisons of social welfare orderings with respect to inequality aver-
sion, the literature on income distribution traditionally relies on the well known
Arrow-Pratt concept, which is borrowed from the literature on decision under risk.
In its most straightforward formulation, the Arrow-Pratt concept says the follow-
ing: if a given social welfare ordering prefers a perfectly equal income distribution
to an unequal income distribution in all cases in which another social welfare or-
dering does, then the given social welfare ordering is (weakly) more inequality
averse than the other one. The application of this concept of inequality aversion
has been mostly restricted to EU social welfare functions, i.e., to social welfare
orderings satisfying the separability axiom. In our analysis of inequality aversion
in Part II, we move beyond the standard practice in two respects. First, in line
with the limitations of the separability axiom that were noted in the outline of Part
I above, we study inequality aversion without the imposition of separability. Sec-
ond, we consider alternatives to the Arrow-Pratt concept itself. Throughout Part
II, special attention is paid to the problem of reconciling the ideals of extreme
inequality aversion and monotonicity, i.e, the question of how to implement the
egalitarian ideal of always choosing for less inequality, except in cases in which
no individual would gain by doing so. We note that the qualification ‘extreme’
should not be interpreted as a label for this egalitarian ideal itself: the term simply
stresses the technical point that we are dealing with the most inequality averse
position one can take.
Hammond (1975), Meyer (1975) and Lambert (2001) have studied extreme
inequality aversion in accordance with the standard practice, i.e., using the Arrow-
Pratt concept and focusing on separable social welfare orderings. Their result says
that the leximin social welfare ordering can be obtained as the limit case, in terms
of inequality aversion, of the class of EU social welfare functions: each choice be-
tween a pair of income distributions implied by leximin coincides with the choices
implied by all of the most inequality averse EU social welfare functions. In Chap-
ter 3, we establish an analogous result using the Arrow-Pratt concept, but focusing
on the class of social welfare orderings not necessarily satisfying separability. It is
established that, for this broader class of social welfare orderings, the limit case is
not a single social welfare ordering but a class, viz., the class of weakly maximin
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social welfare orderings, which give priority to the worst off individual in all cases
in which the worst off does not have the same income in the two alternatives under
comparison. While the weakly maximin class has leximin as one of its members,
it also includes social welfare orderings very different from leximin.
The Arrow-Pratt concept has the drawback of being based on a rather prim-
itive inequality criterion: since it compares social welfare orderings only with
respect to the choices they imply over pairs of income distributions of which one
is perfectly equal and one is not, the Arrow-Pratt concept implicitly supposes
that all there is to say about inequality comparisons is that unequal income dis-
tributions are more unequal than perfectly equal ones. Because there are broadly
accepted inequality criteria in the literature on income distribution that do allow
to make comparisons between unequal income distributions, the Arrow-Pratt ap-
proach seems unduly narrow. In Chapter 4, we consider, therefore, two alterna-
tive concepts of inequality aversion. The first alternative concept is based on the
Lorenz inequality criterion and says the following: if a given social welfare or-
dering prefers a Lorenz dominating income distribution to a Lorenz dominated
income distribution in all cases in which another social welfare ordering does,
then the given social welfare ordering is (weakly) more inequality averse than the
other one. The second alternative concept is defined similarly but using, instead of
the Lorenz criterion, the so-called relative differentials inequality criterion, which
is intermediate in strength between the Lorenz criterion and the primitive inequal-
ity criterion underlying the Arrow-Pratt concept. It is shown that although the
relative differentials based concept of inequality aversion is not equivalent to the
Arrow-Pratt concept in general, it is equivalent to it for separable social welfare
orderings and thus supports important results in the literature that were established
using the Arrow-Pratt concept. The Lorenz concept of inequality aversion is more
profoundly inconsistent with the Arrow-Pratt concept: the two concepts are not
equivalent for the class of separable social welfare orderings and not even for its
popular constant elasticity of substitution subclass. With respect to the problem
of reconciling monotonicity and extreme inequality aversion, the relative differ-
entials concept is once again consistent with the Arrow-Pratt concept, i.e., it iden-
tifies as extremely inequality averse the class of weakly maximin social welfare
orderings (and thus also confirms the result of Chapter 3). The Lorenz concept,
on the other hand, concludes that the ideals of extreme inequality aversion and
monotonicity are incompatible.
Not all approaches to implementing the idea of extreme inequality aversion
have taken as a starting point a concept of inequality aversion. An alternative
approach that has been explored is to impose the so-called Hammond equity ax-
iom. Hammond equity requires that reducing the inequality between any two
individuals—by increasing the income of the poorer one by some amount and de-
creasing that of the richer one by some (possibly different) amount—leads to an
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improvement in social welfare. Hammond (1976) has characterized leximin using
Hammond equity and the basic axioms anonymity and strong Pareto (if one indi-
vidual gets more without anyone getting less, then social welfare increases). In
Chapter 5, we provide an analogous characterization of the maximin social wel-
fare ordering using Hammond equity, anonymity, continuity and weak Pareto (if
all individuals get more, then social welfare increases). A shortcoming of Ham-
mond equity is also pointed out: the transformations it recommends do not always
decrease inequality according to the Lorenz criterion, and sometimes even only
decrease inequality according to rather exotic inequality criteria (and increase it
according to others). We introduce a modified Hammond equity axiom that does
not have this shortcoming, and show that an alternative characterization of max-
imin is obtained by simply replacing Hammond equity by this modified version
in the characterization mentioned above: that is, maximin is also characterized
by modified Hammond equity, anonymity, continuity and weak Pareto. Using the
modified Hammond equity axiom, we present, moreover, another characterization
of the weakly maximin class.
3
In contrast to Parts I and II of this dissertation, Part III is concerned with distri-
bution problems in which the individuals involved differ with respect to ethically
relevant characteristics. We assume that the amount that each individuals should
ideally receive is known, and refer to it as the ‘claim’ of the individual. The eth-
ically relevant differences between individuals are, thus, captured completely by
differences in their claims: if the amount available for distributing between the in-
dividuals is equal to the sum of their claims, then the just division is that in which
each individual receives her claim. We focus on the problem of how to divide
an amount that falls short of the sum of the claims among the individuals. The
literature on the so-called claims problem deals with the axiomatic examination
of ‘rules,’ which are mappings that associate with each claims problem—given
by the claims vector and the amount available for distribution—a division among
the individuals involved.6 The most prominent and also most straightforward di-
vision rules are the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule, and the
constrained equal losses rule. Several more complex rules have been studied as
well in the literature. In Part III, we apply concepts from the theory of inequality
measurement to the literature on claims problems.
In Chapter 6, we examine how nine well known rules—the proportional rule,
the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule, the Talmud
rule, Piniles’ rule, the constrained egalitarian rule, the adjusted proportional rule,
6See Thomson (2003) for an overview.
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the random arrival rule, and the minimal overlap rule—compare in terms of in-
equality aversion. The relevance of inequality aversion comparisons of rules, bet-
ter referred to as progressivity comparisons in this framework, can be illustrated
using Aristotle’s well known adage: “Justice is equality among equals and in-
equality among unequals.” The degree to which individuals have to be seen as
‘unequals,’ and hence the degree to which they ideally ought to be treated un-
equally, depends on the actual economic context of the claims problem because
this determines the ethical status of the claims—e.g., differences between claims
may possibly be considered more relevant ethically if they reflect differences in
needs, than if they reflect differences in talents. Rules, being functions only of
the claims vector and the amount to be distributed, are, however, invariant with
respect to the economic context. In order to determine which rule ought to be
used in which economic context, it is therefore important to be able to compare
the different rules with respect to how progressive they are, i.e., how unequally
they treat ‘unequals.’ In the analysis of Chapter 6, it is shown that the constrained
equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule, the Talmud rule, Piniles’ rule
and the constrained egalitarian rule can be characterized as most or least progres-
sive among a class of rules of which the members satisfy particular basic axioms.
We also provide several results involving the remaining rules in order to uncover
the complete set of Lorenz dominance relationships that hold between the nine
rules.
Chapter 7 describes the results of a questionnaire in which the respondents are
confronted with nine specific claims problems, which are presented in two differ-
ent economic contexts. In the first version of the questionnaire, respondents have
to divide revenue among the owners of a firm who contribute to the activities of
the firm in different degrees, and, in the second version, they have to divide tax
money among pensioners who have paid different contributions during their active
career. The results reveal that, for both questionnaire versions, the proportional
rule performs very well in describing the choices of the respondents. By contrast,
other prominent division rules—in particular the constrained equal awards rule
and the constrained equal losses rule—fail to capture the basic intuitions of the
respondents. We also find that responses in the pensions version of the question-
naire are significantly more egalitarian than those in the firm version. Finally, the
results show that the way in which respondents’ choices vary with respect to basic
changes in the characteristics of the claims problem appear to be well described
in terms of inequality. More precisely, a substantial part of the respondents tend
to become more progressive as the amount to be distributed decreases other things
equal, and tend to become more progressive as the inequality in the distribution of
claims becomes more unequal other things equal. The fact that inequality consid-
erations seem to be useful in organizing respondents’ choices is encouraging for
the inequality perspective on the theoretical study of claims problems.
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Chapter 1
Social Welfare, the Veil of
Ignorance, and Purely Individual
Risk: An Empirical Examination
This chapter is based on Bosmans and Schokkaert (2004).
1.1 Introduction
The central problem of distributive justice is that of finding an ethical ranking of
income distributions. It is generally accepted that such an ethical ranking should
reflect in a certain sense the preferences of an impartial and sympathetic observer
(henceforth referred to as ‘ISO preferences’)—“. . . a person taking a positive sym-
pathetic interest in the welfare of each participant but having no partial bias in
favor of any participant” (Harsanyi, 1977, p. 49). ISO preferences have been
analysed in the literature in many different ways, but a particularly influential ap-
proach has been the exploration of the formal links between inequality and risk
(Cowell and Schokkaert, 2001). This link has been put forward in its most explicit
form in Harsanyi’s (1953, 1955) approach of the veil of ignorance.1
Harsanyi rephrases the problem of distributive justice as a problem of individ-
ual decision making under risk: income distributions should be ranked according
to the preferences of a rational individual behind the veil of ignorance (henceforth,
‘VOI preferences’). VOI preferences are the preferences over income distributions
of a rational individual who does not know her own position in each income distri-
bution (nor the position of the other members of society) and has (like these other
1See also Vickrey (1945, 1960) and Rawls (1971). The latter coined the term ‘veil of ig-
norance.’ Harsanyi used the approach to justify utilitarianism while Rawls used it to justify his
deontological theory which couples a respect for basic liberties with maximin in ‘primary goods.’
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members), for each income distribution, an equal probability of ending up with
the income of any member of society. Harsanyi argues that rationality requires
that VOI preferences be consistent with expected utility (EU) theory. Hence, the
social welfare function, which represents ethical preferences, inherits the proper-
ties of the EU model and is of the mean utilitarian type.2 This approach is often
seen as providing a justification for the most frequently used social welfare func-
tion in the income distribution literature, which is of the mean utilitarian form
with utility a function exclusively of own income and an identical utility function
for each individual.3 However, this approach raises two sets of questions.
First, it is not obvious that VOI preferences and ISO preferences indeed co-
incide. The idea of the veil of ignorance is only one among many approaches to
the problem of finding an ethical ranking of income distributions. Moreover, the
assumption that utility is a function exclusively of own income does not follow
directly from Harsanyi’s conditions. Indeed, VOI preferences are defined over
lotteries that have complete income distributions as outcomes, not over lotteries
with individual incomes as outcomes. We refer to the latter type of preferences as
purely individual risk preferences (henceforth, ‘PIR preferences’). The assump-
tion that utility is a function exclusively of own income can be justified if VOI
preferences are identical to PIR preferences. Differences between VOI prefer-
ences and PIR preferences can result from the fact that the individuals do not
care only about their own incomes, but also for instance about overall equality or
about their own relative income position. A comparison of ISO and VOI prefer-
ences with PIR preferences therefore could give some insight into the importance
of externalities. What is the relationship between ISO, VOI and PIR preferences?
Second, the risk literature has provided ample empirical evidence of system-
atic violations of EU theory (the Allais paradox being the most famous exam-
ple). A theoretical literature on non-expected utility (non-EU) models has devel-
oped mainly to accommodate these empirical violations.4 It seems interesting to
check whether these violations of EU theory for PIR preferences are also relevant
for the ethical ranking of income distributions, that is, for ISO and VOI pref-
erences. In fact, one of the most popular concepts from the non-EU literature,
i.e., rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU), has in its simplified form (Yaari,
1987) received considerable attention in the income distribution literature because
it provides a normative basis for an important subclass of the class of generalized
Gini inequality indices.5 Recent contributions have explored further links between
the RDEU model in its general form and the measurement of inequality (Gajdos,
2Harsanyi’s claim that mean utilitarianism follows from his assumptions has been criticized on
several accounts. See Mongin (2001) for a thorough overview of the literature.
3See Cowell (2000) and Lambert (2001) for recent overviews of this literature.
4For overviews, see Camerer (1995) and Starmer (2000).
5More precisely, the subclass that satisfies Dalton’s (1920) Population Principle.
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2001). How attractive are these non-EU approaches from an ethical point of view?
The present chapter examines both issues through a questionnaire approach
with Belgian students. In order to benefit from the accumulated knowledge in the
risk literature, the setup of our questionnaire will be analogous to the conventional
approach used in that literature. We put respondents into three different choice
contexts allowing revelation of ISO, VOI and PIR preferences, respectively. In
each of these cases we test whether we discover any violations of the standard
properties of the EU model. Such violations can also raise doubts about some of
the standard assumptions in the literature on income distribution. Moreover, we
will also check the empirical relevancy of the Yaari and RDEU models as well as
that of some more basic non-EU concepts.
The questionnaire approach has recently become more popular in the eco-
nomic literature on distributive justice. It has been used extensively for testing
the acceptance of the crucial axioms from the literature on income distribution.6
Recent work has explicitly compared the acceptability of these axioms for the
income inequality and the risk setting (Amiel et al., 2001; Amiel and Cowell,
2002). Camacho-Cuena et al. (2003) and Traub et al. (2005) have run experi-
ments in which subjects get material incentives to rank either income distributions
or risky prospects. The close relationship between social welfare judgements and
choice under risk and the theoretical suppositions of the EU approach are far from
evident for large groups of respondents. Closest related to our work is a question-
naire study by Bernasconi (2002). He also checks the relevance of EU axioms
for ISO, VOI and PIR preferences. The formulation of our questions is very dif-
ferent, however, and we go further in testing explicitly some non-EU alternatives.
Despite these differences, some of our results turn out to be similar to those of
Bernasconi.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 gives an overview of relevant
findings from EU theory and non-EU theory and links these to the evaluation of
income distributions. The actual questionnaire study is presented in Section 1.3.
In Section 1.4 we present the results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 (Non-)Expected Utility Theory and the Evalua-
tion of Income Distributions
We first consider expected utility (EU) theory (Subsection 1.2.1) and some basic
concepts from non-EU theory (Subsection 1.2.2). In Subsection 1.2.3 we summa-
rize the basic characteristics of the RDEU model and of Yaari’s theory. Finally, in
6The most influential work is by Amiel and Cowell, who summarize their most important
findings in Amiel and Cowell (1999). See also Harrison and Seidl (1994a, 1994b).
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Figure 1.1. EU Indifference Curves in the Marschak-Machina Triangle
Subsection 1.2.4, we return to the evaluation of income distributions.
We use the following notation. The set of incomes is X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn},
where the incomes are indexed such that x1 ≤ ·· · ≤ xn. An income distribution is
a vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) with pi ∈ [0,1] for all i and ∑ni=1 pi = 1, where pi is the
proportion of the population with income xi. The set of all income distributions is
denoted by ∆. In the case of individual decision under risk, income distributions
have to be interpreted as lotteries, where pi is the probability of outcome xi. Pref-
erences over alternatives, either income distributions or lotteries, are captured by
a binary relation (‘is at least as good as’). The relation has an asymmetric factor
 (‘is better than’), and a symmetric factor∼ (‘is equally good as’). Under certain
conditions, a function, F , can be used to represent preferences. The function F
has to be interpreted either as a social welfare function or as an individual utility
function, depending on the given choice situation.
A convenient representation device to compare the implications of EU the-
ory with the implications of various non-EU theories is the so-called Marschak-
Machina triangle7 (see Figure 1.1). Focusing on lotteries with only three possible
outcomes (or income distributions with only three income levels) x1 < x2 < x3,
each alternative can be written as a pair (p1, p3), with p2 determined implicitly
7This graphical device was introduced into the literature by Marschak (1950) and popular-
ized by Machina (1982). It has since been used in many empirical studies concerning individual
decision under risk.
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Table 1.1. The Choice Pairs, (p1, p2, p3)
Question a b
1 (0, 1, 0) (0.05, 0.75, 0.2)
2 (0, 1, 0) (0.2, 0, 0.8)
3 (0.75, 0.25, 0) (0.8, 0, 0.2)
4 (0, 0.25, 0.75) (0.05, 0, 0.95)
5 (0, 0.8, 0.2) (0.05, 0.55, 0.4)
6 (0.2, 0.8, 0) (0.25, 0.55, 0.2)
7 (0, 0.8, 0.2) (0.16, 0, 0.84)
8 (0.2, 0.8, 0) (0.36, 0, 0.64)
as p2 = 1− p1− p3. Since, furthermore, for i = 1,2,3, we have pi ∈ [0,1], all
these alternatives are points in the triangle {(p1, p3) ∈ R2+ | p1 + p3 ≤ 1}. In
the Marschak-Machina triangle of Figure 1.1 the different points represent thir-
teen possible alternatives. Our questionnaire study will focus on eight pairwise
choices: each choice problem, j = 1, . . . ,8, involves a choice among a pair of
alternative lotteries or income distributions (a j,b j). Note that the dashed lines
connecting each of these pairs of alternatives have the same slope equal to four.
The probabilities corresponding to the specific options represented in Figure 1.1
are shown in Table 1.1.
1.2.1 Expected Utility Theory
Let us first summarize in a loose way the basic idea of EU theory. Suppose that
all the alternatives can be ordered (implying that the preference relation is reflex-
ive, transitive and complete) and that this ordering is continuous and monotonic.
Suppose moreover that the following condition is satisfied:
Independence. For any alternatives p,q,r ∈ ∆ and any scalar α ∈ (0,1), we have
p q if and only if αp+(1−α)r αq+(1−α)r.8
Under these assumptions, preferences over alternatives can be represented by
F(p) =
n
∑
i=1
piu(xi) for all p ∈ ∆, (1.1)
where u is a strictly increasing function. This condition on u ensures monotonicity,
which means that (first order) stochastically dominating alternatives are preferred.
Strong risk aversion, implying that mean preserving spreads are disapproved, re-
quires that u be strictly concave.
8This condition is very similar to the separability axiom considered in Chapters 3 and 4.
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Expression (1.1) has very strong implications for alternatives in the triangle
diagram. In fact, the slope of the implied indifference curves is
d p3
d p1
∣∣∣∣
F= ¯F
=
u(x2)−u(x1)
u(x3)−u(x2) , (1.2)
which is constant (since the incomes x1,x2 and x3 are given for all points in the
triangle) and positive (since under monotonicity u(x3)> u(x2)> u(x1)).
Positivity of the slope of indifference curves is a general property of prefer-
ence theories that respect monotonicity. Note that monotonicity also implies that
indifference curves lying more to the northwest correspond to higher preference.
For any point p in the triangle, the set of points strictly to the northwest of p (that
is, all points q such that q1 ≤ p1 and q3 ≥ p3, with at least one of the inequalities
strict) constitutes the set of points strictly stochastically dominating p.
The most important implication of EU theory, however, is the fact that the
slope of these indifference curves is constant.9 Thus, in EU theory, indifference
curves are parallel straight lines. The connected lines in Figure 1.1 represent such
a set of EU indifference curves. One number, the value of the constant slope,
determines the preferences over the entire triangle diagram. The figure shows that
this feature severely restricts the number of response patterns allowed. In fact, EU
theory implies that respondents choose consistently either a or b or are indifferent
in each of the eight choice pairs, depending on the relative values of the slopes
of the indifference curves (i.e, the connected lines) and the dashed lines. With
the indifference curves drawn in the figure, this choice should be b. With a larger
value for the slope it could be indifference or a. Note that in EU theory the slope
can be seen as a kind of measure for the degree of risk aversion—in a choice
between a riskless lottery and a risky one, such as in pairs 1 and 2 in the figure,
the riskless one is chosen only for sufficiently high values of the slope.10
1.2.2 Some Basic Concepts from Non-Expected Utility Theory
The well known problems discovered by Allais (1953) offer an important chal-
lenge to the restrictive implications of EU theory. The first three choice pairs in
Figure 1.1 illustrate these problems. Allais’ ‘common consequence effect’ (also
known as the Allais paradox) suggests a tendency for choosing a in choice pair
1 and b in choice pair 3, thus violating EU theory. Allais’ ‘common ratio effect’
concerns a tendency for choosing a and b, respectively, in choice pairs such as 2
and 3, again violating EU theory. There is by now overwhelming experimental
9The slope is not required to be equal across different triangles, i.e., for different sets X .
10Indeed, Machina (1982) has shown that the slope given in expression (1.2) is related to the
Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion. See Chapters 3 and 4 for more on the Arrow-Pratt concept.
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Figure 1.2. Fanning-out
evidence for the empirical relevancy of both predictions (Camerer, 1995; Starmer,
2000).
One solution for ‘explaining’ the Allais problems is to drop the assumption of
parallel indifference curves. In fact, Machina (1982) introduced for that purpose
the notion of fanning-out. In its pure form, fanning-out represents a monotonic
increase in the slope of indifference curves as one moves northwest in the trian-
gle. This can be seen in Figure 1.2, which also reveals that fanning-out does not
require linearity of indifference curves. Concretely, fanning-out says that, given
any two points p and q in the triangle, such that q lies to the northwest of p (that
is, q stochastically dominates p), the slope in point q has to be at least as high as
that in p. For the choice pairs in the figures, fanning-out has the following impli-
cations: given any two choice pairs k and `, if a` stochastically dominates ak and
b` stochastically dominates bk, then the choice of alternative a from pair k implies
that alternative a has to be chosen from pair ` as well, and indifference in pair k
implies that either alternative a has to be chosen from pair ` or that one has to be
indifferent between the alternatives of `. Fanning-out therefore accounts for the
dominant behaviour in situations such as those suggested by Allais.
Empirical research, however, sometimes reveals the opposite pattern: that of
fanning-in (see, e.g., Battalio et al., 1990). In that case, the slope of the indiffer-
ence curves becomes smaller as one moves to stochastically dominating alterna-
tives. For the choice pairs in the figures, fanning-in has the following implica-
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tions: given any two choice pairs k and `, if a` stochastically dominates ak and
b` stochastically dominates bk, then the choice of alternative b in k implies that
alternative b has to be chosen in ` as well, and indifference in k implies that either
alternative b has to be chosen in ` or that one has to be indifferent between the
alternatives of `.
Both fanning-out and fanning-in deal with a change in slope as one moves
to different indifference curves (at least when preferences satisfy monotonicity).
The research on extensions of EU theory has also focused on the relevancy of the
linearity of the indifference curves implied by expressions (1.1) and (1.2). Three
different assumptions have been proposed:
Betweenness. For any alternatives p,q ∈ ∆ and any scalar α ∈ (0,1), we have
p q if and only if p αp+(1−α)q q.
Quasi-convexity. For any alternatives p,q ∈ ∆ and any scalar α ∈ (0,1), we have
F(αp+(1−α)q)≤max{F(p),F(q)}.
Quasi-concavity. For any alternatives p,q ∈ ∆ and any scalar α ∈ (0,1), we have
F(αp+(1−α)q)≥min{F(p),F(q)}.
Betweenness obviously is an implication of independence. It implies that, if
p∼ q, then for any scalar α ∈ (0,1) we have p∼αp+(1−α)q∼ q, which means
that indifference curves are straight lines—but not necessarily parallel. Between-
ness implies neutrality to mixtures of alternatives on the same indifference curve.
Straightforward extensions are concave indifference curves (corresponding to the
assumption of quasi-convexity), describing mixture aversion, and convex indif-
ference curves (corresponding to the assumption of quasi-concavity), describing
mixture proneness. The latter case is illustrated in Figure 1.3. Betweenness, quasi-
convexity and quasi-concavity have implications for the combinations of choice
pairs (1, 2), (5, 7), and (6, 8) in the figures. In each of those combinations, the
only response patterns consistent with betweenness are aa, bb and ∼∼. Quasi-
convexity allows, in addition to the betweenness patterns, ab, a∼ and ∼b. Quasi-
concavity, on the other hand, allows, in addition to the betweenness patterns, ba,
b∼ and ∼a.
1.2.3 Rank-dependent Expected Utility and Yaari’s Dual The-
ory
The most popular alternative to the EU model is Quiggin’s (1982) rank-dependent
expected utility (RDEU) model (see, e.g., Starmer, 2000). Most popular within
the income distribution literature is Yaari’s (1987) dual theory, which is a special
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Figure 1.3. Quasi-concavity
case of the RDEU model. We will first summarize Yaari’s model and then return
to the more general RDEU approach.
Preferences consistent with Yaari’s theory can be represented using
F(p) =
n
∑
i=1
w(pi, p1 + · · ·+ pi)xi for all p ∈ ∆, (1.3)
where, for any i 6= n,
w(pi, p1 + · · ·+ pi) = f (pi + · · ·+ pn)− f (pi+1 + · · ·+ pn),
w(pn, p1 + · · ·+ pn) = f (pn) and f : [0,1] → [0,1] is a strictly increasing and
continuous function for which f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1. Given the conditions on f ,
preferences are monotonic. Strong risk aversion requires that f be strictly convex
(Yaari, 1987). Note that while in the EU approach a change in an income is
evaluated in function of the size of the income, in the Yaari approach it is evaluated
as a function of its rank position (defined as p1 + · · ·+ pi for an income xi).
For the alternatives in the triangle diagram, Yaari’s theory implies that
F(p) = [1− f (1− p1)]x1 +[ f (1− p1)− f (p3)]x2 + f (p3)x3, (1.4)
which yields for the slope of the indifference curves
d p3
d p1
∣∣∣∣
F= ¯F
=
f ′(1− p1)
f ′(p3)
x2− x1
x3− x2 . (1.5)
20 Part I: Social Welfare and Inequality
a4
b4
b7
a5 = a7
a1 = a2
a6 = a8
b2
b8
b3
a3
b6b1
b5
p3
p1
1
10
Figure 1.4. RDEU (Yaari) Indifference Curves
Again, indifference curves are positively sloped (since f ′(p) > 0 for all p). If f
is strictly convex, the slope decreases as p1 increases, ceteris paribus, and also
as p3 increases, ceteris paribus. If p1 decreases and p3 increases, the slope does
not necessarily go up or down. This means that indifference curves strictly fan
out horizontally—that is, the slope becomes strictly higher moving horizontally
west in the triangle diagram—and strictly fan in vertically—that is, the slope be-
comes strictly smaller moving vertically north in the triangle diagram. Moving
diagonally northwest, however, the slope can go up or down. This pattern is illus-
trated in Figure 1.4. By consequence, for the choices in the figures, fanning-out
is satisfied for combinations of the choice pairs 1, 3 and 6 (a horizontal move in
the triangle), while fanning-in is satisfied for combinations of the choice pairs 1,
4 and 5 (a vertical move). There are no implications concerning fanning-out or
fanning-in for combinations of choices 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8.
Another important property is that, whenever f is strictly convex, the slope of
an indifference curve decreases as one moves to the northeast. Therefore, under
the assumption of strong risk aversion, preferences are strictly quasi-convex.11
The Yaari model is a special case of the RDEU model, which is given by
F(p) =
n
∑
i=1
w(pi, p1 + · · ·+ pi)u(xi) for all p ∈ ∆, (1.6)
11For a formal statement and proof, see Lemma 2.2 in Chapter 2.
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where, for any i 6= n,
w(pi, p1 + · · ·+ pi) = f (pi + · · ·+ pn)− f (pi+1 + · · ·+ pn),
w(pn, p1 + · · ·+ pn) = f (pn), f : [0,1]→ [0,1] is a strictly increasing and con-
tinuous function for which f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1 and u is a strictly increasing
function. Again the conditions required for monotonicity are satisfied. Strong
risk aversion requires that the function f be convex and that the function u be con-
cave and, furthermore, that either f be strictly convex or u be strictly concave or
both (Chew et al., 1987). When u is the identity function, the RDEU model (1.6)
reduces to the Yaari model. When f is the identity function, it reduces to the EU
model.
The slope of an indifference curve in the diagram for the RDEU model is
d p3
d p1
∣∣∣∣
F= ¯F
=
f ′(1− p1)
f ′(p3)
u(x2)−u(x1)
u(x3)−u(x2) . (1.7)
Clearly, the indifference curves of the RDEU social welfare function have (more
or less) the same properties as those of the Yaari model. That is, indifference
curves are concave, fan out horizontally and fan in vertically.
1.2.4 Evaluating Income Distributions
There is a close formal relationship between the literature on income distribution
and the theory of decision making under risk. With the Gini index as a prominent
exception, the most common inequality measures (including the Atkinson-Kolm
and the generalized entropy measures) can all be interpreted in a social welfare
framework formally equivalent to the EU model as given in expression (1.1).12
This means that they can be interpreted as reflecting VOI-preferences, i.e., the
preferences of a rational individual behind the veil of ignorance.13 Of course one
can also defend EU-type assumptions without explicitly referring to the idea of
the veil of ignorance. One then has to justify the independence condition for ISO
preferences directly on ethical grounds rather than as a requirement of rationality
behind the veil of ignorance.
A strong competitor of the Atkinson-Kolm and the generalized entropy mea-
sures is the class of generalized Gini indices. These are based on a social welfare
function of the form of the Yaari model (1.3) (or, at least, an important subclass
is) and therefore do not satisfy the independence axiom. The most popular social
welfare function of the form (1.3) is the S-Gini social welfare function, where
12Accordingly, all these inequality measures satisfy the decomposability axiom, which is
closely related to the independence axiom. See Chapter 2.
13Dahlby (1987) explicitly works out this interpretation.
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f (p) = pρ with ρ > 1 (Donaldson and Weymark, 1980; Yitzhaki, 1983). The pa-
rameter ρ can be seen as a measure of inequality aversion. Note that the popular
Gini index is based on the S-Gini social welfare function with ρ = 2. A few stud-
ies such as Ebert (1988) and more recently Chateauneuf (1996) and Chateauneuf
et al. (2002), have considered the evident extension to the Yaari model which is to
base the evaluation of income distributions on the RDEU model.14
The idea of strong risk aversion is interpreted within the income distribution
literature as the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, i.e., the notion that a rank pre-
serving transfer from a richer to a poorer person increases social welfare. As we
have seen, the transfer principle requires in the EU model that the function u be
strictly concave. As can be seen from expression (1.2) the restriction to linear par-
allel indifference curves does not depend on the concavity of u and a test of this
restriction can be seen as a direct test of the independence assumption without any
need to make assumptions about risk aversion.
On the other hand, imposing the transfer principle has stronger consequences
for the Yaari and the RDEU models within the triangle. As we have seen, it re-
quires, for instance, in both cases that the indifference curves be strictly concave.
Since the transfer principle occupies such a dominant position in the income dis-
tribution literature, we will use in the empirical part the terms Yaari model and
RDEU model for expressions (1.3) and (1.6), respectively, with the assumption of
concave indifference curves imposed.
However, we know from previous empirical work that the transfer principle is
violated consistently by respondents.15 Let us therefore define the weaker prin-
ciple of ‘weak inequality aversion:’ given a fixed population, a completely equal
income distribution is better than any unequal income distribution with the same
total income. This principle seems absolutely essential for an egalitarian social
welfare function. It gives additional support for the transfer principle with an EU
social welfare function, i.e., a social welfare function satisfying independence,
because such a welfare function will only satisfy weak inequality aversion if it
satisfies the transfer principle. However, in the Yaari (and RDEU) framework,
weak inequality aversion does not imply the transfer principle. It has been shown
(Chateauneuf, 1996 and Chateauneuf and Moyes, 2004) that the Yaari social wel-
fare function (1.3) satisfies weak inequality aversion if and only if f (p)< p for all
p ∈ (0,1). This condition is strictly weaker than strict convexity (since f (0) = 0
and f (1) = 1). The RDEU social welfare function satisfies weak inequality aver-
sion if f (p)≤ p for all p ∈ (0,1) and u is concave, with at least one of the condi-
14All the inequality measures that are mentioned in this subsection are defined formally in
Chapter 2.
15This is found especially in the context of inequality comparisons (see for instance Amiel and
Cowell, 1992, 1998, Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo, 1993, and Harrison and Seidl, 1994a, 1994b), but
also in the context of social welfare comparisons (Amiel and Cowell, 1994a).
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tions holding strictly.16 In our empirical work we will consider these extensions
as well and label them Yaari′ and RDEU′.
In the risk literature, forms of the RDEU weighting function f that do not sat-
isfy the condition relating to weak inequality aversion have been considered and
sometimes offer a better explanation of observed choice patterns (see, e.g., Gon-
zalez and Wu, 1999). We do not consider these forms in our empirical analysis
because in our view it does not make sense to base the evaluation of income dis-
tributions on a welfare function which does not even satisfy the principle of weak
inequality aversion.
1.3 The Setup of the Questionnaire
The target group of the questionnaire consisted of first year business students of
the K.U.Leuven (Catholic University Leuven, Belgium). The students had not
yet been exposed to any lectures on the evaluation of income distributions or on
decision making under risk, which ensured that the respondents were not preju-
diced. The questionnaires were distributed and filled in in the classroom, after the
teacher had given a short and non-suggestive oral introduction. The survey was
organized twice (with different respondents in two subsequent academic years):
in April 2002 and in November 2002. The results were stable over time. In or-
der to test for the differences between ISO, VOI and PIR preferences, there were
three different versions of the questionnaire. Accordingly, the group of students
was divided into three subgroups. Each subgroup participated in only one version
of the questionnaire and respondents did not know that there were three different
versions. For the ISO version, the VOI version and the PIR version, there are 93,
92 and 94 respondents, respectively.
Each questionnaire version consists of the same eight questions, where in
each question, the respondent is asked to make a choice between two alterna-
tives, which are either income distributions or lotteries, depending on the given
choice situation. The eight choice pairs correspond to the alternatives shown in
Figure 1.1 (with the probabilities as given in Table 1.1). Throughout the question-
naire, the same set of three incomes X = {x1 = e500,x2 = e1500,x3 = e2500}
16In fact, Chateauneuf (1996) has shown that these conditions for the Yaari and RDEU models
imply consistency with the ‘absolute differentials ordering,’ which is a stronger requirement than
the one of weak inequality aversion (see also Chateauneuf and Moyes, 2004). This stronger prin-
ciple can be formulated as follows. Suppose that we have two income distributions with the same
population and total income, and in the first income distribution the absolute income difference
for each income pair is greater than, or equally great as, in the second distribution while for at
least one pair the absolute income difference is greater, then the first income distribution is more
unequal than the second. It seems natural to extend the principle to the social welfare context by
stating that the second income distribution should be evaluated as better than the first.
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is used. In line with the Allais problems described earlier, we refer to questions 1,
3, 4, 5 and 6 as the ‘common consequence questions,’ and to questions 2, 3, 4, 7
and 8 as the ‘common ratio questions.’
Although the same choice pairs are used, the background stories are different
for the three versions of the questionnaire.17 Each of the three versions deals with
recently graduated students that are going to be employed in one of two firms.
Each firm offers three types of jobs which are identical in every respect except
for the income that is earned: the first job pays e2500, the second e1500 and
the third e500. For the ISO and VOI versions, a firm corresponds to an income
distribution, for the PIR version it corresponds to a lottery.
In the ISO version, the respondent is asked to consider the situation of 100
recently graduated students that will all be employed in either of two firms, which
are different only with respect to the number of positions that are available for
each of the jobs. The respondent is then asked to reveal, for the eight cases, which
of the two firms he or she thinks offers the largest social welfare.
The VOI version also asks the respondent to consider the situation of 100
recently graduated students, but this time the respondent has to picture himself or
herself as being one of them. Again, the firms are different only with respect to
the number of positions that are available for each of the jobs. The respondent and
the 99 other graduated students will all be employed in the same firm and each has
an equal chance of ending up in any of the 100 positions available in the firm. The
respondent is then asked to state, for the eight cases, which firm he or she prefers.
In the PIR version, the respondent is asked to picture himself or herself as
being a recently graduated student who will be employed in either of two firms.
The firms are identical except with respect to the probabilities of ending up with
each of the jobs. The respondent is then, again, asked to state, for each of the eight
cases, which firm he or she prefers.
As mentioned already in the introduction, the setup of our questionnaire is
similar to the one used by Bernasconi (2002). There are three main differences,
however. First, we use different and more income distributions (and therefore test
some axioms which could not be tested by him). Second, he represents the dif-
ferent income distributions in the questionnaires with pie charts, while we simply
give the relevant sets of numbers. Third, he formulates the ISO, VOI and PIR
cases in a more abstract form, while we tried to formulate a question which was
closer to the everyday experience of our respondents. The comparison of his re-
sults with ours will therefore give some insight into the importance of framing
effects (for which, again, see Camerer, 1995).
17The precise formulation of the background stories in each of the versions is given in Appendix
1.A. For each background story there were two variants of the questionnaire with the questions
ordered differently. Since the results show that there is only a slight indication of order effects, we
simply pooled the answers for these different variants.
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Figure 1.5. Overview of the Results, b Responses (in %)
1.4 Results
Our discussion of the results focuses on the two general issues raised before: the
comparison of the ISO, VOI and PIR versions of the questionnaire, and the degree
of consistency with the preference theories presented in Section 1.2. In Subsec-
tion 1.4.1 we have a first look at the question of how the three versions of the
questionnaire compare through an analysis of the responses for separate ques-
tions. Combining the answers on different questions makes it possible to test also
the relevancy of the different basic axioms of choice theory (Subsection 1.4.2). In
Subsection 1.4.3 we conclude the discussion by focusing on the different theories
which have been proposed in the income distribution literature.
1.4.1 A First Look
Figure 1.5 and Table 1.2 give the results for the separate questions. The chi-square
test statistics reported in Table 1.3 test for each question separately the null hy-
pothesis that population proportions for categories a and b, respectively, are equal
for the two versions under comparison (ISO-VOI, VOI-PIR or ISO-PIR) (there
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Table 1.2. Results for Separate Questions (in %)
ISO VOI PIR
Question a b ∼ a b ∼ a b ∼
1 37 59 4 26 72 2 27 69 4
2 50 45 5 45 51 4 58 43 0
3 30 66 4 20 77 3 17 78 5
4 61 37 2 38 57 5 28 69 3
5 44 55 1 29 67 3 35 62 3
6 19 76 4 16 82 2 35 63 2
7 56 42 2 41 53 5 51 43 6
8 30 61 9 36 60 4 48 45 8
Table 1.3. Chi-square Tests for Homogeneity for Separate Questions
Question ISO-VOI VOI-PIR ISO-PIR
1 2.72 (0.099) 0.03 (0.867) 2.20 (0.138)
2 0.57 (0.451) 2.15 (0.143) 0.49 (0.483)
3 2.93 (0.087) 0.15 (0.703) 4.35 (0.037)
4 8.94 (0.003) 2.68 (0.101) 21.29 (0.000)
5 3.91 (0.048) 0.71 (0.399) 1.31 (0.253)
6 0.38 (0.539) 8.64 (0.003) 5.47 (0.019)
7 3.23 (0.073) 2.07 (0.151) 0.12 (0.726)
8 0.39 (0.530) 3.58 (0.058) 6.21 (0.013)
Note: p-values in brackets.
is one degree of freedom).18 To some extent Table 1.3 suggests that the results
for the ISO and PIR versions are furthest removed from each other while the re-
sults for the VOI version lie in between. This is exactly what one would expect
a priori: ISO preferences deal exclusively with uninvolved common interest, PIR
preferences deal exclusively with involved self interest and VOI preferences deal
with involved common interest (that is, the common interest is at stake). We will
see that this pattern is confirmed in more detailed analyses.
Table 1.2 shows that, overall, alternative b is more popular than the other two
alternatives. In the risk literature b alternatives are usually seen as more risky
than the corresponding a alternatives. Analogously, we could say that they are
more unequal in the income distribution context. The popularity of the b answers
can be explained by the choice of the set of incomes in our questionnaire design.
Consider as a benchmark the case of a respondent who has preferences consistent
with the Atkinson social welfare function: for the given income amounts, such a
respondent only prefers a over b if she has a relatively high value of approximately
1.75 or more for the parameter of inequality aversion.
18We ignore the category of indifference (∼) in the tests because it usually has frequencies lower
than five, which would make the chi-square test less appropriate.
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Table 1.4. Results for Pairs of Common Consequence Questions (in %)
Questions Version EU Fanning-out Fanning-in
(aa, bb, ∼∼) (ba, b∼, ∼a) (ab, a∼, ∼b)
3, 1 ISO 61 23 (0.203) 16
VOI 63 22 (0.196) 15
PIR 63 23 (0.088) 14
1, 4 ISO 53 35 (0.001) 12
VOI 60 26 (0.049) 14
PIR 55 22 (0.562) 22
3, 6 ISO 61 14 25 (0.066)
VOI 73 12 15 (0.345)
PIR 62 27 (0.014) 12
6, 1 ISO 55 31 (0.010) 14
VOI 67 22 (0.049) 11
PIR 63 14 23 (0.088)
1, 5 ISO 67 19 (0.237) 14
VOI 72 16 (0.279) 12
PIR 66 21 (0.108) 13
5, 4 ISO 62 28 (0.003) 10
VOI 54 27 (0.140) 18
PIR 63 15 22 (0.155)
Note: p-values in brackets.
1.4.2 Testing Some Concrete Hypotheses of Choice Theory
More interesting insights can be gained by analysing the response patterns for
different choice pairs together. We will first look at combinations of two questions
and then analyse the overall response patterns for the eight questions. We focus,
again, on the two main issues. In the first place, we test the empirical relevancy
of the concrete hypotheses of choice theory. In the second place, we check for the
possible differences between ISO, VOI and PIR preferences.
Pairs of Questions
(a) Tables 1.4 and 1.5 show the results for combinations of several pairs of com-
mon consequence questions and common ratio questions, respectively. For each
combination of two choice pairs (described in the first column) we give separately
the results for the three versions of the questionnaire. As shown in Subsection
1.2.1, only three of the nine possible response patterns are consistent with EU the-
ory for each of the combinations of two questions included in Tables 1.4 and 1.5:
the respondent can prefer a in both choice pairs, she can prefer b in both pairs or
she can be indifferent (∼) in both choice situations. We call these patterns, (aa,
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Table 1.5. Results for Pairs of Common Ratio Questions (in %)
Questions Version EU Fanning-out Fanning-in
(aa, bb, ∼∼) (ba, b∼, ∼a) (ab, a∼, ∼b)
3, 2 ISO 55 33 (0.001) 12
VOI 57 36 (0.000) 8
PIR 51 45 (0.000) 4
2, 4 ISO 56 27 (0.106) 17
VOI 62 15 23 (0.155)
PIR 57 6 36 (0.000)
3, 8 ISO 62 20 (0.368) 17
VOI 60 29 (0.004) 11
PIR 53 41 (0.000) 5
8, 2 ISO 61 29 (0.002) 10
VOI 52 29 (0.087) 18
PIR 64 21 (0.196) 15
2, 7 ISO 68 17 (0.428) 15
VOI 62 17 21 (0.368)
PIR 67 16 17 (0.500)
7, 4 ISO 60 23 (0.256) 17
VOI 62 17 21 (0.368)
PIR 56 9 35 (0.000)
Note: p-values in brackets.
bb, ∼∼), therefore ‘EU consistent’ and the percentage of respondents with one
of these three response patterns is given in the third column of Tables 1.4 and 1.5.
Analogously we can say that the response patterns (ba, b∼, ∼a) and (ab, a∼,
∼b) are consistent with indifference curves that fan out and fan in, respectively.
In both cases we exclude EU consistent patterns from the categories fanning-out
and fanning-in. The percentages of respondents with these patterns are given in
the last two columns of the tables.
Clearly, EU consistent responses dominate. One should be aware that this does
not necessarily imply that our respondents follow the axioms of EU theory, as it is
quite possible for an individual to be consistent with EU theory over two questions
but not over three or more. We will return to this issue in the next section. At this
stage it is more interesting to consider whether the violations of EU theory for each
of the question pairs are systematic, that is, whether the percentage of observed
patterns consistent with fanning-out (or fanning-in) is significantly higher than
the percentage that would be observed if the response patterns of the respondents
that violate EU theory were completely random. The null hypothesis is that the
population frequency of fanning-out (or fanning-in) violations relative to the total
population frequency of violations is equal to 50%. The tables report p-values for
the one sided exact test based on the binomial distribution.
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Table 1.6. Chi-square Tests for Homogeneity for Pairs of Questions
Questions ISO-VOI VOI-PIR ISO-PIR
3, 1 0.06 (0.969) 0.12 (0.942) 0.20 (0.907)
1, 4 1.93 (0.381) 2.15 (0.342) 5.88 (0.053)
3, 6 3.16 (0.206) 6.43 (0.040) 8.03 (0.018)
6, 1 3.11 (0.211) 6.04 (0.049) 8.99 (0.011)
1, 5 0.56 (0.756) 0.86 (0.650) 0.14 (0.932)
5, 4 3.07 (0.216) 4.25 (0.120) 8.40 (0.015)
3, 2 0.96 (0.620) 2.04 (0.361) 5.01 (0.082)
2, 4 4.00 (0.135) 6.33 (0.042) 18.16 (0.000)
3, 8 2.85 (0.241) 4.07 (0.131) 13.25 (0.001)
8, 2 3.23 (0.199) 2.65 (0.267) 2.20 (0.333)
2, 7 1.05 (0.591) 0.57 (0.753) 0.16 (0.923)
7, 4 0.94 (0.626) 6.56 (0.038) 11.80 (0.003)
Note: p-values in brackets.
The first combinations of choice pairs in Tables 1.4 and 1.5, the combinations
(3, 1) and (3, 2), are of particular interest, as they are similar to the original exam-
ples used by Allais for introducing the common consequence and common ratio
effects, respectively. In both cases the predicted fanning-out patterns are more
popular than the fanning-in patterns. The statistical significance of fanning-out is
much weaker for Allais’ common consequence effect (questions 3 and 1) than for
Allais’ common ratio effect (questions 3 and 2).
The overall picture shows some interesting differences between the ISO, VOI
and PIR versions of the questionnaire. A mixed pattern of fanning-out and fanning-
in is observed in the PIR version. This is in line with the experimental research
on decision making under risk. However, with only one exception, fanning-out
is always dominating in the ISO version. The VOI version is between the other
two, but with a relatively strong presence of fanning-out. Table 1.6 presents the
chi-square test statistics for the hypothesis of homogeneity of two versions with
respect to the categories EU, fanning-out and fanning-in between versions (there
are two degrees of freedom).19 The hypothesis formulated on the basis of Table
1.3 is corroborated by the results in Table 1.6: the results for the ISO and PIR
versions form the extremes while the results for the VOI version are situated in
between.
The question pairs in Table 1.4 also allow to test for some aspects of the Yaari
and RDEU models (with the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle imposed). As we
have seen (Subsection 1.2.3), these models imply that fanning-out is satisfied hor-
19Note the difference with Table 1.3, in which we tested for homogeneity of the three versions
with respect to the responses (a or b) for the eight separate questions. Table 1.6 tests for ho-
mogeneity of the three versions with respect to response patterns (EU consistent, fanning-out or
fanning-in) for combinations of two questions.
30 Part I: Social Welfare and Inequality
Table 1.7. Results for Pairs of Questions (in %)
Questions Version EU Quasi-convexity Quasi-concavity
(aa, bb, ∼∼) (ab, a∼, ∼b) (ba, b∼, ∼a)
6, 8 ISO 57 15 28 (0.040)
VOI 61 9 30 (0.001)
PIR 54 14 32 (0.007)
1, 2 ISO 70 8 23 (0.006)
VOI 61 9 30 (0.001)
PIR 55 7 37 (0.000)
5, 7 ISO 63 13 24 (0.061)
VOI 57 14 29 (0.019)
PIR 53 14 33 (0.005)
Note: p-values in brackets.
izontally, that is, for the question pairs (3, 1), (3, 6) and (6, 1), while fanning-in
is satisfied vertically, and thus for the question pairs (1, 4), (1, 5) and (5, 4) (of
course, the EU patterns for these pairs are also consistent with the models). This
pattern is not supported by the results for the ISO and VOI versions, especially
where the Yaari and RDEU models imply fanning-in.
(b) Table 1.7 presents the results for the question pairs (6,8), (1,2) and (5,7).
These combinations allow to test betweenness, i.e., the linearity of indifference
curves (which is EU consistent) against quasi-convexity (excluding EU consistent
patterns) and quasi-concavity (again, excluding EU consistent patterns). The cor-
responding response patterns have already been described in Section 1.2.2. The
results in Table 1.7 are striking. There is a clear and significant domination of
quasi-concavity, i.e., convex indifference curves. This mixture proneness is found
in all three versions of the questionnaire.20 Quasi-concavity has also been found
in experimental work on decision making under risk (see, e.g., Camerer and Ho,
1994). We will return to the implications of these findings in Subsection 1.4.3.
The Total Pattern of Answers
In Table 1.8 we summarize the results for a more ambitious approach in which the
eight questions are considered jointly. Each column refers to a specific hypothe-
sis of choice theory. We first give, for each hypothesis, as a reference point the
proportion of the 256 (= 28) possible patterns that is actually consistent with the
given hypothesis.21 If individual response patterns were completely random, we
20Chi-square tests show that the null hypothesis of homogeneity over the versions cannot be
rejected.
21For convenience, we have neglected patterns with indifferences. There are only very few cases
of indifference in the answers of our respondents.
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Table 1.8. Results for the Combination of All Eight Questions (in %)
EU Fanning- Fanning- Between- Quasi- Quasi-
out in ness convexity concavity
Reference 0.8 6.3 6.3 12.5 42.2 42.2
ISO 10 30 13 32 46 68
Test 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.246) (0.000)
Test 2 (0.000) (0.889) (0.002) (0.854) (0.001)
VOI 13 29 18 26 40 70
Test 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.686) (0.000)
Test 2 (0.000) (0.570) (0.393) (0.998) (0.003)
PIR 11 24 15 21 37 72
Test 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.012) (0.859) (0.000)
Test 2 (0.002) (0.762) (0.675) (0.999) (0.000)
Note: p-values in brackets.
would expect to find the ‘reference’ degree of support for the various hypotheses.
We then test whether the actual number of consistent response patterns in the data
is significantly larger than what would be expected for random responses.22 This
test is labeled ‘Test 1’ in Table 1.8.
For all three versions, all hypotheses except quasi-convexity pass Test 1. Note
that about 10% to 13% of the observed patterns are consistent with EU theory—
which is significantly more than the 0.8% which would be found with a completely
random response pattern. An explanation of the success of EU theory could be that
respondents use the expected value rule. At the same time it should be mentioned
that 10% to 13% is far from overwhelming considering the focal role of EU theory
in the risk and in the income distribution literature.
Since all the other hypotheses generalize EU theory, they all benefit from the
relatively good performance of that theory. It is more revealing therefore to test
whether they ‘add’ something to EU theory. We do this by removing from the sam-
ple all EU consistent patterns. For the remaining (non-EU consistent) responses
we follow an analogous procedure as described before. For each hypothesis (each
column) we first compute, with respect to the set of all possible patterns excluding
the EU consistent patterns, the proportion of consistent responses to be expected
if individual response patterns were completely random. We then test whether the
proportion of consistent responses in the (reduced) sample is significantly larger
than what would be expected in the random case. The resulting p-values are sum-
marized in Table 1.8 under the label ‘Test 2.’23
22More specifically, we test the null hypothesis that the population proportion in support of the
given hypothesis of choice theory is equal to the population proportion in support of the same
hypothesis if choices were completely random against the alternative hypothesis that it is greater.
23More specifically, ‘Test 2’ considers the null hypothesis that the population proportion in
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Table 1.9. Results for the Combination of All Eight Questions (in %)
EU S-Gini Yaari RDEU Yaari′ RDEU′
Reference 0.8 2.7 15.2 16.4 65.6 79.3
ISO 10 13 23 23 69 78
Test 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.075) (0.298) (0.633)
Test 2 (0.273) (0.708) (0.805) (0.895) (0.990)
VOI 13 16 25 25 78 88
Test 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.023) (0.006) (0.021)
Test 2 (0.268) (0.794) (0.869) (0.518) (0.829)
PIR 11 15 26 26 74 90
Test 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.016) (0.042) (0.003)
Test 2 (0.113) (0.496) (0.621) (0.627) (0.440)
Note: p-values in brackets.
For all three versions, fanning-out adds significantly to EU theory, while the
fanning-in hypothesis does not. Looking at the shape of the indifference curves,
betweenness adds explanatory power to EU theory for the ISO version, but not for
the other versions. An approach with linear but non-parallel indifference curves
in the Marschak-Machina triangle seems to have some relevance to describe the
preferences of an impartial and sympathetic observer. However, more striking
is the significance of quasi-concavity for all three versions. The global response
patterns therefore confirm what we found already by analysing the combinations
of choice pairs two by two.
1.4.3 The Fate of Different Theories of Income Distribution
Evaluation
The importance of quasi-concavity and fanning-out already suggests that the most
popular approaches in the income distribution literature will not get much support
in our data. Table 1.9, which is constructed in a similar way as Table 1.8, sum-
marizes the results in a more structured way. We repeat the results for the EU
model as a benchmark. Remember that the EU approach performs significantly
better than what would be predicted if the answers were random. As shown by the
results for ‘Test 1,’ the same is true for the S-Gini, the Yaari, the RDEU, the Yaari′
and the RDEU′ models (for the latter three only in the VOI and PIR versions).
support of a specific non-EU hypothesis, excluding the part of the population that is in support of
EU theory as well, is equal to what would be the population proportion in support of that non-EU
hypothesis, excluding the part of the population that is in support of EU theory as well, if choices
were random. The alternative hypothesis is that the former population proportion is greater than
the latter.
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However, in our setup all these alternative theories are less restrictive than
EU theory. In fact, each of them can also rationalize each pattern that is EU
consistent.24 We therefore want to test whether any of these theories adds some
explanatory power to the EU model. Analogously to the previous section, we
therefore computed again the ‘Test 2’ results. For none of the versions, Yaari’s
theory or the (more restricted) S-Gini model passes this stricter test. Nor does the
RDEU model. To repeat: this implies that the proportion of observed response
patterns in the subsample of non-EU consistent responses which is consistent with
these models is not significantly larger than what would be expected if the answers
of the respondents were completely random. It is important to remember that we
imposed the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle in the Yaari and the RDEU model,
i.e., convexity of the weighting function f , and that our results can only be seen
as a test of this restricted model. Yet relaxation of this convexity condition does
not seem to help very much, given the fate of the Yaari′ and the RDEU′ models,
which only impose the property of weak inequality aversion. It is difficult to see
how one could construct an attractive egalitarian theory of social welfare which
does not satisfy this very weak property. Both models (Yaari′ and RDEU′) are
quite flexible and it is therefore not surprising that the proportion of response
patterns compatible with them is very high. Again, however, the models do not
add significantly to EU, in the sense that randomly chosen patterns would have
performed equally well.
These results seem to suggest that it is worthwhile to work out alternatives for
the EU-type social welfare functions, i.e., to try and elaborate an alternative which
does not embody the independence assumption. At the same time, however, the
Yaari- and RDEU-type extensions with weak inequality aversion imposed do not
seem to be very promising, at least when one wants to rationalize the preferences
of our respondents (and they appear to be even less successful for the ISO than for
the VOI or PIR version). Comparing Tables 1.8 and 1.9 it is striking how much
better is the performance of other alternatives to the EU model like fanning-out
and quasi-concavity. It remains to be seen whether these ideas can be integrated
in an attractive theory of income distribution.
1.5 Conclusion
With our questionnaire study we wanted to test whether the veil of ignorance
approach captures in an adequate way the preferences of an impartial and sym-
pathetic observer. Moreover, we wanted to check whether the answers of our
24This is not a general property—but it is true for our set of specific questions within the
Marschak-Machina triangle.
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respondents satisfy the independence axiom—underlying EU theory and most ap-
proaches to inequality measurement—and its most popular alternatives. These
two questions are related but different. One can accept the VOI approach and at
the same time argue in favour of a non-EU model behind the veil of ignorance.
And one can defend the independence assumption for inequality measurement
without the detour of the veil of ignorance.
As to the first question, the results for the three questionnaire versions (ISO,
VOI and PIR) are to a certain degree similar: both of Allais’ problems are present,
there is quite a lot of systematic fanning-out or fanning-in, and quasi-concavity is
an important systematic violation of EU (or betweenness). However, there are
differences and it appears that the ISO and PIR versions are at both extremes. The
identification of ISO preferences with VOI preferences is not evident. Note that
the results for the PIR version are reassuringly comparable to the results encoun-
tered in empirical studies from the literature on decision under risk: e.g., Allais’
problems, a complex fanning pattern, and systematic violations of betweenness.
The EU model yields a significant contribution to the explanation of the re-
sponse patterns. At the same time, however, there are clear indications of the
relevancy of fanning-out and quasi-concavity, also in the ISO version. Fanning-
out and quasi-concavity do not characterize the most popular alternatives to the
EU model—the RDEU model with as a special case the Yaari model, which pro-
vides the normative basis for an important subclass of the family of generalized
Ginis. It is therefore not surprising that they do not add much explanatory power.
These are the results of only one limited study. However, they are in the line
of much previous research on the empirical acceptance of the most popular in-
equality axioms. Moreover, despite the differences in the concrete formulation
of the questionnaires and in the general setup of the empirical study, some of
our results are strikingly similar to those of Bernasconi (2002): he also finds that
the equivalence of VOI and ISO preferences cannot be taken for granted and that
quasi-concavity, i.e., mixture proneness, is important to explain the empirical re-
sults.
The conclusion that the traditional inequality literature does not adequately
capture the intuitions of our respondents seems clear. Even if we take the Yaari
and the EU model together, only a quarter of the students has a response pattern
which is in line with one of them. Of course, one can reasonably argue that the
normative relevancy of this kind of questionnaire results is limited, as they can
never substitute for critical reflection and thorough assessment of the ethical argu-
mentation. We do not go into that debate here. However, a conditional conclusion
seems possible. If one wants to construct a theory of income distribution which is
more attuned to the intuitions of lay respondents, the RDEU model with imposi-
tion of weak inequality aversion does not seem to be the most promising starting
point.
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Appendix 1.A: The Questionnaire Versions
ISO Version
Consider the situation of two firms, A and B, that each plan to employ 100 recently
graduated students. Assume that in each firm there are three types of jobs that are
identical in all respects but yield a different monthly net income. The first job
yields e2500, the second e1500 and the third e500. The firms differ however
with respect to the numbers of positions they have available for each of the three
jobs.
Evidently, due to the different distribution of incomes, the global welfare of
the 100 employees can be different in the firms A and B. We are interested in your
personal judgement of these welfare differences.
Indicate in each of the eight questions below which firm leads to the highest
welfare according to you by marking A or B. So, the marked letter corresponds
to the firm that you prefer from a welfare perspective. If you consider both firms
to be equally good, then mark both letters. Of course each question needs to be
treated separately and a different answer can be given in each case.
A: B:
Question 1 100 earn e1500 each 20 earn e2500 each
75 earn e1500 each
5 earn e500 each
Question 2 100 earn e1500 each 80 earn e2500 each
20 earn e500 each
Question 3 25 earn e1500 each 20 earn e2500 each
75 earn e500 each 80 earn e500 each
Question 4 75 earn e2500 each 95 earn e2500 each
25 earn e1500 each 5 earn e500 each
Question 5 20 earn e2500 each 40 earn e2500 each
80 earn e1500 each 55 earn e1500 each
5 earn e500 each
Question 6 80 earn e1500 each 20 earn e2500 each
20 earn e500 each 55 earn e1500 each
25 earn e500 each
Question 7 20 earn e2500 each 84 earn e2500 each
80 earn e1500 each 16 earn e500 each
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Question 8 80 earn e1500 each 64 earn e2500 each
20 earn e500 each 36 earn e500 each
VOI Version
Try to put yourself in the position of a recently graduated student who has to
choose, just as 99 other recently graduated students, between accepting a job in
firm A or in firm B. Assume that in each firm there are three types of jobs that
are identical in all respects but yield a different monthly net income. The first job
yields e2500, the second e1500 and the third e500. The firms differ however
with respect to the numbers of positions they have available for each of the three
jobs.
You and the 99 other recently graduated students either all end up in firm A or
all in firm B. Each of the 100 of you has an equal probability of ending up in each
of the 100 positions. So, it is unknown beforehand which job you will get.
Indicate in each of the eight questions below which firm you would prefer
by marking A or B. So, the marked letter corresponds to the firm that would be
preferred by you in this situation. If you consider both firms to be equally good,
then mark both letters. Of course each question needs to be treated separately and
a different answer can be given in each case.
Note: The formulation of the questions is identical to that of the ISO version.
The questions are therefore omitted.
PIR Version
Try to put yourself in the position of a recently graduated student who has to
choose between accepting a job in firm A or in firm B. Assume that in each firm
there are three types of jobs that are identical in all respects but yield a different
monthly net income. The first job yields e2500, the second e1500 and the third
e500. The firms differ however with respect to the numbers of positions they
have available for each of the three jobs. Beforehand it is not known with certainty
which of the three possible jobs you will eventually get. Your chances are different
in both firms.
Indicate in each of the eight questions below which firm you would prefer
by marking A or B. So, the marked letter corresponds to the firm that would be
preferred by you in this situation. If you consider both firms to be equally good,
then mark both letters. Of course each question needs to be treated separately and
a different answer can be given in each case.
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A: B:
Question 1 100% chance to earn e1500 20% chance to earn e2500
75% chance to earn e1500
5% chance to earn e500
Question 2 100% chance to earn e1500 80% chance to earn e2500
20% chance to earn e500
Question 3 25% chance to earn e1500 20% chance to earn e2500
75% chance to earn e500 80% chance to earn e500
Question 4 75% chance to earn e2500 95% chance to earn e2500
25% chance to earn e1500 5% chance to earn e500
Question 5 20% chance to earn e2500 40% chance to earn e2500
80% chance to earn e1500 55% chance to earn e1500
5% chance to earn e500
Question 6 80% chance to earn e1500 20% chance to earn e2500
20% chance to earn e500 55% chance to earn e1500
25% chance to earn e500
Question 7 20% chance to earn e2500 84% change to earn e2500
80% chance to earn e1500 16% chance to earn e500
Question 8 80% chance to earn e1500 64% chance to earn e2500
20% chance to earn e500 36% chance to earn e500
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Connection between Chapters 1 and 2: One of the more striking results of Chapter
1 was that the questionnaire responses reveal a positive attitude to mixtures. This
finding is inconsistent with the conventional social welfare functions, which either
imply a neutral attitude to mixtures (in the EU case), or aversion to mixtures (in
the Yaari and RDEU cases). In Chapter 2 it is shown, moreover, that all common
inequality measures tend to indicate a higher level of inequality for mixtures—for
the relation between the mixture properties of the EU, Yaari and RDEU social
welfare functions and the mixture properties of the inequality measures based
on them, see the discussion of Lemma 2.2 and Proposition 2.2 in Section 2.4.
Section 2.5 mentions a study by Amiel and Cowell (1994b) which shows that the
opposite view, i.e., that mixtures tend to be less unequal, is quite popular among
questionnaire respondents. This result is consistent with the findings concerning
mixture attitudes of Chapter 1: perhaps respondents prefer mixtures because they
consider them to be less unequal. It is advisable to remain cautious in drawing this
conclusion, though, since the alternative income distributions in the questionnaire
of Chapter 1 do not only differ in terms of inequality, but also in terms of mean
income.
Chapter 2
Income Inequality, Quasi-Concavity,
and Gradual Population Shifts
2.1 Introduction
In the analysis of income inequality, it is often useful to view the income distri-
bution of interest as being composed of several constituent income distributions,
e.g., the income distributions corresponding to different regions, sectors, or gen-
ders. The question of how inequality in the overall income distribution is affected
if the constituent income distributions change, has received considerable attention
in the form of decomposability analysis.1 By contrast, the complementary ques-
tion of how overall inequality changes if the population shares corresponding to
the constituent income distributions change, has not been studied much. Never-
theless, the latter question is interesting both from the empirical and the theoretical
perspective.
There are several empirical phenomena that involve a shift of the population
from one constituent income distribution to another. Take as an example the phe-
nomenon of demographic ageing. In this case, the overall income distribution
changes over time because population gradually shifts from the income distribu-
tion of working consumers to the income distribution of retired consumers. An-
other, particularly straightforward, example is that of a country with two regions
that have different population growth rates: here also, population shifts from the
income distribution corresponding to the region with the lower growth rate to
that corresponding to the region with the higher growth rate. As a final example,
consider the development process studied by Kuznets (1955), which involves a
gradual population shift from the income distribution of the agricultural sector to
that of the industrial sector.
1See, e.g., the overview of the literature on inequality measurement by Cowell (2000).
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Besides being of empirical interest, the gradual population shift process is rel-
evant theoretically. In order to see this, assume that the overall income distribution
is constituted of two perfectly equal income distributions: one in which everyone
has income 10 and another in which everyone has income 50. Now, suppose that
we start off with the entire population in the former income distribution, and that
over time population gradually shifts to the latter. The income distribution will
take, among others, the following three forms at various stages of this simple pro-
cess:
A =
{
90% has 10
10% has 50 , B =
{
50% has 10
50% has 50 , C =
{
10% has 10
90% has 50 .
Thinking about how inequality evolves as the income distribution changes from A
to B and from B to C obviously means thinking about how inequality judgements
are influenced by the relative population sizes of the ‘rich’ and ‘poor.’ For this rea-
son, this simple case of the gradual population shift process has been considered
of importance for the theoretical question of how inequality comparisons ought to
be made in the first place. It has been studied in this way by Fields (1987, 1993),
among others.
The key to tackling the question of how inequality evolves during a gradual
population shift lies in the behaviour of inequality measures with respect to mix-
ing income distributions. Let us first explain what we mean with mixing income
distributions. Assuming that income distributions are defined in terms of relative
frequencies, any income distribution can be defined as a mixture, i.e., a convex
combination, of its constituent income distributions. As an illustration, consider
a country with two regions: ‘region P’ and ‘region Q,’ representing population
shares of α and 1−α , respectively. Indeed, if px and qx are the proportions of
the population with income x in regions P and Q, respectively, then the proportion
of the population with income x in the country is equal to α px +(1−α)qx. Now,
during a gradual population shift process, the income distribution at any stage is
a mixture of the income distribution at any earlier stage and the income distribu-
tion at any later stage—as an illustration, note that income distribution B, in the
example of the simple case of the process above, is indeed a fifty-fifty mixture of
income distributions A and C. In order to describe the evolution of inequality dur-
ing a gradual population shift process, the important question is whether income
inequality in a mixture is greater than, smaller than, or equal to, income inequal-
ity in each of its constituent income distributions. Moreover, can a general answer
even be given to this question, or does the answer depend on the specifics of the
constituent income distributions and on the particular inequality measure that is
used?
In this chapter, we show that a general answer can indeed be given to the
question of how inequality measures behave with respect to mixing income distri-
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butions. It is demonstrated that virtually all inequality measures that are studied
in the literature on inequality measurement—viz., the class of decomposable in-
equality measures and the class of normative inequality measures based on the
general social welfare function of the rank-dependent expected utility form—
satisfy quasi-concavity properties, which entail a positive response to mixing in-
come distributions. To be concrete, assuming that inequality is equal in the two
constituent income distributions that are mixed, the following is shown to be true:
inequality in the mixture is at least as great as that in each of its constituent income
distributions, and if the mean incomes of the constituent income distributions are
not equal, then inequality in the mixture is strictly greater than that in each of
its constituent income distributions. We emphasize that while all well known in-
equality measures satisfy these quasi-concavity properties, the properties are not
implied by the fundamental Lorenz type axioms on their own. With respect to
the problem of how inequality evolves during a gradual population shift process,
the quasi-concavity properties are shown to reduce the possible patterns describ-
ing the evolution of inequality to only three: (i) an inverted-U pattern in which
inequality increases in the first stages of the process and decreases afterwards, (ii)
an increasing pattern in which inequality increases during the entire process, and
(iii) a decreasing pattern in which inequality decreases during the entire process.
This result generalizes some results of Kakwani (1988) and Anand and Kanbur
(1993) in this context.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 deals with notation and basic
concepts. In Section 2.3, we show axiomatically that the quasi-concavity proper-
ties are satisfied by all inequality quasi-orderings satisfying the transfer principle,
a weak invariance axiom and decomposability. Instead of focusing exclusively
on relative inequality concepts, as is common in the literature, we consider the
weak invariance axiom of Bossert and Pfingsten (1990) which allows for relative
and absolute inequality concepts as well as intermediate ones. While the result of
Section 2.3 applies to, among others, the inequality measures based on a social
welfare function of the expected utility form, it does not apply to its rank-based
alternatives, the generalized Gini indices, as these are not decomposable. There-
fore, we consider in Section 2.4 the class of inequality measures (absolute, rela-
tive as well as intermediate cases) based on a social welfare function of the rank-
dependent expected utility form, which generalizes both the class of expected util-
ity inequality measures and the class of generalized Gini indices. Benefiting from
functional representability of the given inequality orderings, it is shown that the
quasi-concavity properties are also satisfied by all members of this general class
of normative inequality measures. In Section 2.5 we spell out the implications
of the results of Sections 2.3 and 2.4 for the question of how inequality evolves
during a gradual population shift process. Section 2.6 concludes. All the proofs
are contained in Appendix 2.A.
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2.2 Preliminaries
2.2.1 Basic Notation and Axioms
An income distribution is an ordered pair (p,x) where p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) is a
vector (of finite length) of relative frequencies with pi > 0 for all i = 1,2, . . . ,n
and p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pn = 1, and where x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) is the corresponding
vector of income levels that are elements of R++. So, for all i = 1,2, . . . ,n, the
proportion of the population with income xi is equal to pi, which we sometimes
write as pxi . We assume that the components of x are ordered such that 0 < x1 <
x2 < · · ·< xn. The setP collects all income distributions. For any (p,x)∈P , the
set {x1,x2, . . . ,xn} is referred to as the support of the income distribution (p,x),
and the mean income p1x1 + p2x2 + · · ·+ pnxn is denoted by µ(p,x). Any income
distribution (p,x) ∈P is said to be perfectly equal if there exists an income level
e such that pe = 1 and is said to be unequal otherwise. Inequality comparisons of
income distributions are captured by a binary relation  (‘is at most as unequal
as’) onP . The relation’s asymmetric and symmetric factors are denoted by≺ (‘is
less unequal than’) and ∼ (‘is equally unequal as’), respectively. We assume that
the relation is a quasi-ordering, i.e., is reflexive and transitive. A quasi-ordering
that is complete is an ordering. An inequality measure is defined as a function
I :P → R that represents some inequality ordering.
Throughout this chapter, we are often required to view the overall income
distribution as a mixture, i.e., a convex combination, of its constituent income
distributions. Suppose (r,z) ∈P is the overall income distribution, constituted
of the income distributions (p,x) ∈P and (q,y) ∈P with population shares
α ∈ (0,1) and (1−α)∈ (0,1), respectively. Then the support of (r,z) is the union
of the supports of (p,x) and (q,y) and, for all elements zi in the support of (r,z),
we have
ri =

α pzi if zi occurs in x and not in y;
(1−α)qzi if zi occurs in y and not in x;
α pzi +(1−α)qzi if zi occurs in x and in y.
This mixture (r,z) of (p,x) and (q,y) is denoted by α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y).
We now consider three basic axioms. To define the well known transfer princi-
ple, we require the concept of the mean preserving spread. Consider any (p,x) ∈
P and let 0 < z1 < z2 ≤ z3 < z4 be any four income levels with z2 and z3 belong-
ing to the support of (p,x). The income distribution (q,y) is obtained from (p,x)
by a mean preserving spread if and only if there exists a scalar δ > 0 such that
qz1 = pz1 +δ > 0, qz2 = pz2 −δ ≥ 0, qz3 = pz3 −δ ≥ 0, qz4 = pz4 +δ > 0,
(if z1 (respectively, z4) does not belong to the support of (p,x), we set pz1 (respec-
tively, pz4) equal to 0), qxi = pxi for all other elements xi in the support of (p,x),
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and µ(p,x) = µ(q,y). Informally, whenever (q,y) is obtained from (p,x) by a
mean preserving spread, this means that (q,y) is obtained from (p,x) by a series
of poorer-to-richer transfers. The transfer principle demands that such transfers
increase inequality.
Axiom 2.1 (TP). For any (p,x) ∈P , if (q,y) is obtained from (p,x) by a mean
preserving spread, then we have (p,x)≺ (q,y).
The second axiom we consider is an invariance condition, i.e., it defines a
transformation, by which all incomes are changed in the same direction, that
leaves inequality invariant. For any transformation f : R++→ R and any (p,x) ∈
P , we denote the transformed vector of income levels ( f (x1), f (x2), . . . , f (xn))
by f (x). So, for instance, (p,τx) denotes the income distribution obtained from
(p,x) by multiplying each individual’s income by τ . The β -invariance axiom
is a general, linear, invariance condition first proposed by Bossert and Pfingsten
(1990).
Axiom 2.2 (β INV). For the scalar β ∈ [0,1], the following is true. For any (p,x)∈
P and any scalar λ such that (p,x + λ (βx+1−β )) ∈P , we have (p,x) ∼
(p,x+λ (βx+1−β )).
The axiom β INV encompasses both the popular relative (β = 1) case, which
says that multiplication of all incomes by the same scalar leaves inequality invari-
ant, and the absolute (β = 0) case, which says that addition to all incomes of the
same scalar leaves inequality invariant. Inequality relations satisfying β INV for
β ∈ (0,1) are referred to as intermediate inequality relations. In line with the liter-
ature, we consider TP and β INV to be the two fundamental axioms. Accordingly,
both axioms are satisfied by all concepts of inequality comparisons considered in
this chapter.
Decomposability, finally, is a popular axiom, but is usually interpreted as being
less compelling than TP and β INV.2 Roughly speaking, decomposability says that
any transformation of the overall income distribution that changes only one of its
constituent income distributions and leaves population shares and mean income
unaffected, should affect inequality in the overall income distribution in the same
direction as it affects inequality in the given constituent income distribution.
Axiom 2.3 (DEC). For any (p,x),(q,y),(r,z) ∈P with µ(p,x) = µ(q,y), we
have
(p,x) (q,y)⇔ α(p,x)+(1−α)(r,z) α(q,y)+(1−α)(r,z)
for any α ∈ (0,1).
2For a critique of decomposability, see Sen and Foster (1997, pp. 149-163). The axiom they
refer to as subgroup consistency is similar to our definition of the concept.
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2.2.2 Properties Concerning Mixtures
The main focus of this chapter are properties that describe how inequality re-
lations behave with respect to mixing income distributions, i.e., how a mixture
compares in terms of inequality to its constituent income distributions. We em-
phasize that we are interested in examining which of these properties are satisfied
by the inequality relations proposed in the literature and in what the implications
of the properties are. By consequence, we do not want to impose them as a pri-
ori desirable properties on inequality relations—accordingly, we refer to them as
‘properties’ and not as ‘axioms’ because the latter term would suggest otherwise.
Quasi-concavity and strict quasi-concavity describe a positive inequality at-
titude to mixing income distributions. Loosely speaking, the properties say that
mixing tends to increase inequality. To give an example, (strict) quasi-concavity
implies that a mixture of two equally unequal income distributions is at least as
unequal as (is more unequal than) the given two income distributions.
Property 2.1 (QC). For any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P , we have
(p,x) (q,y)⇒ (p,x) α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y) for any α ∈ (0,1). (2.1)
Property 2.2 (SQC). For any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P with (p,x) 6= (q,y), we have
(p,x) (q,y)⇒ (p,x)≺ α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y) for any α ∈ (0,1). (2.2)
More relevant than SQC, however, will turn out to be the following conditional
strict quasi-concavity property, which says that (2.2) has to be satisfied only if the
means of the two constituent income distributions are not equal.
Property 2.3 (CSQC). For any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P with µ(p,x) 6= µ(q,y), (2.2) is
true.
Note that SQC implies both QC and CSQC, while the latter two properties are
independent.
Quasi-convexity and strict quasi-convexity describe negative inequality atti-
tudes to mixing income distributions and, thus, are the natural counterparts of QC
and SQC. Loosely speaking, these properties say that mixing tends to decrease
inequality. For instance, (strict) quasi-convexity implies that a mixture of two
equally unequal income distributions is at most as unequal as (is less unequal
than) each of the given two income distributions.
Property 2.4 (QV). For any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P with neither (p,x) nor (q,y) per-
fectly equal, we have
(p,x) (q,y)⇒ α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y) (q,y) for any α ∈ (0,1). (2.3)
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Property 2.5 (SQV). For any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P with (p,x) 6= (q,y) and neither
(p,x) nor (q,y) perfectly equal, we have
(p,x) (q,y)⇒ α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y)≺ (q,y) for any α ∈ (0,1). (2.4)
The reason why the perfectly equal income distributions are excluded from
the set of income distributions over which (2.3) and (2.4) are required to hold,
is that the properties QV and SQV would otherwise be incompatible with the
commonsense requirement that any unequal income distribution is strictly more
unequal than any perfectly equal one.3
Using the minimal framework of inequality quasi-orderings, we demonstrate
in Section 2.3 that the three axioms TP, β INV and DEC are sufficient for the
properties QC and CSQC to be satisfied. In Section 2.4, similar results are shown
to be true for the members of an important class of inequality orderings consistent
with TP and β INV but not (necessarily) with DEC. We remark that although QC
and CSQC turn out to be satisfied very generally, this does not necessarily imply
that these are desirable properties for inequality relations—indeed, in Section 2.5
we discuss a critique of some of the implications of these properties that has been
put forward in the literature.
2.3 Inequality Quasi-Orderings
In this section, we examine the implications of the three basic axioms, TP, β INV
and DEC, for the behaviour of inequality quasi-orderings with respect to mixing
income distributions.
First, the two fundamental axioms TP and β INV are sufficient to rule out the
two quasi-convexity properties, but are not sufficient to imply any of the three
quasi-concavity properties. To see this, consider the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Let  be any inequality quasi-ordering satisfying TP and β INV.
For any (p,x) ∈P and any scalar λ such that (p,x+λ (βx+ 1−β )) ∈P and
(p,x) 6= (p,x+λ (βx+1−β )), we have
(p,x)≺ α(p,x)+(1−α)(p,x+λ (βx+1−β )) for any α ∈ (0,1).
Note that β INV requires, moreover, that (p,x) ∼ (p,x+ λ (βx+ 1− β )) in
Lemma 2.1. By letting (q,y) = (p,x+ λ (βx+ 1− β )) in conditions (2.3) and
(2.4), it thus follows from the lemma that TP and β INV imply violations of these
3This can be seen by letting (p,x) and (q,y) in (2.3) or (2.4) both be perfectly equal income
distributions (with (p,x) 6= (q,y)). Note, furthermore, that the ‘commonsense requirement’ is
implied by TP and β INV jointly.
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conditions and, hence, of QV and SQV. In a similar way, it is established that TP
and β INV imply (2.1) and (2.2) in cases where (q,y) = (p,x+λ (βx+ 1−β )).
Although the latter reveals that TP and β INV imply instances of QC, SQC and
CSQC, the two axioms are not sufficient for any of the three quasi-concavity prop-
erties to be satisfied in general. The following example provides an illustration of
this point.
Example 2.1. Consider the inequality measure I :P→R : (p,x) 7→ κI10GE(p,x)+
I−9GE(p,x) where κ > 0 is a scalar and where IθGE is the generalized entropy inequal-
ity measure, given by
IθGE :P → R : (p,x) 7→
1
θ 2−θ
n
∑
i=1
pi
[(
xi
µ(p,x)
)θ
−1
]
,
with θ a scalar. Since the generalized entropy inequality measure satisfies TP
and β INV (for β = 1), I obviously satisfies these axioms as well. By con-
trast, IθGE satisfies DEC, while I does not. Now consider the following three
income distributions: (p,x) = ((0.4,0.6),(10,50)), (q,y) = ((0.9,0.1),(10,50))
and (r,z) = ((0.65,0.35),(10,50)). Let, moreover, κ = I
−9
GE(p,x)−I−9GE(q,y)
I10GE(p,y)−I10GE(p,x)
≈ 0.719.
We have
23.370≈ I(r,z) = I(0.5(p,x)+0.5(q,y))< I(p,x) = I(q,y)≈ 270.061,
which implies that I violates QC, SQC and CSQC. Furthermore, it can be shown
that (2.4) is true for the chosen (p,x) and (q,y).
Second, on its own DEC implies a bias neither to quasi-concavity, nor to quasi-
convexity: DEC implies instances of the weak versions of both quasi-concavity
and quasi-convexity, and is (typically) incompatible with the strict versions of
both. In order to see this, consider any income distributions (p,x),(q,y) ∈P
with µ(p,x) = µ(q,y) and (p,x) (q,y). Then, DEC implies
(p,x) α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y) (q,y) for any α ∈ (0,1).4 (2.5)
In other words, DEC implies instances of QC or QV in those cases in which the
income distributions in the mixture have equal means. If (p,x)∼ (q,y) (still with
µ(p,x) = µ(q,y)), then DEC implies that the inequality relations in (2.5) hold
with equivalence (∼), thus giving rise to violations of both (2.2) and (2.4). Hence,
given the weak assumption—which would follow, e.g., from completeness and
continuity—that at least one pair of income distributions (p,x),(q,y) ∈P such
4This is obtained by letting (r,z) in the definition of DEC equal in turn (p,x) and (q,y).
Income Inequality, Quasi-Concavity, and Gradual Population Shifts 47
that µ(p,x) = µ(q,y) and (p,x) ∼ (q,y) exists, DEC is incompatible with both
SQC and SQV.5
To summarize, we have seen that TP and β INV are not sufficient for QC, SQC
or CSQC to be satisfied, and also that DEC typically rules out SQC. The following
result says that any inequality quasi-ordering satisfying TP, β INV and DEC must
satisfy QC as well as CSQC.
Proposition 2.1. Any inequality quasi-ordering satisfying TP, β INV and DEC
satisfies QC and CSQC.
Proposition 2.1 has implications that are relevant in the context of the study of
the evolution of inequality during a process in which population gradually shifts
from one constituent income distribution to another. We postpone the discussion
of these implications until Section 2.5, but consider here relevant results con-
cerning this context by Kakwani (1988) and Anand and Kanbur (1993) that are
generalized in Proposition 2.1. Anand and Kanbur present results that imply that
the inequality orderings represented by the following relative inequality measures
satisfy CSQC: the first and second Theil inequality measures, the coefficient of
variation, the entire class of Atkinson inequality measures, and the Gini index in
the case of non-overlapping income distributions.6 The same has been shown by
Kakwani for the entire class of generalized entropy inequality measures, thus gen-
eralizing the results pertaining to all measures considered by Anand and Kanbur
except the Gini index.7 Proposition 2.1 demonstrates that neither the demand that
inequality be a relative concept, nor even completeness or continuity are essen-
tial in obtaining the result. Examples of absolute inequality measures covered by
Proposition 2.1 are the variance and the entire class of Kolm inequality measures.
Notable inequality measures that Proposition 2.1 does not deal with—because
they do not satisfy DEC—are the Gini index in the general, possibly overlapping,
case, as well as its rank-based generalizations. In the next section, we show that
a similar result as Proposition 2.1 holds for a class of normative inequality mea-
sures that encompasses both the well known classes of decomposable normative
5In a sense, CSQC is as far as one can go in the direction of SQC while still satisfying DEC. To
see this, consider any income distributions (p,x),(q,y) ∈P with µ(p,x) = µ(q,y) and (p,x) 
(q,y), i.e., any income distributions for which SQC implies (2.2), while CSQC does not. Now, if
(p,x)∼ (q,y), then DEC is inconsistent with (2.2) which means that SQC goes too far, whereas if
(p,x)≺ (q,y), then DEC already implies (2.2) on its own.
6Moreover, the logarithmic variance, also considered by Anand and Kanbur, can be added to
the list. Anand and Kanbur borrow the result concerning this inequality measure from Robinson
(1976). We do not consider the logarithmic variance as it does not satisfy TP.
7Kakwani (1988, pp. 210-213) mistakenly believes to have proven the result only for the gen-
eralized entropy inequality measures for which θ ≥ 1 and θ = 0. However, he proves the result
also for the entire Atkinson class, which is ordinally equivalent to the generalized entropy class in
the case where θ < 1. Therefore, the ordinal nature of the property CSQC implies that the result
applies to the entire generalized entropy class.
48 Part I: Social Welfare and Inequality
inequality measures (the Atkinson and Kolm inequality measures) and the gener-
alized Gini indices.
2.4 Normative Inequality Orderings
Normative inequality measures are based on some conception of social ethics,
captured by a social welfare function W :P→R.8 Define the equally distributed
equivalent income for any income distribution (x, p) ∈P , denoted by ξ (p,x),
as the per capita income which, if distributed equally, yields the same level of
social welfare as (p,x). That is, ξ (p,x) for any income distribution (p,x) ∈P
is defined as ξ (p,x) = e, where e ∈ R++ is such that there is a (q,y) ∈P for
which qe = 1 and W (p,x) = W (q,y). It is common to define relative normative
inequality measures using
I :P → R : (p,x) 7→ 1− ξ (p,x)
µ(p,x)
, (2.6)
and absolute normative inequality measures using
I :P → R : (p,x) 7→ µ(p,x)−ξ (p,x). (2.7)
The literature on inequality measurement has focused mainly on two partic-
ular social welfare functions: the social welfare function of the expected utility
(EU) form on which among others the Atkinson and Kolm inequality measures
are based, and the social welfare function of the Yaari (1987) form on which the
generalized Gini indices are based. Both are special cases of the social welfare
function of the rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) form,
W :P → R : (p,x) 7→
n
∑
i=1
pii(p)u(xi), (2.8)
with, for all i = 1,2, . . . ,n−1, pii(p) = φ(pi + pi+1 + · · ·+ pn)−φ(pi+1 + pi+2 +
· · ·+ pn), and pin(p) = φ(pn). Furthermore, φ : [0,1] → [0,1] is a continuous
and strictly increasing function with φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1, and u : R→ R is a
continuous and strictly increasing function. In the case where φ coincides with
the identity function, we have pii(p) = pi for all i = 1,2, . . . ,n, and (2.8) reduces
to the EU social welfare function. In the case where u coincides with the identity
function, (2.8) reduces to the Yaari social welfare function.
Relative RDEU inequality measures, which we denote by I1,ε,φRDEU , are given by
(2.6) with W as in (2.8), with
u : R→ R : t 7→ 1
1− ε t
1−ε
, ε ≥ 0, (2.9)
8For an overview of the normative approach to inequality measurement, see Gajdos (2001).
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and with φ a convex function. In order for TP to be satisfied, we assume, more-
over, that either u is strictly concave (i.e., ε > 0), φ is strictly convex, or both.9
Following Bossert and Pfingsten (1990), we obtain the relative, intermediate and
part of the absolute RDEU inequality measures as Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(p,x) =
1
β I
1,ε,φ
RDEU(p,x+
1−β
β ) for all (p,x) ∈P . Hence, we have
Iβ ,ε,φRDEU :P → R : (p,x) 7→
1
β
1−
(
n
∑
i=1
pii(p)
(
xi +
1−β
β
)1−ε) 11−ε
µ(p,x)+ 1−ββ
 , (2.10)
where 0 < β ≤ 1 if ε > 0 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 if ε = 0, pi is defined as above, and
φ is strictly convex whenever ε = 0 and convex otherwise. The absolute RDEU
inequality measures not given by Iβ ,ε,φRDEU are those for which u does not coincide
with the identity function. These are obtained as (2.7) with W as in (2.8), and with
u : R→ R : t 7→ −exp(−γt), γ > 0, (2.11)
and are denoted by I0,γ,φRDEU . Hence, we have
I0,γ,φRDEU :P → R : (p,x) 7→ µ(p,x)+
1
γ
ln
( n
∑
i=1
pii(p)exp(−γxi)
)
, (2.12)
where γ > 0, pi is defined as above, and φ is convex.
Several well known inequality measures belong to the class of RDEU inequal-
ity measures. For φ coinciding with the identity function, we obtain the class of
EU inequality measures, with as special cases the Atkinson class (by letting, fur-
thermore, β = 1 in Iβ ,ε,φRDEU ) and the Kolm class (given by I0,γ,φRDEU ). For u coinciding
with the identity function (i.e., ε = 0), we obtain the Yaari, or generalized Gini,
indices.10 A well known subclass of the generalized Gini indices is that of the
S-Gini indices, for which φ : t 7→ tρ , with ρ > 1, which has as a notable special
case the Gini index (ρ = 2). RDEU inequality measures for which neither φ nor u
coincide with the identity function, and which, consequently, belong to neither the
EU class nor the Yaari class, have been studied by Ebert (1988) and Chateauneuf
et al. (2002), among others.
All RDEU inequality measures are consistent with TP and β INV. However,
while all RDEU inequality measures also incorporate a weak decomposability
9See Chew et al. (1987).
10The absolute subclass of the generalized Gini indices is obtained by, furthermore, taking the
limit β → 0 in Iβ ,ε,φRDEU .
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idea as shown by Ebert (1988), only the inequality orderings corresponding to
members of the EU subclass satisfy DEC. By consequence, the EU inequality
measures are the only members of the RDEU class that are covered by Proposi-
tion 2.1. To prove that the inequality orderings representable by any of the remain-
ing RDEU inequality measures also all satisfy the quasi-concavity properties of
Proposition 2.1, we require a result which relates the convexity of the weighting
function φ to the convexity of the RDEU social welfare function. A social welfare
function W is said to be convex if and only if, for any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P , we have
W (α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y))≤ αW (p,x)+(1−α)W (q,y) for any α ∈ (0,1).
(2.13)
The following lemma summarizes the required relationship.
Lemma 2.2. Let W be any social welfare function of the RDEU form, given by
(2.8).
(i) If φ is linear, then W is linear, i.e., (2.13) holds with equality for any (p,x),
(q,y) ∈P .
(ii) If φ is convex, then W is convex, i.e., (2.13) holds for any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P .
(iii) If φ is strictly convex, then W is strictly convex, i.e., (2.13) holds with strict
inequality for any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P with (p,x) 6= (q,y).
Note that we have αW (p,x) + (1−α)W (q,y) ≤ min{W (p,x),W (q,y)} for
any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P and any α ∈ (0,1). Using this observation together with
(2.13), we see that Lemma 2.2 has implications for the behaviour of RDEU social
welfare functions with respect to mixing income distributions: a linear weighting
function φ , as that of the EU social welfare function, corresponds to a neutral so-
cial welfare attitude to mixing, whereas a (strictly) convex weighting function φ ,
as that of the RDEU or Yaari social welfare functions, corresponds to a (strictly)
negative attitude to mixing. Now, note that Proposition 2.1 can be interpreted as
revealing that inequality orderings based on social welfare function with a neu-
tral attitude to mixing (the EU social welfare function) have a positive attitude to
mixing as expressed by the properties QC and CSQC. Since social welfare and
inequality are negatively related concepts (see expressions (2.6) and (2.7)), we
would expect that if a neutral social welfare attitude to mixing translates into a
positive inequality attitude to mixing, then a negative social welfare attitude to
mixing should definitely translate into a positive inequality attitude to mixing. In
other words, if inequality orderings based on a EU social welfare function satisfy
the properties QC and CSQC, then this should be true a fortiori for inequality or-
derings based on an RDEU social welfare function. Proposition 2.2 confirms this
intuition.
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Proposition 2.2. Any RDEU inequality ordering , i.e., any inequality ordering
representable by (2.10) or (2.12), satisfies QC and CSQC. If the weighting func-
tion φ corresponding to is in addition strictly convex, then also satisfies SQC.
Note that, since all generalized Gini indices have strictly convex weighting
functions φ , the inequality orderings represented by these inequality measures all
satisfy the strongest quasi-concavity property SQC.
2.5 Inequality and Gradual Population Shifts
We now examine the implications of the properties QC and CSQC for the question
of how inequality evolves during an adjustment process in which the population
gradually shifts from one constituent income distribution to another over time.
As discussed in Section 2.1, several empirical phenomena involve such an adjust-
ment process. Suppose that the constituent income distributions are (p,x) ∈P
and (q,y) ∈P , and that population shifts from (q,y) to (p,x). Then, the overall
income distribution is α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y) and α gradually rises over some in-
terval (α,α) ⊆ (0,1). The question we are interested in is how inequality in the
overall income distribution evolves as α rises over (α,α).
In the previous sections, we saw that all well known inequality concepts satisfy
the properties QC and CSQC. As the following proposition shows, these proper-
ties reduce the number of allowed patterns, describing inequality evolution dur-
ing the considered adjustment process, to only three: (i) an inverted-U pattern in
which inequality increases in the early stages of the process and decreases after-
wards, (ii) an increasing pattern in which inequality increases during the entire
process, and (iii) a decreasing pattern in which inequality decreases during the
entire process. The proposition focuses on CSQC, which has the stronger impli-
cations of the two properties (given that µ(p,x) 6= µ(q,y)), and, for convenience,
restricts attention to inequality orderings.
Proposition 2.3. Let  be any inequality ordering satisfying CSQC. Consider,
moreover, any (q,y),(p,x) ∈P with µ(p,x) 6= µ(q,y). Only the following three
patterns, describing the evolution of inequality in α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y) during a
process in which α rises over the interval (α,α)⊆ (0,1), are possible.
(i) An inverted-U pattern, i.e., there exists an α∗ ∈ (α,α) such that, for any
α,α ′ ∈ (α,α∗], if α > α ′ then
α ′(p,x)+(1−α ′)(q,y)≺ α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y),
and, for any α,α ′ ∈ [α∗,α), if α > α ′ then
α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y)≺ α ′(p,x)+(1−α ′)(q,y).
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(ii) A strictly increasing pattern, i.e., for any α,α ′ ∈ (α,α), if α > α ′ then
α ′(p,x)+(1−α ′)(q,y)≺ α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y).
(iii) A strictly decreasing pattern, i.e., for any α,α ′ ∈ (α,α), if α > α ′ then
α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y)≺ α ′(p,x)+(1−α ′)(q,y).
A case of the gradual population shift process of theoretical interest is the
simple one in which the two constituent income distributions (p,x) and (q,y)
are both perfectly equal. If in (p,x) everyone has the income xˆ and in (q,y)
everyone has the income yˆ, then the overall income distribution can be written as
((α,1−α),(xˆ, yˆ)). We assume, furthermore, that xˆ> yˆ and that α rises over (0,1).
During this simple process, the relative group sizes of the ‘rich’ and ‘poor’—those
with incomes xˆ and yˆ, respectively—change continuously. For this reason, this
case has been regarded by Fields (1987, 1993), among others, as interesting for
the theoretical question of how to define the concept of inequality comparisons.
Fields criticizes the popular inequality measures—by which he means those stud-
ied by Anand and Kanbur (1993) (see Section 2.3 of this chapter)—because they
all imply an inverted-U pattern of inequality in the simple gradual population
shift process, while there are other patterns that would be at least as plausible in
his opinion. The inverted-U pattern implies, loosely speaking, that income dis-
tributions with equally sized poor and rich groups are more unequal than income
distributions with a small number of poor and a large number of rich or with a
large number of poor and a small number of rich. In his own work, Fields defends
the opposite view, the U pattern (inequality rises in the early stages of the process
and decreases afterwards), which implies that situations with few poor and many
rich or few rich and many poor are considered particularly unequal.11
It follows from the results of this chapter that Fields’ critique applies not only
to the inequality measures dealt with by Anand and Kanbur, but to all inequality
measures commonly considered in the literature. Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 imply
11Fields (1993) provides a justification for the U pattern on the basis of the notions ‘elitism of
the rich’ and ‘isolation of the poor.’ Loosely speaking, elitism of the rich says that, for relatively
low values of α , decreases in α lead to greater inequality because the ‘rich’ then attain a more
elite position. Similarly, isolation of the poor says that, for relatively high values of α , increases in
α cause inequality to increase because the ‘poor’ then become more isolated. The simple case of
the gradual population shift process has also been considered by Temkin (1986) and by Amiel and
Cowell (1994b). Using his own framework for inequality measurement, the philosopher Temkin
gives justifications for the three patterns dealt with in Proposition 2.3 as well as for a pattern of
constant inequality during the entire process. Amiel and Cowell provide questionnaire results
showing that respondents support several patterns among which the U pattern proposed by Fields
is quite popular. See also the discussion by Kolm (1998, pp. 36-38).
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that the inequality orderings corresponding to all these inequality measures satisfy
CSQC, and Proposition 2.3 implies that all continuous inequality orderings satis-
fying CSQC imply an inverted-U pattern in the simple gradual population shift
process. The latter follows from the fact that if the two constituent income distri-
butions are equally unequal, as is the case in the simple gradual population shift
process,12 then the patterns (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 2.3 are only possible for
noncontinuous inequality orderings since these patterns involve a discontinuity at
α = 0 or at α = 1. Note, finally, that, as Example 2.1 shows, the fundamental
axioms TP and β INV do not exclude the occurrence of a U pattern over part of
the gradual shift process for some constituent income distributions.
2.6 Conclusion
The literature on inequality measurement has focused exclusively on the specific
strategy of supplementing the fundamental axioms, TP and β INV, with decompos-
ability ideas, i.e., ideas concerning how changes in the inequality of constituent
income distributions have to relate to changes in overall inequality—directly, in
the form of the DEC axiom, or, indirectly, by basing inequality measures on a(n)
(RDEU) social welfare function that incorporates a weak decomposability condi-
tion. It was demonstrated in this chapter that all inequality measures considered
in the literature satisfy the quasi-concavity properties QC and CSQC. Moreover,
it was shown that the latter property allows only three patterns describing how
inequality evolves during a process in which population gradually shifts from one
constituent income distribution to another.
On the one hand, the latter result reveals an attractive feature of CSQC: the
property facilitates the study of empirical phenomena in which gradual population
shifts occur. On the other hand, it may be argued that the three patterns allowed
by CSQC are not the only plausible ones. If it is concluded that the other—non
CSQC consistent—inequality views should also be expressible within a theory of
inequality measurement, then our results show that one should focus on supple-
menting the fundamental axioms, TP and β INV, in alternative ways, rather than
with decomposability ideas.
12At least, this would follow from β INV or from the commonsense assumption that all perfectly
equal income distributions are equally equal.
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Appendix 2.A: Proofs
In the proofs, we usually abbreviate, for any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P and any scalar α ,
the expression α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y) with (α; p,x;q,y).
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Consider any inequality quasi-ordering  that satisfies TP
and β INV. Consider, moreover, any (p,x) ∈P , any scalar λ such that (p,y) =
(p,x+ λ (βx+ 1− β )) ∈P and (p,x) 6= (p,y), and any α ∈ (0,1). Note that
we have λ = µ(p,y)−µ(p,x)βµ(p,x)+1−β by definition. What has to be shown is that (p,x) ≺
(α; p,x; p,y).
Consider (p,z) = (p,x+λ ′(βx+1−β )), where λ ′ = µ(α;p,x;p,y)−µ(p,x)βµ(p,x)+1−β . The
choice of λ ′ ensures that µ(p,z) = µ(α; p,x; p,y). Since either 0< xi < zi < yi for
all i = 1,2, . . . ,n, or xi > zi > yi > 0 for all i = 1,2, . . . ,n, we have, furthermore,
(p,z) ∈P . We now prove the claim that TP implies (p,z) ≺ (α; p,x; p,y). Note
that the supports of (p,x), (p,y) and (p,z) have the same number of elements.
Now, clearly, to any element in the support of (p,x), say income level t, there
corresponds one element in the support of (p,y) equal to t +λ (β t +1−β ). The
frequency with which t appears in (p,x), say frequency s, is equal to the frequency
with which t +λ (β t +1−β ) appears in (p,y). By consequence, in (α; p,x; p,y),
there is, for any element in the support of (p,x), a pair of incomes such that the
sum of frequencies is s and the mean income for the group of individuals with any
of these two incomes is αt+(1−α)(t+λ (β t+1−β )). Similarly, to any element
in the support of (p,x), say t occurring with frequency s, there corresponds one
income in the support of (p,z) equal to t + λ ′(β t + 1− β ) and occurring with
frequency s. Now, we have t + λ ′(β t + 1− β ) = αt + (1−α)(t + λ (β t + 1−
β )). Therefore, (α; p,x; p,y) can be obtained from (p,z) by a sequence of mean
preserving spreads and, hence, TP implies (p,z)≺ (α; p,x; p,y).
Since (p,z) ≺ (α; p,x; p,y) by TP and (p,x) ∼ (p,z) by β INV, we obtain
(p,x)≺ (α; p,x; p,y) using transitivity. 
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Consider any inequality quasi-ordering  that satisfies
TP, β INV and DEC. Consider, moreover, any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P such that (p,x)
(q,y) and any α ∈ (0,1). In the case where µ(p,x)= µ(q,y), DEC already implies
(p,x)  (α; p,x;q,y). Therefore, we assume µ(p,x) 6= µ(q,y) in what follows.
What has to be shown is that (p,x)≺ (α; p,x;q,y).
Consider (p,z) = (p,x+λ (βx+1−β )), where λ = µ(q,y)−µ(p,x)βµ(p,x)+1−β . The choice
of λ ensures that µ(p,z) = µ(q,y). Two cases are possible: either (a) (p,z) ∈P ,
or (b) (p,z) /∈P .
In case (a), we have (p,x) ∼ (p,z) by β INV. Using transitivity, we have
(p,z)  (q,y) and, hence, (α; p,x; p,z)  (α; p,x;q,y) by DEC. Lemma 2.1 im-
plies (p,x)≺ (α; p,x; p,z), and we obtain (p,x)≺ (α; p,x;q,y) using transitivity.
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Case (b) occurs if and only if λ is such that in going from (p,x) to (p,z),
nonpositive incomes get nonzero frequency (which is only possible if µ(p,x) >
µ(q,y)). Consider (p,x′) = (p,x+λ ′(βx+1−β )) and (q,y′) = (q,y+λ ′(βy+
1−β )) where λ ′ is any scalar such that [x1+λ ′(βx1+1−β )]+λ (β [x1+λ ′(βx1+
1−β )]+1−β )> 0. We can then return to the beginning of this proof and prove
the result for (p,x′) and (q,y′) without getting case (b). If the result is true for
(p,x′) and (q,y′), then it must be true for (p,x) and (q,y) as well by β INV and
transitivity. 
Proof of Lemma 2.2. First note that (2.8) can be rewritten as
W :P → R : (p,x) 7→ u(x1)+
n
∑
i=2
φ
( n
∑
j=i
p j
)
(u(xi)−u(xi−1)).
Consider any (p,x),(q,y)∈P and any scalar α ∈ (0,1). Define, furthermore, the
ordered pairs (p′,z) and (q′,z) with z = (z1,z2, . . . ,zm) the vector that contains the
components of both x and y ordered such that 0 < z1 < z2 < · · · < zm. Moreover,
p′ = (p′1, p
′
2, . . . , p
′
m) is a vector where, for all i = 1,2, . . . ,m, p′i = pzi if zi occurs
in x and p′i = 0 otherwise, and, similarly, q′ = (q′1,q′2, . . . ,q′m) is a vector where,
for all i = 1,2, . . . ,m, q′i = qzi if zi occurs in y and q′i = 0 otherwise. We then have
W (α(p,x)+(1−α)(q,y))
= u(z1)+
m
∑
i=2
φ
( m
∑
j=i
α p′j +(1−α)q′j
)
(u(zi)−u(zi−1))
≤ α
[
u(z1)+
m
∑
i=2
φ
( m
∑
j=i
p′j
)
(u(zi)−u(zi−1))
]
+(1−α)
[
u(z1)+
m
∑
i=2
φ
( m
∑
j=i
q′j
)
(u(zi)−u(zi−1))
]
= αW (p,x)+(1−α)W (q,y),
where the inequality follows from the convexity of φ . The inequality holds with
equality if φ is linear, and holds strictly if φ is strictly convex and (p,x) 6= (q,y)
since the latter implies p′ 6= q′. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Consider any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P such that (p,x) (q,y),
and any scalar α ∈ (0,1). Since the case where (p,x) = (q,y) is trivial, we assume
(p,x) 6= (q,y) in what follows.
We first consider the case where  is representable by (2.10). Defining the
function Wβ as Wβ (p,x) = W (p,x+ 1−ββ ) for all (p,x) ∈P with W as in (2.8)
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and u as in (2.9), we have
Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(α; p,x;q,y) =
1
β
1−
(
(1− ε)Wβ (α; p,x;q,y)
) 1
1−ε
µ(α; p,x;q,y)+ 1−ββ
 . (2.14)
We have to show the following: (a) expression (2.14) is at least as great as (strictly
greater than) Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(p,x) whenever φ is (strictly) convex, and (b) expression (2.14)
is strictly greater than Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(p,x) whenever µ(p,x) 6= µ(q,y).
First, consider
1
β
1−
(
(1− ε)
[
αWβ (p,x)+(1−α)Wβ (q,y)
]) 1
1−ε
µ(α; p,x;q,y)+ 1−ββ
 (2.15)
=
1
β
1− 1
µ(α;p,x;q,y)+ 1−ββ
α (µ(p,x)+ 1−ββ )1−ε
(
[(1−ε)Wβ (p,x)]
1
1−ε
µ(p,x)+ 1−ββ
)1−ε
+ (1−α)
(
µ(q,y)+ 1−ββ
)1−ε( [(1−ε)Wβ (q,y)] 11−ε
µ(q,y)+ 1−ββ
)1−ε 11−ε

=
1
β
[
1− (1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(p,x))A] ,
where
A =
α(µ(p,x)+ 1−ββ )1−ε+(1−α)(µ(q,y)+ 1−ββ )1−ε
(
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU (q,y)
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU (p,x)
)1−ε 11−ε
µ(α;p,x;q,y)+ 1−ββ
= B×C,
where
B =
α
(
µ(p,x)+ 1−ββ
)
+(1−α)
(
µ(q,y)+ 1−ββ
)(
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU (q,y)
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU (p,x)
)
αµ(p,x)+(1−α)µ(q,y)+ 1−ββ
and
C =
α(µ(p,x)+ 1−ββ )1−ε+(1−α)(µ(q,y)+ 1−ββ )1−ε
(
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU (q,y)
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU (p,x)
)1−ε 11−ε
α
(
µ(p,x)+ 1−ββ
)
+(1−α)
(
µ(q,y)+ 1−ββ
)( 1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU (q,y)
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU (p,x)
)
.
Income Inequality, Quasi-Concavity, and Gradual Population Shifts 57
It is readily checked that 0 < B ≤ 1. Furthermore, if ε = 0, then C = 1, while if
ε > 0, then
C = 1− I1,ε,ιRDEU
(
(α,1−α),
[
µ(p,x)+ 1−ββ ,
(
µ(q,y)+ 1−ββ
)(
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU (q,y)
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU (p,x)
)])
where ι is the identity function. By consequence, we have 0 <C ≤ 1.
Second, notice that 1β
[
1− (1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(p,x))BC] ≥ Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(p,x) since 0 <
B≤ 1 and 0 <C ≤ 1. Because, moreover, it follows from Lemma 2.2 that when-
ever φ is (strictly) convex, expression (2.14) is at least as great as (is strictly greater
than) expression (2.15), (a) follows. The case in which φ is strictly convex has
been dealt with, and hence we assume ε > 0 in what follows. Notice that when-
ever µ(p,x) 6= µ(q,y) and Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(p,x) = Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(q,y), we have B = 1 but C < 1
since ε > 0, so that 1β
[
1− (1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(p,x))BC] > Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(p,x), and whenever
µ(p,x) 6= µ(q,y) and Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(p,x) < Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(q,y), we have B < 1, so that, again,
1
β
[
1− (1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(p,x))BC] > Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(p,x). Combining this with the fact that
convexity of φ implies that expression (2.14) is at least as great as expression
(2.15), we find that (b) follows.
We now consider the second case where  is representable by (2.12). Using
W as in (2.8) and u as in (2.11), we have
I0,γ,φRDEU(α; p,x;q,y) = µ(α; p,x;q,y)+
1
γ
ln(−W (α; p,x;q,y)) . (2.16)
The following has to be shown: (c) expression (2.16) is at least as great as (strictly
greater than) I0,γ,φRDEU(p,x) whenever φ is (strictly) convex, and (d) expression (2.16)
is strictly greater than I0,γ,φRDEU(p,x) whenever µ(p,x) 6= µ(q,y).
Consider
µ(α; p,x;q,y)+
1
γ
ln(− [αW (p,x)+(1−α)W (q,y)]) , (2.17)
and
αµ(p,x)+(1−α)µ(q,y)+ 1
γ
α ln(−W (p,x))+(1−α) ln(−W (q,y)) (2.18)
= αI0,γ,φRDEU(p,x)+(1−α) I0,γ,φRDEU(q,y). (2.19)
It follows from Lemma 2.2 that whenever φ is (strictly) convex, expression (2.16)
is at least as great as (is strictly greater than) expression (2.17). Since, moreover,
expression (2.17) is at least as great as expression (2.18) by concavity of the ln
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function, we have (c). In the case where µ(p,x) 6= µ(q,y) and I0,γ,φRDEU(p,x) =
I0,γ,φRDEU(q,y), we have W (p,x) 6= W (q,y) and, hence, expression (2.17) is strictly
greater than expression (2.18) by strict concavity of the ln function. If µ(p,x) 6=
µ(q,y) and I0,γ,φRDEU(p,x) 6= I0,γ,φRDEU(q,y), then expression (2.19) is strictly greater
than I0,γ,φRDEU(p,x). Hence, (d) follows. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Consider any inequality ordering that satisfies CSQC.
Consider, moreover, any (p,x),(q,y) ∈P with µ(p,x) 6= µ(q,y).
Consider the following two subpatterns, both of which describe how inequality
evolves as α rises over some subinterval (α˜, α˜)⊆ (α,α) in (α; p,x;q,y):
(a) A constant pattern over (α˜, α˜), i.e., for any α,α ′ ∈ (α˜, α˜), (α; p,x;q,y) ∼
(α ′; p,x;q,y).
(b) A U pattern over (α˜, α˜), i.e., there exists an α∗ ∈ (α˜, α˜) such that, for any
α,α ′ ∈ (α˜,α∗], if α > α ′, then (α; p,x;q,y) ≺ (α ′; p,x;q,y), and, for any
α,α ′ ∈ [α∗, α˜), if α > α ′, then (α ′; p,x;q,y)≺ (α; p,x;q,y).
We first show by contradiction that neither subpattern can be the case for any
subinterval (α˜, α˜). Suppose, therefore, that (a) or (b) holds over some subinterval
(α˜, α˜)⊆ (α,α). Both subpatterns imply that there exist some α,α ′,α ′′ ∈ (α˜, α˜)
where α > α ′ > α ′′ such that (α ′; p,x;q,y)  (α; p,x;q,y) and (α ′; p,x;q,y) 
(α ′′; p,x;q,y). This is obvious in the case of (a), while in the case of (b) this can
be seen by letting α ′ equal the α∗ in the definition of (b). Note now that, for
α ′′′ = α
′−α ′′
α−α ′′ , we have (α
′′′;(α; p,x;q,y);(α ′′; p,x;q,y)) = (α ′; p,x;q,y). By con-
sequence, we obtain both (α ′′′;(α; p,x;q,y);(α ′′; p,x;q,y))  (α; p,x;q,y) and
(α ′′′;(α; p,x;q,y);(α ′′; p,x;q,y))  (α ′′; p,x;q,y). Since, moreover, α ′′′ ∈ (0,1)
and µ(α; p,x;q,y) 6= µ(α ′′; p,x;q,y), we have a violation of CSQC.
Now, any pattern for which subpattern (a) is not the case for any (α˜, α˜), is
either pattern (i), (ii), (iii), or a pattern for which pattern (b) is the case for some
(α˜, α˜). However, as we have seen, the latter is impossible. 
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Chapter 3
Extreme Inequality Aversion
without Separability
3.1 Introduction
For social preferences that can be represented by social welfare functions of the
expected utility form, it is broadly accepted that leximin constitutes the case of
extreme inequality aversion. As far as we know, the only formal justification for
this connection between leximin and the concept of extreme inequality aversion
is a result that can be attributed to Hammond (1975), Meyer (1975) and Lambert
(2001). Loosely speaking, their result says that any pairwise choice implied by
leximin is unanimously approved by the most inequality averse members (in the
Arrow-Pratt sense) of the class of expected utility type social preferences.
Our contribution in this chapter is to study the concept of inequality aversion
for more general social preferences, viz., for social preferences that do not nec-
essarily satisfy the separability axiom that underlies expected utility theory. This
more general outlook is very common in the social choice literature: see for in-
stance the standard overviews of Bossert and Weymark (2004) and d’Aspremont
and Gevers (2002).1 We show that, for these more general social preferences,
the case of extreme inequality aversion is covered by the class of weakly max-
imin social preferences—these are all social preferences that have in common the
property that a given alternative is strictly preferred over another if the worst off
is strictly better off in the given alternative.2 In order to establish this result, we
prove an analogue of the Hammond-Meyer-Lambert result mentioned above.
1As we saw in Chapter 1, the literature on individual decision under risk has likewise studied
several non-separable alternatives to expected utility.
2In their analysis of extreme inequality aversion, Tungodden and Vallentyne (2005) also arrive
at the class of weakly maximin social preferences. The same holds for our analysis of Chapter 4.
However, in both cases approaches are used that deviate from the standard Arrow-Pratt approach.
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3.2 Preliminaries
A social alternative is a vector x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) ∈ Rn++ where n is the number
of individuals in society and xi measures the well-being of individual i. The set of
individuals is N and the set of social alternatives is X . We use the symbol 1n to
denote an n-dimensional vector of which all components are equal to 1. For any
x ∈ X , xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, . . . , xˆn) denotes a permutation of x such that xˆ1 ≤ xˆ2 ≤ ·· · ≤ xˆn.
For any x,y ∈ X , we write x > y if and only if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N with at least
one inequality holding strictly. Social preferences are represented by a relation
 (‘is at least as good as’) on X . It is assumed throughout that social preference
relations are orderings.3 We denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of  by
 and ∼, respectively.
The Hammond-Meyer-Lambert result applies to social preferences that are
formally similar to the preferences of expected utility maximizers. We shall say
that is a member of this class, which we denote byWEU , if and only if it satisfies
the following four well known properties:4
(i) Anonymity: ∀x ∈ X , [x′ is any permutation of x]⇒ x∼ x′.
(ii) Continuity: ∀x ∈ X , {y |y ∈ X ,y x} and {y |y ∈ X ,x y} are closed in X .
(iii) Strong Pareto: ∀x,y ∈ X , x > y⇒ x y.
(iv) Separability: ∀ ˜N ⊂ N, ∀x,y,x′,y′ ∈ X ,
[∀i ∈ ˜N, xi = yi, x′i = y′i, and, ∀i ∈ N \ ˜N, xi = x′i, yi = y′i]
⇒ [x y⇔ x′  y′].
The result we shall present deals with more general social preferences that satisfy
the basic properties (i) to (iii), but not necessarily separability. We use the symbol
W to indicate this general class of social preferences.
The Arrow-Pratt concept was designed originally to compare members ofWEU
with respect to inequality aversion. However, one of the several equivalent for-
mulations of the concept—that based on the ‘equally distributed equivalent well-
being’—can be applied to the general class W as well. The equally distributed
equivalent well-being, ξ (;x), for any x ∈ X and any ∈ W , is the per capita
level of well-being that, when equally distributed, yields the same level of welfare
according to  as x. Formally, for all ∈W and for all x ∈ X , ξ (;x) = e if and
only if e1n ∼ x. For each∈W , the function ξ (; ·) on X is defined and is, more-
over, a representation of on X . The Arrow-Pratt concept says the following: for
3An ordering is a reflexive, transitive and complete relation.
4See Chapter 4 or for instance Bossert and Weymark (2004) for a discussion of these properties.
In Chapter 4, strong Pareto is referred to as monotonicity.
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any,′∈W ,  is at least as inequality averse as′, written as RAP ′, if and
only if, for all x ∈ X , ξ (;x)≤ ξ (′;x).
The Hammond-Meyer-Lambert result shows that leximin—which gives pri-
ority to the worst off in a lexicographical fashion—can be interpreted as being
extremely inequality averse with respect to the class WEU . Leximin, which we
denote by lex, is defined as follows: ∀x,y ∈ X ,
xlex y ⇔ [x is a permutation of y, or,
∃k ∈ N, ∀i < k, xˆi = yˆi and xˆk > yˆk] .
Leximin is a member of the class of weakly maximin social preferences. The
members of this class give priority to the worst off in all cases in which the worst
off is not indifferent. Formally, a social preference relation  is weakly maximin
if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X ,
xˆ1 > yˆ1 ⇒ x y.
It can be shown that leximin is the only social preference relation that is both
weakly maximin and separable.5 We denote the class of anonymous and strongly
Paretian weakly maximin social preferences by M . Since M does not contain
any continuous members, the classes M and W are disjoint.6 Clearly, leximin
is a member of M . We wish to emphasize, however, that M contains as well
social preferences that are very different from leximin. To see this, note that for
any anonymous and strongly Paretian social preference relation ′ there exists a
 belonging toM such that, for all x,y ∈ X ,
xˆ1 = yˆ1 ⇒ [x y⇔ x′ y].
Loosely speaking, this means that in all cases in which the worst off are equally
well off, any social preferences are allowed as long as they satisfy anonymity and
strong Pareto.
In the next section we provide a result, analogous to the Hammond-Meyer-
Lambert result, which shows that if we broaden our attention from only the sep-
arable members of W (i.e., the members of WEU ) to all members of W , then the
corresponding class of extremely inequality averse social preferences broadens
from only the separable members ofM (i.e., the single member of {lex}) to all
members ofM .
5See Chapter 5.
6Each member of M is a positional dictatorship and positional dictatorships cannot satisfy
both continuity and strong Pareto (see Bossert and Weymark, 2004, p. 1114). In relation to this,
note that maximin—which implies social indifference for all pairs for which the worst off individ-
uals are equally well off—is the only continuous member of the class of weakly maximin social
preferences (see Chapter 5), but that it is not strongly Paretian and hence does not belong toM .
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3.3 Result
Relying heavily on Hammond (1975) and Meyer (1975), Lambert (2001, Theo-
rem 4.4) presents a result that justifies the interpretation of leximin as extremely
inequality averse, provided that separability is demanded.7
Theorem 3.1. For all x,y ∈ X such that xˆ 6= yˆ,
xlex y ⇔ [∃ ∈WEU , ∀ ′∈WEU , ′ RAP ⇒ x′ y].
Theorem 3.1 says that (i) whenever leximin implies a strict preference over a
pair of social alternatives, then the most inequality averse social preferences in the
class WEU unanimously agree weakly with that preference, and, conversely, (ii)
whenever all most inequality averse members of WEU weakly prefer one social
alternative over another, then leximin strictly agrees with this preference.
Our contribution is to provide the following corresponding result for the case
where separability is not demanded.
Theorem 3.2. For all x,y ∈ X such that xˆ 6= yˆ,
[∀ ∈M , x y] ⇔ [∃ ∈W , ∀ ′∈W , ′ RAP ⇒ x′ y].8
Proof. (⇒) Take any x,y ∈ X such that xˆ 6= yˆ, for which
∀ ∈M , x y,
which is equivalent to xˆ1 > yˆ1. We have to show that there exists a ∈ W such
that
∀ ′∈W , ′ RAP ⇒ x′ y. (3.1)
Consider any ′′∈ W such that ξ (′′;x) ≤ ξ (′′;y). If such a ′′ does not
exist, then any member of W serves as a  for which (3.1) holds. If, on the other
hand, such a ′′ exists, then we define  such that, for all w,z ∈ X ,
w z ⇔ αwˆ1 +(1−α)ξ (′′;w)≥ α zˆ1 +(1−α)ξ (′′;z),
7Hammond (1975) proves the result only for a proper subclass of WEU , viz., for social prefer-
ences of the CES type. Lambert (2001) uses the analysis of Meyer (1975) to extend Hammond’s
result to the entire class WEU .
8An alternative to Theorem 3.2 which is closer to Hammond’s (1975) original formulation
can as well be obtained. This requires a somewhat stronger concept of inequality aversion:  is
strongly more inequality averse than ′, which is written as  ˆPAP ′, if and only if, for all x ∈ X
with at least two distinct components, ξ (;x)< ξ (′;x) (note that this version of the Arrow-Pratt
concept is more demanding than the asymmetric part of RAP). The alternative to Theorem 3.2 is:
∀x,y ∈ X , [∀ ∈M , x  y] ⇔ [∃ ∈ W , ∀ ′∈ W , ′ ˆPAP ⇒ x ′ y]. We omit the proof
because it is very similar to that of Theorem 3.2.
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where α ∈ [0,1) is such that
α yˆ1 +(1−α)ξ (′′;y) = xˆ1.
By strong Pareto and reflexivity, ξ (′′;x) ≥ xˆ1, and, hence, we have ξ (′′;y) ≥
xˆ1. The latter, combined with the fact that xˆ1 > yˆ1, ensures that  can be defined
in the above way. It can be readily checked that ∈W . Since ξ (′′; xˆ11n) = xˆ1,
we have xˆ11n ∼ y and, consequently, ξ (;y) = xˆ1.
What remains to be shown is that (3.1) holds for the constructed . For any
′ such that ′ RAP , we have
xˆ1 = ξ (;y)≥ ξ (′;y),
and, by strong Pareto and reflexivity, ξ (′;x) ≥ xˆ1. By consequence, we have
ξ (′;x)≥ ξ (′;y) and so x′ y.
(⇐) Seeking a contradiction, we assume there exists a pair x,y ∈ X such that
xˆ 6= yˆ, for which
∃ ∈W , ∀ ′∈W , ′ RAP ⇒ x′ y, (3.2)
while there exists a′′∈M such that y′′ x. Note that from y′′ x it follows that
x > y does not hold by strong Pareto, and also that xˆ1 ≤ yˆ1.
Define ′′′∈W such that, for all w,z ∈ X ,
w′′′ z ⇔ ∑
n
i=1φiwˆi
∑ni=1φi
≥ ∑
n
i=1φizˆi
∑ni=1φi
,
where φ1,φ2, . . . ,φn > 0. The weights are determined in two steps. First, we
choose any φ1,φ2, . . . ,φn > 0 such that y′′′ x. A choice of the weights such that
y ′′′ x is possible since x > y does not hold. Second, we increase the weight φ1
while holding all other weights fixed until, for all w ∈ X , ξ (′′′;w) ≤ ξ (;w).
This is possible, since by choosing φ1 sufficiently high,
ξ (′′′;w) = ∑
n
i=1φiwˆi
∑ni=1φi
can be chosen as close to wˆ1 as necessary for all w ∈ X . Note that increasing
φ1 while holding all the other weights fixed preserves the ranking y ′′′ x since
xˆ1 ≤ yˆ1.
Now, since ′′′∈ W is such that, for all w ∈ X , ξ (′′′;w) ≤ ξ (;w), and,
moreover, y′′′ x, we have that (3.2) is contradicted. 
Theorem 3.2 is completely analogous to Theorem 3.1: (i) if all members of the
classM imply a strict preference over a pair of social alternatives, then the most
inequality averse social preferences in the general class W unanimously agree
weakly with that preference, and, conversely, (ii) if all most inequality averse
members of W weakly prefer one social alternative over another, then the mem-
bers ofM unanimously strictly agree with this preference.
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Connection between Chapters 3 and 4: Chapter 3 provided a justification on the
basis of the Arrow-Pratt concept of viewing the class of weakly maximin social
welfare orderings as extremely inequality averse. The discussion of the weakly
maximin class in Section 3.2 revealed that the class is very broad: for choices over
alternatives in which the worst off is equally well off, the property of being weakly
maximin does not impose anything at all. In Chapter 4, this observation is used
to criticize the Arrow-Pratt concept. It is argued that the weakly maximin class
includes members that we would not usually refer to as particularly egalitarian,
and that, by consequence, the Arrow-Pratt concept is not demanding enough as
a concept of inequality aversion—see the discussion following Proposition 4.4 in
Section 4.5. Accordingly, Chapter 4 studies two such more demanding concepts
of inequality aversion. In Section 4.5, it is revealed that the weaker of the two, the
RD-concept, also characterizes the weakly maximin class as extremely inequality
averse. By contrast, according to the stronger of the two alternative concepts,
the L-concept, the class of monotonic extremely inequality averse social welfare
orderings is empty.
Chapter 4
Comparing Degrees of Inequality
Aversion
4.1 Introduction
How should we compare different social preference relations over income distri-
butions with respect to the degree of inequality aversion, i.e., the degree of dislike
towards inequality, they express? We propose a procedure for comparing degrees
of inequality aversion that can be loosely formulated as follows:
Procedure (?): A social welfare ordering (SWO) R is at least as inequality averse
as an SWO R′ if and only if, for all income distributions x and y such that x is less
unequal than y according to a pre-specified inequality quasi-ordering, (i) R strictly
prefers x to y (xPy) whenever R′ strictly prefers x to y (xP′y), and (ii) R weakly
prefers x to y (xIy or xPy) whenever R′ is indifferent between x and y (xI′y).
Note that in order to make this procedure operational, an inequality quasi-ordering
must first be chosen. This feature of Procedure (?) makes explicit the fact that,
underlying any concept for comparing degrees of inequality aversion, there nec-
essarily has to be a criterion for making comparisons according to inequality—
obviously, to be able to check whether an SWO expresses more or less dislike to-
wards inequality than another SWO, it must be clear what is meant by inequality
in the first place. Once an inequality quasi-ordering is chosen, Procedure (?) turns
into a fully operational concept of inequality aversion which entails a straightfor-
ward check for dominance: an SWO is referred to as at least as inequality averse
as another if it implies, in all relevant choice situations (i.e., those pairs of income
distributions that are strictly ranked using the chosen inequality quasi-ordering),
an at least as inequality averse choice as the other (as defined in (i) and (ii) of
Procedure (?)). Procedure (?) can furthermore be shown to be consistent with the
67
68 Part II: Inequality Aversion
common approach of measuring the degree of inequality aversion by the amount
of mean income an SWO is prepared to forego in exchange for a given decrease
in inequality (see Section 4.3).
Interestingly, the traditional Arrow-Pratt concept for comparing degrees of
inequality aversion1 is a special case of Procedure (?). Roughly speaking, the
Arrow-Pratt concept of inequality aversion is obtained in the case where the cho-
sen inequality quasi-ordering is the extremely simplistic one which allows only
(strict) inequality comparisons between, on the one hand, unequal income distri-
butions and, on the other hand, perfectly equal ones (see Section 4.4). In this
chapter, we take the point of view that while Procedure (?) is the appropriate way
to approach the problem of comparing degrees of inequality aversion, the Arrow-
Pratt version of the procedure is unattractive because it is based on an unduly
restrictive inequality quasi-ordering. Taking into consideration its central place
in the literature on inequality measurement, the Lorenz inequality quasi-ordering
seems a much more suitable candidate for this role. This critique of the Arrow-
Pratt concept echoes that of Ross (1981) in the context of decision under risk.
Ross argues that for a comparison of risk aversion between two expected utility
maximizers, it is not sufficient to compare the premia they are maximally prepared
to pay for an insurance against all risks, as the Arrow-Pratt concept prescribes, but
it is also necessary to consider premia for insurances that decrease risk to a lower,
but still risky, level. Our proposal to consider the concept of inequality aversion
based on Procedure (?) using the Lorenz inequality quasi-ordering is similar to
that proposed by Ross since his criterion of decreasing risk is close to the Lorenz
criterion.
Throughout the chapter, we will often be concerned with comparing results
yielded by, on the one hand, the version of Procedure (?) that is equivalent to the
Arrow-Pratt concept and, on the other hand, the favoured version of Procedure
(?) which uses the Lorenz inequality quasi-ordering. It is interesting, however, to
consider also a third concept that is intermediate between the Arrow-Pratt concept
and the Lorenz-based concept. This third concept is based on the relative differen-
tials quasi-ordering, an inequality criterion that is stronger than the minimalist in-
equality criterion underlying the Arrow-Pratt concept and weaker than the Lorenz
quasi-ordering (see Moyes, 1994). Henceforth, we refer to the inequality aversion
concept obtained from Procedure (?) using the Lorenz quasi-ordering as the ‘L-
concept,’ and to that obtained from the procedure using the relative differentials
quasi-ordering as the ‘RD-concept.’
We first compare the three concepts of inequality aversion for the class of con-
tinuous and monotonic SWOs, the broadest class of SWOs to which the conven-
tional Arrow-Pratt concept is commonly applied. We show that the RD-concept
1The Arrow-Pratt approach is discussed thoroughly in Lambert (2001).
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yields the same results as the Arrow-Pratt concept if SWOs are in addition sepa-
rable, but not necessarily otherwise. Unfortunately, such consistency turns out not
to hold between the L-concept and the Arrow-Pratt concept, not even with respect
to the important class of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) SWOs (a sub-
class of the class of continuous, monotonic and separable SWOs). Usually, a CES
SWO with a higher value of the single parameter, ε , is considered more inequal-
ity averse than one with a lower value of ε . This role of ε as a measure for the
degree of inequality aversion is justified in the framework of the Arrow-Pratt con-
cept of inequality aversion. However, as straightforward examples show, this role
of ε is not justified if the L-concept is adopted: given two income distributions
such that one is less unequal than the other according to the Lorenz inequality
quasi-ordering, it is quite possible that a CES SWO with ε strictly prefers the less
unequal income distribution, while a CES SWO with ε ′ > ε strictly prefers the
more unequal one. Moreover, using a result by Ross (1981) we show that such
examples can be found for any two CES SWOs. In other words, if the L-concept
is adopted, then no two CES SWOs can be compared with respect to degree of
inequality aversion.
Second, we study the idea of ‘extreme inequality aversion’ for the three differ-
ent concepts of inequality aversion. We call an SWO extremely inequality averse
in a class of SWOs S if and only if it is at least as inequality averse as all SWOs in
S (and, moreover, is itself a member of S). In the literature, leximin is often seen
as a typical example of an SWO that combines extreme inequality aversion with
monotonicity. We show that, in the class of monotonic SWOs, both the Arrow-
Pratt concept and the RD-concept identify the entire class of weakly maximin
SWOs as extremely inequality averse—an SWO is said to be weakly maximin if
and only if it implies a strict preference for a given income distribution over an-
other whenever the worst off is strictly better off in the given income distribution.
The class includes leximin and, by consequence, the Arrow-Pratt concept and the
RD-concept can be said to support the conventional view (see also Tungodden and
Vallentyne, 2005). However, if the L-concept is adopted, this view has to be aban-
doned: we show that in this case the set of extremely inequality averse monotonic
SWOs is empty. Finally, we demonstrate that the incompatibility between extreme
inequality aversion and monotonicity is robust with respect to certain reasonable
changes in the definition of the idea of extreme inequality aversion.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 deals with preliminaries. In
Section 4.3 we formally introduce and discuss the three concepts for comparing
degrees of inequality aversion that constitute the topic of the chapter. The ques-
tions of how the three concepts compare with respect to the class of continuous
and monotonic SWOs, and with respect to the idea of extreme inequality aversion,
are dealt with in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. Some concluding remarks are
given in Section 4.6. All proofs are contained in Appendix 4.A.
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4.2 Preliminaries
An income distribution is a vector x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) ∈ Rn++ where n ≥ 3 is the
(fixed) number of individuals in society and xi is the income of individual i. The
set of individuals is N and the set of income distributions is X . We assume that, for
any income distribution x∈X , individuals are indexed such that x1≤ x2≤ ·· · ≤ xn.
In accordance with this assumption, we suppose that all considered concepts for
welfare and inequality comparisons satisfy anonymity—that is, any given income
distribution is treated equivalently as each of its permutations. The arithmetic
mean of any income distribution x ∈ X is written as µ(x). We use the symbol 1n
to denote an n-dimensional vector of which all components are equal to 1. For
any pair of income distributions, x,y ∈ X , we write x > y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N
with at least one strict inequality, and we write x y if xi > yi for all i ∈ N.
Social preferences are represented by a social welfare ordering (SWO) R (‘is
at least as good as’) on X .2 The asymmetric and symmetric parts of R are denoted
by P (‘is better than’) and I (‘is equally good as’), respectively. A social welfare
function is a function W : X → R which represents some SWO.
We shall require certain axioms in our analysis. Roughly speaking, continuity
ensures that small changes in an income distribution cause only small changes in
its social welfare ranking against other income distributions.
Continuity. For all x ∈ X , {y | y ∈ X ,yRx} and {y | y ∈ X ,xRy} are closed in X .
Monotonicity says that it is an improvement if some individuals get better off
without any individuals getting worse off.
Monotonicity. For all x,y ∈ X , if x > y, then xPy.
Separability requires that the social welfare ranking of any pair of income
distributions is not influenced by the incomes that are the same in both income
distributions.
Separability. For all ˆN ⊂ N and for all x,y,x′,y′ ∈ X , if xi = yi and x′i = y′i for all
i ∈ ˆN, and xi = x′i and yi = y′i for all i ∈ N \ ˆN, then xRy⇔ x′Ry′.
Any SWO that satisfies continuity, monotonicity and separability can be rep-
resented by a social welfare function of the following form:
W (x) =
n
∑
i=1
u(xi) for all x ∈ X , (4.1)
where u : R++ → R is a continuous and strictly increasing function, referred to
as a utility function (see Bossert and Weymark, 2004, Theorem 20). We shall pay
2An ordering is a reflexive, transitive and complete binary relation.
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special attention in our analysis to the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
class of SWOs, an important subclass of the class of continuous, monotonic and
separable SWOs. An SWO Rε is a member of the CES class if and only if there
exists a nonnegative scalar ε such that Rε can be represented by (4.1) with utility
function u(t) = 11−ε t
1−ε for all t ∈ R++.
Since comparisons of income distributions with respect to inequality are con-
ceptually prior to comparisons of SWOs with respect to degree of inequality aver-
sion, we require the concept of an inequality quasi-ordering (IQO)  (‘is at most
as unequal as’) on X .3 The asymmetric and symmetric parts of  are denoted
by ≺ (‘is less unequal than’) and ∼ (‘is equally unequal as’), respectively. An
inequality measure is a function J : X →R which represents some complete IQO.
The strongest IQO to receive broad acceptance amongst economists is the Lorenz
IQO. The Lorenz IQO, written as L, is defined as follows: for all x,y ∈ X ,
xL y⇔
k
∑
i=1
xi
µ(x)
≥
k
∑
i=1
yi
µ(y)
for all k = 1,2, . . . ,n.
An IQO  will be referred to as Lorenz consistent if it agrees with all compar-
isons made by the Lorenz IQO, i.e., if ≺L⊂≺ and ∼L⊂∼. We shall refer to an
SWO as Lorenz consistent if it follows the asymmetric part of the Lorenz IQO for
comparisons between income distributions with the same mean incomes.4
Lorenz Consistency. For all x,y ∈ X , if µ(x) = µ(y) and x≺L y, then xPy.
In the literature, social welfare functions are often assumed to depend on mean
income and inequality only, i.e., it is assumed that there exists an inequality mea-
sure J and a function f : (R++×R)→ R, increasing in the first argument and
decreasing in the second, such that W (x) = f (µ(x),J(x)) for all x ∈ X . In this
framework, Lorenz consistency is a weak requirement for SWOs—it is sufficient
that the underlying inequality measure is Lorenz consistent.5 We note that all
CES SWOs are Lorenz consistent and can be written as a function of mean in-
come and inequality. Specifically, it can be shown that any CES SWO Rε can be
represented by a social welfare function of the form W (x) = µ(x)[1− Jε(x)] for
all x ∈ X , where Jε is a Lorenz consistent inequality measure.6 We emphasize that
3A quasi-ordering is a reflexive and transitive binary relation.
4So we use the same term for two different concepts of Lorenz consistency. However, confu-
sion is avoided because it will always be clear from the context whether the Lorenz consistency
concept for IQOs or that for SWOs is meant.
5Note that, for any continuous, monotonic and separable SWO R, Lorenz consistency is satis-
fied if the following weaker criterion is satisfied: µ(x)1nPx for all x∈ X such that x is not perfectly
equal. See Chateauneuf and Moyes (2004, Proposition 4.1).
6See Atkinson (1970).
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our results—with the sole exception of Proposition 4.8—do not assume that social
welfare is a function of mean income and inequality only. To the contrary, we do
not make any assumptions at all about the determinants of social welfare (see the
discussion at the end of Section 4.3). Because the mean income-inequality repre-
sentation of inequality is popular, we will however occasionally interpret results
in that light.
4.3 Three Concepts of Inequality Aversion
In this section, we define three concepts for comparing degrees of inequality aver-
sion based on Procedure (?). We give a formal outline of this procedure. First, a
set is determined that contains exactly all pairs of income distributions such that
one income distribution is strictly more unequal than the other according to some
‘reference’ IQO (clearly, this set is simply the asymmetric part of the reference
IQO on X). These are exactly all pairs for which each SWO either implies an
inequality averse choice (the less unequal income distribution is chosen), a neu-
tral choice (indifference), or an inequality prone choice (the more unequal one is
chosen)—three choices which can of course be unambiguously ranked from most
inequality averse to least inequality averse. Second, two SWOs are compared with
respect to the choices implied for each of the pairs of income distributions in the
asymmetric part of the reference IQO: one SWO is referred to as at least as in-
equality averse as the other if and only if it implies an at least as inequality averse
choice for all pairs belonging to the reference set. The procedure can be defined
formally as follows, with A taking the role of the reference IQO.
Definition 4.1. Let A be some IQO. Let R and R′ be any two SWOs. Then, R is
at least as A-inequality averse as R′ if and only if, for all x,y∈ X such that x≺A y,
we have (i) if xP′y, then xPy, and, (ii) if xI′y, then xRy.
As is conventional, we say that R is more A-inequality averse than R′ if R is
at least as A-inequality averse as R′ while R′ is not at least as A-inequality averse
as R, and we say that R is equally A-inequality averse as R′ if R is at least as
A-inequality averse as R′ and R′ is at least as A-inequality averse as R.
In principle, any IQO can be chosen to determine the reference set ≺A in the
outlined procedure. However, since different people may have different reason-
able views with respect to inequality comparisons, it seems preferable to consider
the common part of all these views. Now, this is exactly the role that is often
attributed to the Lorenz criterion in the literature. We argue, therefore, that it is
most appropriate to use as the set of pairs of income distributions for which two
SWOs are compared, the set ≺L. We refer to the concept of inequality aversion
based on Definition 4.1 with A equal to L as the L-concept.
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The L-concept is closely related to the concept of ‘strong risk aversion’ studied
by Ross (1981). Ross’ concept is obtained if the L-concept is restricted to SWOs
of the expected utility form, i.e., SWOs satisfying continuity, monotonicity and
separability, and if the absolute version of the Lorenz IQO is used instead of the
regular (relative) version.7
Given the broad acceptance of the Lorenz IQO, we consider the L-concept to
be the ideal concept for comparing degrees of inequality aversion, but to allow
for a stronger link with the existing literature on the topic, we shall consider also
two alternative concepts based on Definition 4.1 that will appear to be closer to
the conventional Arrow-Pratt framework (as will be shown in Section 4.4). For
these concepts, two IQOs are used that are (weaker) alternatives for the Lorenz
IQO—that is, in both cases, in comparing two SWOs a set is considered which
is a proper subset of ≺L. The first alternative IQO we consider is the minimalist
IQO, written as M: for all x,y ∈ X ,
xM y⇔ x = e1n for some scalar e.
The minimalist IQO only allows inequality comparisons between pairs of income
distributions of which at least one is perfectly equal. The second alternative is the
relative differentials IQO, written as RD: for all x,y ∈ X ,
xRD y⇔ xiyi ≥
xi+1
yi+1
for all i = 1,2, . . . ,(n−1).
The relative differentials IQO, which was introduced into the literature on income
distribution by Moyes (1994), says that any progressive redistribution decreases
inequality. Setting A in Definition 4.1 equal to M or RD, we obtain the M-
concept and the RD-concept, respectively.
The M-concept is sometimes considered in the literature on risk aversion, but
in a restricted version that makes the concept applicable only to SWOs of the ex-
pected utility form. It is an established result in this context that, for SWOs of the
expected utility form, the M-concept and the Arrow-Pratt concept are equivalent.8
A more general result will be shown to hold in Section 4.4.
Since the three concepts of inequality aversion rely on comparisons of choices
over pairs of income distributions that are members of some set which repre-
sents a view on inequality, ≺M, ≺RD and ≺L, respectively, and given the fact that
≺M⊂≺RD⊂≺L, the following remark is straightforwardly established.
7Definition 4.1 has, moreover, a different phrasing than the concept of Ross (1981). Statement
(ii) of Proposition 4.1 below and condition (4.3) in the proof of Lemma 4.2 below, are closer to
the formulation used by Ross.
8See, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Proposition 6.C.2)—the restricted version of the M-concept
is close to their statement (v).
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Remark 4.1. Let R and R′ be any two SWOs. Then, of the following three state-
ments, (i) implies (ii), but (ii) does not imply (i), and (ii) implies (iii), but (iii) does
not imply (ii):
(i) R is at least as L-inequality averse as R′;
(ii) R is at least as RD-inequality averse as R′;
(iii) R is at least as M-inequality averse as R′.
The relationships described in Remark 4.1 also hold for the relation ‘is equally
inequality averse as,’ but not for the relation ‘is more inequality averse than.’
Remark 4.1 shows that the RD-concept is more demanding than the M-concept
and, in turn, the L-concept is more demanding than the RD-concept. A conse-
quence is that if, for instance, the M-concept and the L-concept yield a different
conclusion, then this disagreement will typically be of the type where the M-
concept ranks two SWOs whereas the L-concept does not. The converse case, as
well as cases in which the M-concept and the L-concept rank two SWOs in op-
posite ways, are excluded by Remark 4.1. In this respect, it is important to note
that if two SWOs, say R and R′, are incomparable according to one of the three
concepts of inequality aversion, this does not simply mean that there is not suf-
ficient evidence to refer to one SWO as at least as inequality averse as the other,
but, more strongly, it means that the evidence is pointing in different directions:
for some pair(s) of income distributions, R is locally more inequality averse than
R′, while, for (an)other pair(s) R′, is locally more inequality averse than R.
Comparisons of inequality aversion are often interpreted as comparisons of
the willingness of SWOs to sacrifice mean income in return for a given decrease
in inequality. Since this view of inequality aversion as essentially describing a
trade-off between mean income and equality is popular, we wish to demonstrate
that the L-concept, the M-concept and the RD-concept are consistent with it—i.e.,
that these three concepts can be rephrased in terms of the mean income-equality
trade-off. The following proposition shows that according to each of the three
concepts, for any continuous and monotonic SWOs R and R′, R is at least as
inequality averse as R′ if and only if, starting from any income distribution, R
accepts a move to a given lower level of inequality at a loss of at least as much
income as R′ does.
Proposition 4.1. Let A be equal to either L, M or RD. Let R and R′ be
any two continuous and monotonic SWOs. Then, the following two statements are
equivalent:
(i) R is at least as A-inequality averse as R′;
(ii) for all x,x′,y ∈ X such that x ∼A x′, x ≺A y, xIy and x′I′y, we have µ(x) ≤
µ(x′).
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To conclude the section, we mention two reasons for preferring the simple for-
mulation used in Definition 4.1—i.e., the formulation in terms only of preferences
over pairs of income distributions—to the more traditional formulation in terms
of the mean income-equality trade-off. First, the formulation in Definition 4.1 has
the advantage that it allows application of the inequality aversion concepts to all
SWOs—also for instance to non-continuous SWOs, which will be useful in the
discussion of extreme inequality aversion in Section 4.5. Second, a deeper con-
cern is that an explicit reference to a mean income-equality trade-off may in cer-
tain cases misrepresent what comparisons of inequality aversion are really about.
In general, there is no reason why equality should be traded off only with mean
income. SWOs may express interest for other concerns, such as poverty allevi-
ation for instance—then, the trade-off with mean income is just one of several
trade-offs that are relevant for the idea of inequality aversion. As the neutral for-
mulation used in Definition 4.1 does not refer to any particular trade-off, it seems
to better capture the general essence of the idea of inequality aversion.
4.4 The Three Concepts and the Arrow-Pratt Ap-
proach
The objective of this section is to compare the conventional Arrow-Pratt concept
with the three concepts of inequality aversion that were presented in the previous
section.
We first define the Arrow-Pratt concept. The analysis of Pratt (1964) concern-
ing risk aversion has provided several equivalent concepts that can be applied to
the problem of comparing degrees of inequality aversion (see also Lambert, 2001,
pp. 94-97). Some of these concepts can only be used to compare SWOs that can
be written in the expected utility form, i.e., SWOs that satisfy continuity, mono-
tonicity and separability. This class is important and we shall pay attention to it
in this section. However, because we wish to initially consider the entire class of
continuous and monotonic SWOs, we focus on the strongest of Pratt’s concepts
that is applicable also to non-separable SWOs, viz., the criterion based on the
equally distributed equivalent income. The equally distributed equivalent income,
ξ (R;x), for any income distribution x and any SWO R, is the income that, when
equally distributed, yields the same level of welfare according to R as the income
distribution x.9 Formally, for any SWO R and any x ∈ X , we have ξ (R;x) = e if
and only if e1nIx. The Arrow-Pratt concept of inequality aversion is defined as
follows.
9See Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1969).
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Definition 4.2. Let R and R′ be any two continuous and monotonic SWOs. Then,
R is at least as Arrow-Pratt inequality averse as R′ if and only if, for all x ∈ X ,
ξ (R;x)≤ ξ (R′;x).10
The ‘more inequality averse than’ and ‘equally inequality averse as’ relations
corresponding to the Arrow-Pratt concept are defined in the same way as for the
inequality aversion concept of Definition 4.1.
Although we are most interested in the L-concept for the reason specified in
Section 4.3, it is convenient for expositional purposes to start with the comparison
of the Arrow-Pratt concept with the M-concept and RD-concept. These criteria
will turn out to be closer to the Arrow-Pratt concept than the L-concept is. Con-
sider first the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let R and R′ be any two continuous, monotonic and separable SWOs.
Consider any x,y ∈ X such that
there is an integer k such that xi ≥ yi for all i < k, and xi ≤ yi for all i≥ k. (4.2)
Then, of the following two statements, (i) implies (ii):
(i) R is at least as Arrow-Pratt inequality averse as R′;
(ii) if xP′y, then xPy, and, if xI′y, then xRy.
The following proposition summarizes the relationships between the Arrow-
Pratt concept, the M-concept and the RD-concept.
Proposition 4.2. Let R and R′ be any two continuous and monotonic SWOs. Con-
sider the following three statements:
(i) R is at least as Arrow-Pratt inequality averse as R′;
(ii) R is at least as M-inequality averse as R′;
(iii) R is at least as RD-inequality averse as R′.
Then, we have:
(a) statements (i) and (ii) are equivalent;
(b) statement (iii) implies statement (i), but statement (i) does not imply state-
ment (iii);
(c) if, in addition, R and R′ are separable, then statements (i), (ii) and (iii) are
equivalent.
10Note that the Arrow-Pratt concept compares, for all income distributions, how much sacrifice
of mean income SWOs maximally allow in order to move from a given income distribution to a
perfectly equal one—for an SWO R and an income distribution x, this sacrifice equals [µ(x)−
ξ (R;x)].
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We mentioned in the previous section that the M-concept and the Arrow-Pratt
concept are equivalent for continuous, monotonic and separable SWOs. As state-
ment (a) of Proposition 4.2 shows, this equivalence also holds if separability is
not demanded. This result is not very surprising, given the fact that the defini-
tions of both the M-concept and the Arrow-Pratt concept refer to preferences over
pairs of income distributions of which one is perfectly equal. Statement (b) shows
that, if we take the step from the minimalist IQO to the relative differentials IQO
as the underlying inequality criterion for the concept of inequality aversion, then
we move away from convention. The inconsistency of the RD-concept and the
Arrow-Pratt concept consists of there being SWOs such that the Arrow-Pratt con-
cept ranks them while the RD-concept does not. Finally, statement (c) shows that
the RD-concept and the Arrow-Pratt concept agree on how to rank any pair of
SWOs of the expected utility form.
With respect to the M-concept and the RD-concept we may conclude that the
former, and to a lesser extent the latter, support the claims made traditionally in
the literature on the basis of the Arrow-Pratt concept. An important question we
now turn to is whether the favoured L-concept is consistent with these claims.
We already know, by Remark 4.1 and Proposition 4.2, that the L-concept and the
Arrow-Pratt concept cannot be equivalent for the entire class of monotonic and
continuous SWOs, so the question becomes whether this equivalence holds for
the expected utility class of SWOs (as for the RD-concept), or at least for the
popular CES subclass. This appears not to be the case. According to the Arrow-
Pratt concept, an SWO in the CES class is more inequality averse as the value of its
corresponding ε is greater.11 For this reason, ε is traditionally interpreted as being
a parameter of inequality aversion. Now, there are several pairs of CES SWOs Rε
and Rε ′ such that ε > ε ′, and several pairs of income distributions x,y ∈ X such
that x≺L y, for which we have yPεx while xPε ′y. This is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 4.1. The example is for the case n = 3. Take the income distributions
x = (19,57,76) and y = (20,20,130). We have x ≺L y. However, for all CES
SWOs with ε such that 0.403 < ε < 14.513, we have xPεy, while for all CES
SWOs with ε > 14.514, we have yPεx.12
Note that the example exploits the fact that the parameter ε plays a double
role in the CES class: it is a parameter of inequality aversion in the Arrow-Pratt
sense, but it is also a parameter that measures the sensitivity of the SWO to in-
equality in the bottom of the income distribution relative to inequality in the top
11In fact, ε is the value of the relative Arrow-Pratt measure of risk/inequality aversion.
12Note that we have µ(x) < µ(y) in the example. This is no coincidence since if we would
have µ(x)≥ µ(y) and x ≺L y, then all CES SWOs would strictly prefer x over y, as can be easily
established using the fact that all these SWOs satisfy Lorenz consistency.
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(see Cowell, 1985). Indeed, while y = (20,20,130) is overall more unequal than
x = (19,57,76) according to the Lorenz IQO, which is all that is required for our
purposes, it is true that y has less inequality in the bottom of the income distribu-
tion (i.e., between individuals 1 and 2) than x. Accordingly, the CES SWOs with
higher bottom sensitivity, those with higher values of ε , prefer y to x.
Using a result by Ross (1981) it is possible to draw even stronger conclu-
sions with respect to the CES class. Ross’ critique of the Arrow-Pratt framework
can be interpreted as a confrontation of the L-concept and the M-concept in the
framework of expected utility theory. The following lemma is based on one of his
results.
Lemma 4.2. Let Ru and Rv be any two continuous, monotonic and separable
SWOs such that the respective corresponding utility functions u and v, are twice
differentiable. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) Ru is at least as L-inequality averse as Rv;
(ii) there exist a decreasing and concave function f : R++ → R and a scalar
λ > 0 such that, for all t ∈ R++, u(t) = λv(t)+ f (t).
It can be shown now that in the entire class of CES SWOs there are no two
SWOs that can be compared using the L-concept of inequality aversion.
Proposition 4.3. Let Rε and Rε ′ be any CES SWOs such that ε 6= ε ′. Then, Rε
and Rε ′ are incomparable according to the L-concept, i.e., Rε is not at least as
L-inequality averse as Rε ′ , and Rε ′ is not at least as L-inequality averse as Rε .
The CES class of SWOs is often considered to be very useful in practice be-
cause, according to the conventional Arrow-Pratt approach, it encompasses a con-
tinuum of positions with respect to inequality aversion from the completely non-
egalitarian mean income rule (ε = 0) to leximin (ε → ∞) which is often viewed
as extremely inequality averse (see Section 4.5, but also Chapter 3). The class
owes its popularity furthermore to the fact that it has attractive properties from the
theoretical perspective: all CES SWOs satisfy the basic axioms continuity, mono-
tonicity and separability, and allow a natural decomposition into mean income and
a Lorenz consistent inequality measure as explained in Section 4.2. However, the
deep inconsistency between, on the one hand, the conventional interpretation of
the parameter ε and, on the other hand, the L-concept may be seen as somewhat
damaging for the CES class to operate as a canonical class of SWOs. The problem
is aggravated by the fact that all members of the CES class ascribe importance to
the Lorenz IQO—and thus the L-concept—because they are all Lorenz consistent.
Is it possible to find another class of SWOs which both has attractive properties
and encompasses a continuum of degrees of inequality aversion according to the
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L-concept? Although we shall not attempt to answer this question here, we wish
to note that a sacrifice will have to be made irrespective of the direction in which
an answer is sought. For instance, the analysis of Ross (1981) can be used to
construct a class of SWOs to play a role similar to that of the CES class, in which
case continuity, monotonicity and separability will still be satisfied. However, it
may possibly be seen as a drawback that in that case the natural link between
welfare and an underlying criterion of (Lorenz consistent) inequality will be lost.
Alternatively, such a natural link can be taken as a starting point to construct an
alternative to the CES class, but at the cost of separability.13
4.5 Extreme Inequality Aversion
In this section, we characterize the classes of SWOs that reconcile monotonicity
with an extreme form of inequality aversion for each of the three concepts pro-
posed in Section 4.3.14
Conventionally, maximin and leximin, both of which give absolute priority to
the worst off, are seen as typical examples of extremely inequality averse SWOs.
Maximin implies indifference in all cases in which the worst off is equally well
off, i.e., an SWO R is maximin if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X , xRy ⇔ x1 ≥ y1.
Leximin, on the other hand, gives priority to the second worst off in the cases
where the worst off is equally well off in both alternatives, and so on, i.e., an
SWO R is leximin if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X , we have
xRy⇔ x = y, or, there is an integer k such that
xi = yi for all i < k and xk > yk.
Maximin and leximin are both members of the class of weakly maximin SWOs,
which is the class of SWOs that all have in common the asymmetric part of max-
imin, i.e., an SWO R is weakly maximin if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X , if x1 > y1,
then xPy. It can be shown that maximin is the only continuous member of the
class of weakly maximin SWOs and that leximin is the only separable member
of the class.15 It will be of interest to see what role leximin plays in our analy-
sis, since this is the only popular SWO that is commonly viewed as combining
extreme inequality aversion with monotonicity—maximin, by contrast, does not
satisfy monotonicity.
13See Champernowne and Cowell (1998, pp. 107-108) on a similar point.
14How the ideals of extreme inequality aversion and monotonicity can be combined is an im-
portant question in egalitarian social ethics. See Tungodden (2003, pp. 10-23) for an overview of
the economic and philosophical literature concerning this topic.
15See Chapter 5.
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The starting point of our analysis is the following definition of the idea of
extreme inequality aversion.
Definition 4.3. Let S be a class of SWOs. An SWO R is extremely inequality
averse in the class S if and only if R is a member of S and R is at least as inequality
averse as any member of S.
This definition assures that an extremely inequality averse SWO in S never
implies a choice over a pair of income distributions that is less inequality averse
than that implied by any other member of S. Note also that all extremely inequality
averse SWOs are equally inequality averse.
In what follows, we identify the members of the class of monotonic SWOs
that are extremely inequality averse according to the M-concept, the RD-concept
and the L-concept. Since we do not require continuity, the standard Arrow-Pratt
concept cannot be applied in this context—however, it is natural to interpret the
M-concept as being the evident extension of the Arrow-Pratt concept capable of
such comparisons. Again, it is convenient to begin the analysis by considering the
M-concept and the RD-concept.
Proposition 4.4. Let R be any monotonic SWO. Then, the following five state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) R is extremely M-inequality averse in the class of monotonic SWOs;
(ii) R is extremely RD-inequality averse in the class of monotonic SWOs;
(iii) for all x,y ∈ X such that not x < y, we have, if x≺M y, then xPy;
(iv) for all x,y ∈ X such that not x < y, we have, if x≺RD y, then xPy;
(v) R is weakly maximin.
The equivalence of (i) and (v) in Proposition 4.4 says that, the case of ex-
treme M-inequality aversion in the class of monotonic SWOs is covered by the
monotonic weakly maximin SWOs. To a certain extent, this result supports the
conventional view that leximin constitutes the case of extreme inequality aversion.
The reason is that the literature focuses virtually exclusively on separable SWOs
when studying extreme inequality aversion, combined with the fact that leximin is
the only separable weakly maximin SWO.16 The finding that (i) and (v) are equiv-
alent is important for two reasons. Firstly, given Remark 4.1, it follows from this
16The interpretation of leximin as being extremely inequality averse can be defended on the
basis of the Arrow-Pratt concept. As we saw in Chapter 3, Hammond (1975) has demonstrated
that leximin can be interpreted as the limit case, ε → ∞, of the CES class of SWOs, a point
which Lambert (2001, Theorem 4.4) has generalized with respect to the entire class of continuous,
monotonic and separable SWOs. In Chapter 3, we have shown that using an approach analogous
to that of Hammond (1975) and Lambert (2001) the weakly maximin class can be identified as
extremely inequality averse on the basis of the Arrow-Pratt concept if separability is dropped.
Proposition 4.4 confirms the latter result.
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result that the classes of extremely inequality averse SWOs that are implied by the
RD-concept and the L-concept must be subsets of the class of monotonic weakly
maximin SWOs. Secondly, it presents another way of seeing why the M-concept
is unattractive. As an illustration of this point, consider the following SWO R: for
all x,y ∈ X , we have,
if x1 > y1, then xPy, and
if x1 = y1, then [xRy⇔ µ(x)≥ µ(y)].
Clearly, this SWO is both monotonic and weakly maximin. Now note that when-
ever two income distributions have the same lowest incomes, this SWO ranks
them according to the completely non-egalitarian mean income rule.17 Probably,
many would hesitate to refer to such an SWO as extremely inequality averse, thus
implicitly accepting that the M-concept is too undemanding as a criterion for com-
paring degrees of inequality aversion. However, as the equivalence of (ii) and (v)
shows, moving on to the RD-concept does not solve anything: the class of mono-
tonic weakly maximin SWOs is still identified as the extremely inequality averse
subclass of the class of monotonic SWOs. Before we consider which monotonic
weakly maximin SWOs survive the test of Definition 4.3 when we move to the
L-concept, we consider the other statements of Proposition 4.4.
The conditions expressed in statements (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 4.4 con-
stitute a natural way of giving meaning to extreme inequality aversion for SWOs
that satisfy monotonicity—the conditions say that one should prefer, for any pair
of income distributions, the one which is less unequal (according to the minimal-
ist IQO and the relative differentials IQO in statements (iii) and (iv), respectively)
unless the income distribution is worse for some and better for none. In a recent
study on the possibility of combining extreme inequality aversion and monotonic-
ity, Tungodden and Vallentyne (2005) have taken natural conditions as those ex-
pressed in statements (iii) and (iv) as a starting point (so, relying only implicitly
on the concepts defined in our Definitions 4.1 and 4.3). They have considered a
condition similar to that of statement (iii) and also show that statements (iii) and
(v) are equivalent. Later, we draw a more interesting parallel between the present
work and theirs.
Now, we come to the important question of which SWOs are extremely in-
equality averse according to the L-concept. Note first that while the M-concept
and the RD-concept identify all weakly maximin SWOs as extremely inequality
averse, according to the L-concept no member of this class is extremely inequality
averse.
17Note that the comparison of such income distributions is probably even quite common in
practice—think of a change in the tax system that leaves the existing minimally guaranteed income
unaffected.
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Proposition 4.5. Let R be any continuous and monotonic SWO satisfying Lorenz
consistency. Then, there are several pairs x,y ∈ X for which x≺L y, such that we
have xPy, while all weakly maximin SWOs strictly prefer y to x.
Proposition 4.5 demonstrates that, given the L-concept, the weakly maximin
SWOs do not only fail the test of extreme inequality aversion described in Def-
inition 4.3, they do so in a particularly bad way. The proposition says that, for
instance, it is possible to find pairs of income distributions such that a CES SWO
with ε arbitrarily close to, but greater than, zero, and hence arbitrarily close to the
completely non-egalitarian mean income rule, is locally more inequality averse
than all weakly maximin SWOs for these pairs. As an illustration, note that, for the
income distributions x and y in Example 4.1, all weakly maximin SWOs strictly
prefer y to x. Because any extremely L-inequality averse SWO in the class of
monotonic SWOs must be weakly maximin by Remark 4.1 and Proposition 4.4,
the following result follows immediately from Proposition 4.5.
Proposition 4.6. There is no SWO that is extremely L-inequality averse in the
class of monotonic SWOs.
So, we conclude that if we accept the L-concept, then extreme inequality aver-
sion is incompatible with monotonicity. In their work, Tungodden and Vallentyne
(2005) reach a similar conclusion. However, they implicitly use a criterion that
lies in between the M-concept and the RD-concept, and find an incompatibility.18
This is possible because they use a slightly (but significantly) different framework
than the one used here: their result is driven by the fact that they reject anonymity
as a property of SWOs, but accept it for IQOs. The present study shows that with-
out this assumption, there is no incompatibility between their version of extreme
inequality aversion and monotonicity (this is implied by the equivalence of (ii)
and (v) in Proposition 4.4), but that the incompatibility crops up again when the
L-concept is accepted (Proposition 4.6).19
What should egalitarians who agree with the L-concept and want both mono-
tonicity and extreme inequality aversion choose as an SWO? It might at first
glance seem natural to regard leximin or other monotonic weakly maximin SWOs
as being ‘close enough’—these SWOs satisfy a necessary condition for being ex-
tremely inequality averse (they are extremely inequality averse if one looks only
at the pairs in ≺M or ≺RD), and a sufficient condition cannot be satisfied (being
extremely inequality averse for those in ≺L is impossible), hence why not content
18More precisely, they use a condition similar to that stated in statements (iii) and (iv) of Propo-
sition 4.4, but with, instead of the minimalist or relative differentials IQO, an IQO that is a proper
subrelation of the relative differentials IQO and a proper superrelation of the minimalist IQO.
19In Tungodden (2000) it is also shown that, without rejecting anonymity, their extreme inequal-
ity aversion condition and monotonicity are compatible.
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ourselves with these? Proposition 4.5 illustrates already how unattractive it is to
settle for a conclusion based on the less demanding criteria M-concept and RD-
concept if the L-concept is the one which is deemed ideal. There is also a deeper
reason for extreme egalitarians not to (necessarily) focus on the class of weakly
maximin SWOs. It is perfectly acceptable to consider the pairs ordered by the
minimalist IQO (i.e., the set ≺M) as not being more important than some alterna-
tive set of pairs ordered by the Lorenz IQO (i.e., a subset of≺L which differs from
≺M). If one accepts the Lorenz IQO, these former pairs of income distributions
are not special in any way. If such an alternative set of pairs is used in a criterion
for comparing degrees of inequality aversion, in accordance with the explanation
at the beginning of Section 4.3, then the set of extremely inequality averse mono-
tonic SWOs need not be empty, nor contain any weakly maximin SWOs. For
instance, if the income distributions from Example 4.1 are members of this al-
ternative set, then none of the weakly maximin SWOs pass the test of extreme
inequality aversion of Definition 4.3, while (depending on the other elements of
the set) other SWOs may pass the test.
To conclude the section, we consider two alternative ways of giving meaning
to the view that inequality reduction should always be preferred unless no one
gains by it. However, as we shall see, neither alternative produces a convincing
way out of the incompatibility.
The first alternative is to consider the SWOs for which no monotonic SWO
is more inequality averse according to the L-concept, instead of the ones that are
at least as inequality averse as all the other monotonic ones according to the L-
concept (as in Definition 4.3). Consider the following definition of this alternative
concept of ‘maximal inequality aversion.’
Definition 4.4. Let S be a class of SWOs. An SWO R is maximally inequality
averse in the class S if and only if R is a member of S and no member of S is more
inequality averse than R.20
The subset of maximally L-inequality averse SWOs in the set of monotonic
SWOs is not empty: as the following proposition shows, at least leximin is a
member.
Proposition 4.7. Leximin is maximally L-inequality averse in the set of monotonic
SWOs.
20Note that the ideas of extreme inequality aversion and maximal inequality aversion do not, in
general, coincide if the concept of inequality aversion does not provide a complete ranking (as is
the case for all inequality aversion concepts discussed in this chapter). The distinction between
extreme inequality aversion and maximal inequality aversion is analogues to the distinction made
by Sen (1997) between optimization and maximization, respectively, in individual choice theory.
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However, the concept of maximal inequality aversion seems too undemand-
ing, because it is not excluded that there are SWOs, which are themselves un-
likely candidates for being considered extremely inequality averse, that are more
inequality averse for at least some pairs of income distributions—in the case of
leximin, Proposition 4.5 should suffice to make this point.
A second alternative is to start from the view that SWOs are functions of an
underlying inequality measure or IQO, a view not uncommon in the literature as
we saw in Section 4.2. In that perspective, the following approach to combining
monotonicity and an absolute preference for inequality reduction seems reason-
able: choose an SWO that, for all pairs of income distributions to which mono-
tonicity applies, follows monotonicity, and, for all pairs to which monotonicity
does not apply, prefers the income distribution which minimizes inequality ac-
cording to some IQO (or some inequality measure). Note that this approach does
not require a complete IQO since the IQO need not order pairs of income distri-
butions to which monotonicity applies—it does have to order all pairs to which
monotonicity does not apply, however. The question is whether it is possible to
find an SWO and a corresponding IQO that satisfy the required condition. First
we need to consider some minimal criteria that a sensible IQO ought to satisfy.
The first is that it should have the minimalist IQO as a subrelation. The second
is that it satisfies some invariance criterion. An invariance criterion defines the
transformation which when applied to all incomes leaves inequality invariant. For
instance, the invariance criterion underlying the Lorenz IQO and the relative dif-
ferentials IQO is scale invariance, which says: for all x ∈ X and all scalars λ > 0,
x ∼ λx. However, we will demand only that a much weaker invariance criterion
is satisfied. Minimal invariance says that for any given income distribution there
must exist an income distribution in which everyone is better off and which is at
least as unequal as the given income distribution.
Minimal Invariance. For all x ∈ X , there is a x′ ∈ X such that x′ x and x x′.
The following proposition shows that no SWO and IQO with the described
properties exist.
Proposition 4.8. Let R be any monotonic SWO and let be any IQO that satisfies
minimal invariance and for which ≺⊃≺M. Then, the following condition is not
satisfied: for all x,y ∈ X such that not x < y, x y⇔ xRy.
The proposition implies that whatever the concept of inequality used (requir-
ing only that it satisfies minimal conditions—far weaker than Lorenz consistency
for instance), say, leximin at least for some pairs of income distributions will not
choose the least unequal one according to this concept of inequality, even though
this income distribution is not worse by monotonicity. Moreover, this is not only
true for leximin, but for all monotonic SWOs.
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4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we studied a straightforward dominance procedure for comparing
SWOs with respect to degree of inequality aversion. We considered three ver-
sions of the procedure based on three inequality criteria: the L-concept which we
argued to be the ideal version, the M-concept which is roughly equivalent to the
traditional Arrow-Pratt approach, and the RD-concept which is intermediate in
strength between the other two concepts.
It was shown that the L-concept is in general incompatible with the M-concept.
In the case of the CES class of SWOs, the difference between the conclusions pro-
duced by the two concepts was especially pronounced: whereas the M-concept
ranks all members of this class, the L-concept ranks none. As we have said al-
ready, it would be interesting to think about theoretically agreeable alternatives to
the CES class of which the members can be ranked using the L-concept and which
covers a wide spectrum of positions with respect to inequality aversion. Proba-
bly the most attractive solution is to give up separability and to consider classes
of SWOs such as those given by W (x) = µ(x)[1− J(x)]α for all x ∈ X , where
J is a Lorenz consistent inequality measure and α is a parameter that measures
inequality aversion in accordance with the L-concept. It may be interesting to
see whether classes of SWOs in the spirit of this example can be constructed in a
theoretically and philosophically sound way starting directly from the idea of the
natural decomposition of welfare in mean income and inequality.
We showed, furthermore, that if we accept the L-concept, then monotonicity
and extreme inequality aversion are incompatible. Hence, egalitarians commit-
ted to monotonicity have to content themselves with being less than extremely
inequality averse: it is always possible to find pairs of income distributions for
which a less inequality averse choice than possible must be made. Those who
are attracted to both the ideals of monotonicity and extreme inequality aversion
have to determine which of the two to weaken. We have discussed that if extreme
inequality aversion is weakened, nothing forces one to opt for a weakly maximin
SWO such as leximin. It is perfectly possible to choose a different set over which
one wants to make inequality averse choices than the set that forces one to give
full priority to the worst off. The other possibility, not yet discussed, is to weaken
monotonicity. For instance, a possibility is to demand only ray-monotonicity: for
all x ∈ X and all λ > 1, λxPx. It can easily be shown that there exist extremely
inequality averse SWOs according to the L-concept in the class of ray-monotonic
SWOs.21 Interestingly, not only does the weakening to ray-monotonicity make it
possible to have extremely inequality averse SWOs, but none of them is weakly
21Consider the example of an SWO R: for all x,y ∈ X , we have, if x≺ y, then xPy, and if x∼ y,
then [xRy⇔ µ(x)≥ µ(y)], where  is a Lorenz consistent and complete IQO.
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maximin (and this is true even if we use the M-concept instead of the L-concept).
In other words, whichever of the two ideals egalitarians choose to weaken in or-
der to deal with the incompatibility, they should not feel required to restrict their
consideration to leximin or other weakly maximin SWOs.
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Appendix 4.A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1. We provide a proof for the case where A is equal to
L. The proofs for the cases where A is equal to M or RD are very similar
and are, therefore, omitted.
First, we show that statement (i) implies statement (ii). Assume that (i) is true.
Take any x,x′,y ∈ X such that x∼L x′, x≺L y, xIy and x′I′y. We have to show that
µ(x)≤ µ(x′). Note that, for all z,w ∈ X , z∼L w if and only if there exists a scalar
λ > 0 such that λ z = w. Hence, there exists a λ > 0 such that λx′ = x. Now,
we have x′Ry by (i). Since also xIy, it follows that λ ≤ 1 by monotonicity. By
consequence, we obtain µ(x)≤ µ(x′).
Second, we show that statement (ii) implies statement (i). Assume that (ii) is
true. Take any x,y ∈ X such that x ≺L y. By continuity and monotonicity, there
exist λ ,λ ′ > 0 such that λxIy and λ ′xI′y. To check statement (ii), suppose, first,
that xP′y. We have to show that in this case xPy. Note that xP′y implies λ ′ < 1
by monotonicity. Since, furthermore, λ ≤ λ ′ by (ii), we have λ < 1. Hence,
monotonicity implies xPy. By a similar reasoning, xI′y is seen to imply xRy. 
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let Ru and Rv be any two continuous, monotonic and sepa-
rable SWOs with u and v as utility functions in (4.1), respectively. Suppose that
statement (i) is true for Ru and Rv, i.e., ξ (Ru;x) ≤ ξ (Rv;x) for all x ∈ X . We de-
note the sets of individuals who gain and individuals who lose in going from any
y ∈ X to any x ∈ X by G(y,x) = {i |xi > yi} and L(y,x) = {i |xi < yi}, respectively.
Throughout the proof we consider the pair x,y ∈ X , which is any pair for which
condition (4.2) of Lemma 4.1 is satisfied. What has to be shown is that statement
(ii) is true for this pair, i.e., if xIvy, then xRuy, and, if xPvy, then xPuy. Therefore,
it is assumed that we have either xIvy or xPvy. Since statement (ii) is trivially true
for the pair x,y in the cases where G(y,x) = ∅ or L(y,x) = ∅, we only consider
cases in which both sets are nonempty.
We require a tool to bring any income distribution z ∈ X closer to x by replac-
ing at least one of the components of z by a component of x, and this in such a
way that for the resulting income distribution z′ we have zIvz′. Consider a function
Ti j which transforms any z ∈ X into z′ by replacing two and only two incomes, zi
and z j. The function Ti j has z in its domain if and only if zi < xi ≤ x j < z j, in
other words, if and only if i ∈G(z,x) and j ∈ L(z,x), and, furthermore, i < j. The
values of z′i and z′j are determined as follows: (a) if v(xi)+ v(x j) = v(zi)+ v(z j),
then (z′i,z′j) = (xi,x j), (b) if v(xi) + v(x j) > v(zi) + v(z j), then (z′i,z′j) = (s,x j),
where s is such that zi < s < xi and v(zi) + v(z j) = v(s) + v(x j), (c) if v(xi) +
v(x j) < v(zi)+ v(z j), then (z′i,z′j) = (xi, t), where t is such that x j < t < z j and
v(zi)+ v(z j) = v(xi)+ v(t). The s and t considered in cases (b) and (c), respec-
tively, always exist by continuity and monotonicity. Note that indeed zIvz′.
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Now, using Ti j, we transform y step by step into x. First, transform y into y′ by
applying Ti j for some i ∈G(y,x) and some j ∈ L(y,x). If G(y′,x) and/or L(y′,x) is
empty, stop. Otherwise, perform the transformation on y′ by again applying Ti j for
some i ∈ G(y′,x) and some j ∈ L(y′,x) such that i < j. Repeat this until the set of
those who gain and/or the set of those who lose is empty after the transformation,
then stop. Note that the transformation can always be performed if the sets are
both nonempty due to the fact that x,y ∈ X satisfy condition (4.2) of Lemma 4.1,
since the condition implies that, for all i∈G(y,x) and all j ∈ L(y,x), we have i< j,
and this continues to hold after every step. So, the income distribution that results
from the final step, say y′′, has the property that G(y′′,x) and/or L(y′′,x) is empty
and y′′Ivy. Furthermore, it is impossible that G(y′′,x) is empty while L(y′′,x) is
not, since otherwise x < y′′ and so y′′Pvx by monotonicity, so that the fact that
y′′Ivy would imply that yPvx, contrary to what we assumed. So, given that L(y′′,x)
must be empty, we have either y′′ < x or y′′ = x and, by consequence, x is weakly
preferred to y′′ by any monotonic SWO.
We shall now show that y′′Ivy implies y′′Ruy. It is known from Pratt (1964)
that ξ (Ru;x) ≤ ξ (Rv;x) for all x ∈ X implies that u = f ◦ v where the function
f : R→ R is strictly increasing and concave. Now for any z ∈ X , zIvz′ is equiva-
lent to v(z′i)+ v(z′j) = v(zi)+ v(z j) or v(z′i)− v(zi) = v(z j)− v(z′j). Since, further-
more, v(z j)> v(z′j)> v(z′i)> v(zi), we have u(z′i)−u(zi)≥ u(z j)−u(z′j) by strict
increasingness and concavity of f . So, we have z′Ruz. Hence, by transitivity, it
follows that y′′Ruy
We can now conclude the following. In the case where xIvy, we have indeed
xRuy, since y′′Ruy and since x is weakly preferred to y′′ by any monotonic SWO.
In the case where xPvy, we have indeed xPuy since xPvy and y′′Ivy imply xPvy′′ and
hence x > y′′, so that, by xPuy′′ and y′′Ruy, we obtain xPuy. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2. (a) Statement (i) of Proposition 4.2 is equivalent to
statement (ii) of Proposition 4.1 for A=M. Hence, the result follows from
Proposition 4.1.
(b) That (iii) implies (i) follows from statement (a) and Remark 4.1. We give
an example to show that (i) does not imply (iii). Consider an SWO R such that,
for all x,y ∈ X ,
xRy⇔ F(x)≥ F(y),
where
F(x) =
{ 2
3x1 +
1
3x2 +∑ni=3 xi if x1 ≥ 25x2;
3
13(4x1 + x2)+∑ni=3 xi if x1 ≤ 25x2.
Consider also an SWO R′ such that, for all x,y ∈ X ,
xR′y⇔ G(x)≥ G(y),
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where
G(x) =
{ 3
5x1 +
2
5x2 +∑ni=3 xi if x1 ≥ 12x2;
7
30(4x1 + x2)+∑ni=3 xi if x1 ≤ 12x2.
Both SWOs are clearly continuous and monotonic.
First, we show that R is at least as Arrow-Pratt inequality averse as R′. We
consider, in turn, the three possible cases. (I) Case where x ∈ A = {x ∈ X |x1 ≥
1
2x2}: Note that ξ (R;x) = 1n−1(23x1 + 13x2 + ∑ni=3 xi) and ξ (R′;x) = 1n−1(35x1 +
2
5x2 +∑ni=3 xi) for all x ∈ A. By consequence, ξ (R;x)≤ ξ (R′;x) for all x ∈ A. (II)
Case where x∈B= {x∈X | 25x2≤ x1≤ 12x2}: Note that ξ (R;x)= 1n−1(23x1+ 13x2+
∑ni=3 xi) for all x ∈ B. To calculate ξ (R′;x) for any given x ∈ B, we first find an y ∈
X such that xI′y and (y1,y2) = (12t, t) and then use that ξ (R
′;x) = ξ (R′;y). Now, y
is such that 4x1 +x2 = 412t + t, so that t =
4x1+x2
3 , and yi = xi for all i = 3,4, . . . ,n.
Since y ∈ A, we can calculate ξ (R′;y) as in the previous case, so that ξ (R′;x) =
ξ (R′;y) = 1
n−1(
28
30x1 +
7
30x2 +∑ni=3 xi). For all x = (x1,x2) ∈ X , ξ (R;x)< ξ (R′;x)
if and only if the condition is met that x1 > 38x2, a condition that holds for all x∈B.
(III) Case where x ∈C = {x ∈ X |x1 ≤ 25x2}: To calculate ξ (R;x) and ξ (R′;x) for
any given x ∈ C, we use the same method as in the previous case. So, first we
find y,y′ ∈ X such that xIy, xI′y′, (y1,y2) = (25t, t) and yi = xi for all i = 3,4, . . . ,n,
(y′1,y
′
2) = (
2
5t
′, t ′) and y′i = xi for all i = 3,4, . . . ,n, and then calculate ξ (R;y) and
ξ (R′;y′), which are equal to ξ (R;x) and ξ (R′;x), respectively. Note, however,
that t = t ′, so that, since y,y′ ∈ B, we have that ξ (R;y) < ξ (R′;y′), and hence
ξ (R;x) < ξ (R′;x) for all x ∈ C. We conclude from (I), (II) and (III) that R is at
least as Arrow-Pratt inequality averse as R′.
We now show that R is not at least as RD-inequality averse as R′. Consider x
and y such that (x1,xn) = (120,785), (y1,yn) = (100,800) and xi = yi = 240 for
all i = 2,3, . . . ,(n−1). Clearly, x≺RD y, but yPx while xP′y.
(c) That (iii) implies (i) follows from (b). That (i) implies (iii) follows from
Lemma 4.1 and the fact that, for any pair x,y ∈ X , if x≺RD y, then condition (4.2)
of Lemma 4.1 is met. 
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Ross (1981) shows (ii) to be equivalent to the condition: for
all x,y ∈ X such that x ≺L y, if x− piu1nIuy and x− piv1nIvy, then piu ≥ piv. We
consider the following condition:
for all x,y ∈ X such that x≺L y, if γuxIuy and γvxIvy, then γu ≤ γv. (4.3)
If this latter condition is fitted into the proof of Ross instead of the former, it is
easily seen that they play the same role and are equivalent.
What remains to be shown is that the condition in (4.3) is equivalent to (i).
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First we show that (4.3) is equivalent to
for all x,x′,y ∈ X such that x∼L x′, x≺L y, xIuy and x′Ivy,
we have µ(x)≤ µ(x′). (4.4)
It is immediate that (4.4) implies (4.3). That (4.3) implies (4.4) follows from the
fact that if there exist x,x′,y ∈ X such that x ∼L x′, x ≺L y, xIuy and x′Ivy, then
there exists a z ∈ X and scalars γu,γv such that x = γuz and x′ = γvz. Now, since
(4.4) is equivalent to (i) by Proposition 4.1, the required result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Seeking a contradiction, suppose that, without loss of
generality, ε > ε ′ and that Rε is at least as L-inequality averse as Rε ′ . Then, by
Lemma 4.2, there exist a decreasing and concave function f : R++ → R and a
scalar λ > 0 such that, for all t ∈ R++,
t1−ε
1− ε = λ
t1−ε ′
1− ε ′ + f (t).
Decreasingness and concavity of f imply
d f (t)
dt = t
−ε −λ t−ε ′ ≤ 0 for all t ∈ R++, (4.5)
and
d f 2(t)
dt2 =−εt
−(1+ε)+λε ′t−(1+ε
′) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ R++. (4.6)
From (4.5) and (4.6) it follows that
λ ≥ t−(ε−ε ′) for all t ∈ R++, (4.7)
and
λ ≤ ε
ε ′
t−(ε−ε
′) for all t ∈ R++, (4.8)
respectively. Since the functions t 7→ t−(ε−ε ′) and t 7→ εε ′ t−(ε−ε
′) map R++ onto
R++, there exist s, t ∈ R++ such that s−(ε−ε ′) > εε ′ t−(ε−ε
′)
. By consequence, λ
cannot satisfy both (4.7) and (4.8) and we have a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Equivalence of (iii) and (v): That (v) implies (iii) is
immediate. We prove using contraposition that (iii) implies (v). Suppose R is a
monotonic SWO for which (v) is not true, that is, R is not weakly maximin. Then,
there is a pair x,y ∈ X , where x1 > y1, such that yRx. Since xRx11n by reflexivity
and monotonicity, we have by transitivity that yRx11n while not x11n < y and
x11n ≺M y. Hence, (iii) is not true for R.
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Equivalence of (i) and (iii): That (iii) implies (i) is immediate. We prove using
contraposition that (i) implies (iii). Suppose that R is a monotonic SWO for which
(iii) is not true, that is, there is a pair x,y∈ X such that not x < y and x≺M y, while
yRx. Now, take any monotonic SWO R′ such that xP′y. Clearly, R is not at least
as inequality averse as R′ according to the M-concept. Hence, (i) is not true for R.
Equivalence of (iv) and (v): We first show that (v) implies (iv). Let x,y ∈ X
be any pair such that not x < y and x ≺RD y. Suppose, first, that µ(x) > µ(y).
Then, there must be an i ∈ N such that xiyi > 1. Since also x ≺RD y, we have
x1
y1 > 1. Hence, xPy for any weakly maximin SWO R. Suppose alternatively that
µ(x) ≤ µ(y). Then, because x ≺RD y, x1 ≤ y1 would imply that xiyi ≤ 1 for all
i ∈ N and xiyi < 1 for at least one i ∈ N and, hence, that x < y which contradicts
our premise. By consequence, x1 > y1 and xPy for any weakly maximin SWO R.
Since (iv) implies (iii), because ≺M⊂≺RD, and (iii) implies (v), as shown above,
it follows furthermore that (iv) implies (v).
Equivalence of (ii) and (iv): The proof is very similar to that of the equivalence
of (i) and (iii) and is therefore omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Take any x,y ∈ X such that x1 ≤ x2 < x3 and y =(
λx1,λ
∑ni=2 xi
n−1 ,λ
∑ni=2 xi
n−1 , . . . ,λ
∑ni=2 xi
n−1
)
where λ is a positive scalar. For any allowed
value of λ , we have y≺L x. Whenever λ = 1, then yPx by Lorenz consistency. By
continuity and monotonicity, there is an infinite number of λ s such that 0 < λ < 1
and yPx. Now, for any such λ we have that x is strictly preferred to y by all weakly
maximin SWOs. 
Proof of Proposition 4.7. Suppose R is a monotonic SWO that is more inequality
averse than leximin. Then, there is some pair x,y ∈ X such that x ≺L y, xRy and
leximin strictly prefers y to x. By the latter condition, we have that, either (a) x1 <
y1, or (b) there is a k > 1 such that, for all i = 1,2, . . . ,(k−1) we have xi = yi while
xk < yk. Now, consider a z∈X such that, in case (a), x1 < z1 < y1 and z= z11n and,
in case (b), zi = xi = yi for all i = 1,2, . . . ,(k−1), xk < zk < min{ ∑
n
i=k xi
n−k+1 ,yk} and
zi = zk for all i = (k+1),(k+2), . . . ,n. Then, by monotonicity, yPz, and hence by
transitivity xPz. Now, z≺L x and leximin strictly prefers z to x. By consequence,
R is not more inequality averse than leximin and we have a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 4.8. Proposition 4.4 implies that a monotonic SWO R can
only satisfy the condition stated in the proposition if it is weakly maximin. Next,
take an income distribution x∈X where x1 < x2 < x3. By minimal invariance there
must be some x′ ∈ X such that x′ x and x x′. Now consider an y such that x1 <
y1 < x′1, y2 < x2 < x
′
2, and x3 < x′3 < y3. Clearly, for any weakly maximin SWO
R, we have yPx and x′Py. Now, suppose  is an inequality quasi-ordering that
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satisfies the condition specified in the proposition. Then, x x′, y≺ x since not y>
x, and x′≺ y since not x′> y. The IQO is intransitive, which is a contradiction. 
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Connection between Chapters 4 and 5: In Chapter 4 (as well as in Chapter 3),
concepts of inequality aversion were used to determine the class of extremely in-
equality averse social welfare orderings. An alternative egalitarian approach is
to focus on a particular basic inequality decreasing transformation and demand
that the social welfare ordering always considers the transformation as welfare
increasing. In Chapter 5, we study Hammond equity, which is a famous exam-
ple of an axiom in this spirit. We argue that Hammond equity is too demanding
as a general egalitarian principle because it sometimes forces social welfare or-
derings to make choices over pairs of income distributions that cannot be ranked
using the Lorenz inequality criterion. This critique is in a sense the counterpart
of the critique of the Arrow-Pratt criterion in Chapter 4: there we argued that
the Arrow-Pratt concept is not demanding enough because in comparing social
welfare orderings it does not use all pairs of income distributions that can be
ranked using the Lorenz inequality criterion. We introduce in Chapter 5 a modi-
fied version of Hammond equity which does not share the mentioned shortcoming
of Hammond equity. This new axiom is then used to characterize once again the
weakly maximin class (Proposition 5.1), and, moreover, to characterize maximin
(Theorem 5.1), which is a prominent member of this class.
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Chapter 5
A Characterization of Maximin
This chapter is based on joint work with Erwin Ooghe.
5.1 Introduction
Maximin and leximin are two well known social rankings which give priority to
the worst off. Leximin receives considerable attention in the axiomatic social
choice literature—see, e.g., Sen (1986), and more recently Bossert and Weymark
(2004) and d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002), for excellent overviews. Among the
many available characterizations, we mention Hammond’s (1976) seminal one,
in which an equity axiom—Hammond equity—is reconciled with the standard
axioms anonymity and strong Pareto.
Contrary to leximin, maximin traditionally receives very little attention—e.g.,
none of the above overviews provides a characterization of maximin. In the con-
text of Hammond’s characterization of leximin, maximin is often just quoted as
an example of a different rule that also satisfies Hammond equity. In addition,
maximin satisfies anonymity and—contrary to leximin—continuity, but only weak
Pareto instead of the more demanding strong Pareto. As far as we know, no at-
tempts have been made to characterize maximin along this line. Roemer (1996, p.
35) characterizes maximin on the basis of a strong information invariance require-
ment (allowing only ordinal measurability and full comparability of utilities). In
a recent contribution, Segal and Sobel (2002) provide a joint characterization of
maximin, maximax and the sum of utilities rule using a partial separability ax-
iom.1
Our main contribution is to provide the characterization of maximin alluded
1Lauwers (1997) characterizes the related infimum rule in the context of social choice with in-
finite populations. For choice under uncertainty, a characterization of maximin has been provided
by Barbera´ and Jackson (1988).
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to above, i.e., on the basis of anonymity, continuity, weak Pareto and Hammond
equity. In addition, we (i) show that this characterization result remains valid
under a weaker and possibly more interesting set of axioms, and (ii) present an
alternative characterization of leximin along this way.
5.2 Preliminaries
The problem of social choice concerns the determination of a ranking of all possi-
ble alternatives open to society. A society consists of n ∈N0 individuals, gathered
in a set N = {1, . . . , i, . . . ,n}. In line with the so called welfarist doctrine, the dif-
ferent alternatives for society are represented by individual utility vectors, denoted
by u = (u1, . . . ,un) ∈ Rn. Let (u(1),u(2), . . . ,u(n)) be a permutation of the utility
vector u such that u(1) ≤ u(2) ≤ ·· · ≤ u(n). The idea of a social ranking is cap-
tured by a binary relation R (‘is at least as good as’) on Rn. The asymmetric and
symmetric parts of R are denoted P (‘is better than’) and I (‘is equally good as’),
respectively. We assume R to be a quasi-ordering, i.e., a reflexive and transitive
(but not necessarily complete) relation.
We can now define maximin. A quasi-ordering R on Rn is maximin if and only
if, for all u,v ∈ Rn,
uRv if and only if u(1) ≥ v(1).
Maximin is obviously a complete quasi-ordering: it fully corresponds with the
ranking of the worst off. We note that maximin is a member of the class of weakly
maximin quasi-orderings. A quasi-ordering R onRn is weakly maximin if and only
if, for all u,v ∈ Rn,
if u(1) > v(1), then uPv.
To characterize maximin, we need to define some axioms. The first four ax-
ioms are well known. Anonymity requires that the identities of the individuals do
not matter.
Anonymity. For all u ∈ Rn, uIu′, with u′ any permutation of u.
Continuity ensures, loosely speaking, that small changes in a utility vector can
only cause small changes in its social ranking with respect to other utility vectors.
Continuity. For all u ∈ Rn, if a sequence of vectors (vk)k∈N0 converges to v and
we have uRvk (respectively, vkRu) for all k ∈ N0, then uRv (respectively, vRu).2
2Contrary to the version of the continuity axiom used in Chapters 3 and 4, the version in this
chapter is suitable also for incomplete relations. For complete relations, the two versions are
equivalent.
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Weak Pareto demands that an increase in the utilities of all individuals is con-
sidered as an improvement.
Weak Pareto. For all u,v ∈ Rn, if ui > vi for all i ∈ N, then uPv.
According to Hammond equity, social welfare should (weakly) increase when-
ever the utilities of two individuals become more equal while keeping the other
utilities constant.
Hammond Equity. For all u,v ∈ Rn, if vi < ui < u j < v j for some i, j ∈ N, and
uk = vk for all k 6= i, j, then uRv.
We wish to introduce an alternative equity axiom. It is convenient to first point
out what some may consider to be a shortcoming of Hammond equity. Hammond
equity is not an egalitarian principle in the following sense: if Hammond equity
implies uRv for some utility vectors u and v, then it is not necessarily the case
that u is less unequal than v according to the Lorenz criterion, the strongest in-
equality concept to enjoy wide acceptance. For example, for the utility vectors
u = (10,21,22,40) and v = (10,20,30,40), Hammond equity implies uRv, but u
does not Lorenz dominate v. Furthermore, since u does not Lorenz dominate v,
there exist Lorenz consistent inequality measures which indicate a higher level
of inequality for u than for v. In other words, Hammond equity would force an
egalitarian who defines inequality using such an inequality measure to prefer the,
in her opinion, more unequal alternative u over v. Therefore, it may be interest-
ing to consider a new axiom, modified Hammond equity, which, in contrast to
Hammond equity, qualifies as an egalitarian principle in the above sense. Modi-
fied Hammond equity says that if there is exactly one worst off individual and all
those better off have equal utility levels, then society must weakly approve of any
change that increases the utility level of the worst off (such that this individual
remains the worst off) and decreases the utility levels of all the best off (such that
they all remain the best off).
Modified Hammond Equity. For all u,v∈Rn, if v(1) < u(1) < u(2) = u(3) = · · ·=
u(n) < v(2) = v(3) = · · ·= v(n), then uRv.
It can straightforwardly be established that if modified Hammond equity im-
plies uRv for any utility vectors u and v, then u strictly Lorenz dominates v. Also,
it is important to note that if transitivity is given, Hammond equity implies modi-
fied Hammond equity. By consequence, in the present context of quasi-orderings
modified Hammond equity can be treated as a weakening of Hammond equity.
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5.3 Result and Discussion
Our main result says that maximin is characterized by anonymity, continuity, weak
Pareto and Hammond equity, and that an alternative characterization is obtained
if Hammond equity is replaced by modified Hammond equity.
Theorem 5.1. Let R be a quasi-ordering on Rn. Then, the following three state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) R is maximin;
(ii) R satisfies anonymity, continuity, weak Pareto and Hammond equity;
(iii) R satisfies anonymity, continuity, weak Pareto and modified Hammond eq-
uity.
Before we prove Theorem 5.1, we consider two intermediate results that are
interesting in their own right, and are therefore presented as propositions. The
first proposition says that, if anonymity is given, then weak Pareto and modi-
fied Hammond equity characterize the class of weakly maximin quasi-orderings.
Anonymity has to be given because not all weakly maximin quasi-orderings sat-
isfy this axiom.
Proposition 5.1. Let R be a quasi-ordering on Rn that satisfies anonymity. Then,
R satisfies weak Pareto and modified Hammond equity if and only if R is weakly
maximin.
Proof. It is easy to verify that any weakly maximin quasi-ordering satisfies weak
Pareto and modified Hammond equity. Therefore, we concern ourselves only with
the reverse implication. Suppose R is any quasi-ordering on Rn which satisfies
anonymity, weak Pareto and modified Hammond equity. Consider, moreover, any
two vectors u,v ∈ Rn.
We have to show that if u(1) > v(1), then uPv. Note that it is possible to con-
struct vectors w,z ∈ Rn such that
v(1) < w(1) < z(1) < z(2) = · · ·= z(n) < u(1) ≤max{u(n),v(n)}< w(2) = · · ·= w(n).
Using anonymity, weak Pareto and transitivity, we have uPz and wPv. Using
modified Hammond equity, we also have zRw. Hence, we obtain uPv by transitiv-
ity. 
We note that Tungodden (2000) presents a weaker version of Proposition
5.1. He shows that anonymity, strong Pareto and a stronger axiom than mod-
ified Hammond equity (but also weaker than Hammond equity) imply that the
quasi-ordering must be weakly maximin.
Our second proposition identifies maximin as the only weakly maximin quasi-
ordering that satisfies continuity.
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Proposition 5.2. Let R be a quasi-ordering on Rn. Then, R is weakly maximin
and satisfies continuity if and only if R is maximin.
Proof. It is easily verified that maximin satisfies continuity and is weakly max-
imin. Therefore, we consider only the reverse implication. Suppose R is any
quasi-ordering on Rn which is weakly maximin and satisfies continuity. Consider,
moreover, any two vectors u,v ∈ Rn.
Since maximin is weakly maximin, what remains to be shown is that if u(1) =
v(1), then uIv. Note that it is possible to construct two sequences of vectors
(xk)k∈N0 and (yk)k∈N0 with
xk =
(
u1 +
1
k ,u2 +
1
k , . . . ,un +
1
k
)
and yk =
(
u1− 1k ,u2−
1
k , . . . ,un−
1
k
)
.
By construction, both sequences converge to u. Furthermore, xk(1) = u(1) +
1
k >
u(1) = v(1) and yk(1) = u(1)− 1k < u(1) = v(1) for all k ∈N0. Thus, using the fact that
R is weakly maximin, we also have xkRv and vRyk for all k∈N0. Using continuity,
we get uRv and vRu, and thus uIv. 
We now prove Theorem 5.1 using Propositions 5.1 and 5.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. It is immediate both that (i) implies (ii) and that (ii) implies
(iii). What remains to be shown is that (iii) implies (i). Suppose R is any quasi-
ordering on Rn which satisfies anonymity, continuity, weak Pareto and modified
Hammond equity.
From Proposition 5.1 it follows that if R satisfies anonymity, weak Pareto and
modified Hammond equity, then it is weakly maximin. Proposition 5.2 implies
that if R satisfies in addition continuity, then it is maximin. 
To conclude, we note that a characterization of leximin is obtained using the
axioms mentioned in statement (ii) of Theorem 5.1 but with continuity replaced by
separability—the latter axiom demands that the social ranking is independent of
the utilities of indifferent individuals.3 So, leximin is characterized by anonymity,
weak Pareto, modified Hammond equity and separability. We omit the formal
statement and proof of this result because a similar result has already been pre-
sented by Tungodden (2000)—to prove the result, he builds on his alternative
version of Proposition 5.1 that was mentioned above. This characterization of
leximin testifies of the fact that Hammond equity is not a purely egalitarian con-
cept but, rather, carries with it also instances of the idea of separability.
3For formal definitions of leximin and separability, see Chapters 3 and 4.
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Part III
Inequality and the Claims Problem
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Chapter 6
Lorenz Rankings of Nine Division
Rules for Claims Problems
6.1 Introduction
Claims problems are distribution problems concerned with the allocation of an
amount of money (referred to as the estate) among a group of individuals who
typically have different entitlements (referred to as claims) and where the estate
falls short of the sum of the claims. Several distribution problems can be framed
as claims problems. In the taxation problem, the estate equals the sum of the pre-
tax incomes minus the desired tax revenue and the claims are the pre-tax incomes.
In the bankruptcy problem, the estate is the liquidation value of the firm and the
claims are the entitlements of the creditors. The literature on claims problems
focuses on the axiomatic study of rules that associate with each claims problem a
division between the individuals of the estate (referred to as an awards vector).1
In this chapter, we analyze the Lorenz dominance relationships that exist be-
tween several well known division rules for claims problems. A glance at the
literature on the measurement of income inequality shows that the Lorenz domi-
nance relation is the most prominent criterion for making inequality comparisons
between distributions.2 Our analysis will therefore enable us to compare rules
with respect to progressivity—a rule is more progressive than another rule if, for
any claims problem, the awards vector it selects is less unequal than that of the
other rule.3
1For an extensive overview of the literature, see Thomson (2003).
2See Cowell (2000) and Lambert (2001) for overviews of this literature.
3See also Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006), who compare the members of the so-called TAL
family of rules—a one-parameter family which encompasses the constrained equal awards rule,
the constrained equal losses rule and the Talmud rule—with respect to progressivity using the
concept of Lorenz dominance.
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Concretely, we analyze the Lorenz dominance relationships that exist between
the following nine well known division rules: the proportional rule, the con-
strained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule, the Talmud rule,
Piniles’ rule, the constrained egalitarian rule, the adjusted proportional rule, the
random arrival rule and the minimal overlap rule. It is shown that several of these
rules can be characterized as most or least progressive among a class of rules of
which the members satisfy certain axioms. Thus, we provide a generalization of a
characterization in the same spirit of the constrained equal awards rule by Schum-
mer and Thomson (1997). The other characterizations along this line concern the
constrained equal losses rule, the Talmud rule, the constrained egalitarian rule,4
and Piniles’ rule. We also provide several results involving the other rules in order
to uncover the complete set of Lorenz dominance relationships that hold between
the nine rules.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 introduces notation, defines
rules and axioms and defines and discusses the Lorenz dominance relation. In
Section 6.3, we provide the characterization results. In Section 6.4, we provide
several additional results in order to be able to give a detailed description of the
Lorenz relationships holding between the division rules. Section 6.5 concludes.
All proofs are relegated to Appendix 6.A.
6.2 Preliminaries
The set of individuals is N = {1,2, . . . ,n} with n an integer greater than 1. Each
individual i ∈ N has an associated claim ci ∈ R+. We let C = ∑i∈N ci. A claims
problem is an ordered pair (c,E) where c = (ci)i∈N ∈ Rn+ is the claims vector,
E ∈ R+ is the estate which has to be divided among the members of N, and
where C ≥ E. The symbol C denotes the set of all claims problems. A rule
is a function R which associates with each (c,E) ∈ C an element of Rn+ such
that ∑i∈N Ri(c,E) = E and 0 ≤ R(c,E) ≤ c.5 We refer to R(c,E) as the awards
vector of rule R for (c,E). For any vector x ∈ Rn+, we let (x(1),x(2), · · · ,x(n)) be a
rearrangement of x such that x(1) ≤ x(2) ≤ ·· · ≤ x(n).
In this chapter, we focus on nine division rules for claims problems.6 The rule
that is without a doubt the most often used in practice is the proportional rule,
which makes awards proportional to claims.
Proportional rule (P). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have P(c,E) = λc where λ solves
∑i∈N λci = E.
4A result also considered by Chun, Schummer and Thomson (2001).
5For any x,y ∈ Rn+, the vector inequality x≤ y signifies that xi ≤ yi for all i = 1, . . . ,n.
6For a thorough discussion of the rules and axioms defined in this section, see Thomson (2003).
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The next two rules both implement the idea of equality, but in very different
ways. In the case of the constrained equal awards rule, all individuals receive
equal awards as long as their claim is not exceeded.
Constrained equal awards rule (CEA). For all (c,E)∈C and all i∈N, we have
CEAi(c,E) = min{ci,λ} where λ solves ∑i∈N min{ci,λ}= E.
The constrained equal losses rule equalizes losses—the loss of an individual is
equal to her claim minus her award—instead of awards, under the condition that
no individual receive less than zero.
Constrained equal losses rule (CEL). For all (c,E) ∈ C and all i ∈ N, we have
CELi(c,E) = max{0,ci−λ} where λ solves ∑i∈N max{0,ci−λ}= E.
The Talmud rule specifies two different regimes depending on whether the
estate is smaller or greater than the sum of the half-claims. In the former case,
the formula of the constrained equal awards rule is used in the definition of the
Talmud rule and, in the latter case, that of the constrained equal losses rule is used,
in both cases applied to the vector of half-claims instead of to the claims vector
itself.
Talmud rule (T). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
(i) if E ≤ 12C, then T (c,E) =CEA(12c,E); and
(ii) if E ≥ 12C, then T (c,E) = 12c+CEL(12c,E− 12C).
The four rules defined above constitute the classical rules for solving claims
problems.7 All rules subsequently defined are, as we shall see, in some way re-
lated to the Talmud rule.
The next two rules are equal to the Talmud rule whenever the estate is smaller
than the sum of the half-claims, but different whenever it is greater. Piniles’ rule
utilizes the formula of the constrained equal awards rule instead of that of the
constrained equal losses rule whenever the estate is greater than the sum of the
half-claims.
Piniles’ rule (Pin). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
(i) if E ≤ 12C, then Pin(c,E) =CEA(12c,E); and
(ii) if E ≥ 12C, then Pin(c,E) = 12c+CEA(12c,E− 12C).
The constrained egalitarian rule uses a different egalitarian procedure in the
case where the estate exceeds the sum of the half-claims.
7For a comparative study of these four rules, see Herrero and Villar (2001).
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Constrained egalitarian rule (CE). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
(i) if E ≤ 12C, then CE(c,E) =CEA(12c,E); and
(ii) if E ≥ 12C, then, for all i ∈ N, CEi(c,E) = max{ ci2 ,min{ci,λ}} where λ
solves ∑i∈N max{ ci2 ,min{ci,λ}}= E.
The last three rules we define in this section are equal to the Talmud rule
for claims problems with only two individuals, but may deviate otherwise.8 To
define the adjusted proportional rule, we require the concept of a minimal right.
The minimal right of an individual is the part of the estate that is left for her if
the others are all compensated fully. Formally, for all (c,E) ∈ C and all i ∈ N,
mi(c,E) = max{E−∑ j∈N\{i} c j,0} is the minimal right of individual i. We let
m(c,E) = (mi(c,E))i∈N . The adjusted proportional rule gives every individual
her minimal right and applies the proportional rule for allocating the remainder.
Adjusted proportional rule (A). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
A(c,E) = m(c,E)
+P
((
min{ci−mi(c,E),E−
n
∑
j=1
m j(c,E)}
)
i∈N ;E−
n
∑
j=1
m j(c,E)
)
.
For defining the random arrival rule, suppose the individuals arrive one at
a time and are completely compensated until the estate runs out. The division
selected by the random arrival rule is the average over all orders of arrival of the
awards vectors obtained in this way. We let ΠN denote the class of all bijections
that map N onto itself.
Random arrival rule (RA). For all (c,E) ∈ C and all i ∈ N, we have
RAi(c,E) =
1
n! ∑pi∈ΠN min{ci,max{E− ∑j∈N,pi( j)<pi(i)c j,0}}.
To explain and formally define the minimal overlap rule, we assume that the
members of N are indexed such that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ·· · ≤ cn. This can be done with-
out loss of generality since the rule—as all other rules defined in this section—is
symmetric. To understand the minimal overlap rule, regard individuals as claim-
ing specific parts of the interval [0,E]. Each part is equally distributed among all
individuals claiming it. For instance, the interval [0,c1] is claimed by everyone,
and so everyone gets c1
n
. The interval (c1,c2] is claimed by everyone except indi-
vidual 1, and so each member of N \{1} receives in addition c2−c1
n−1 . This process
8See Thomson (2003). The two-individual version of the Talmud rule and these three rules is
conventionally referred to as the contested garment rule or as concede-and-divide.
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continues until the entire interval [0,E] is covered. If there are individuals who
have claims higher than the estate, then their claims are simply truncated by the
estate. If, on the other hand, there are no individuals who have claims higher than
the estate, then a scalar t is sought such that all individuals with claims higher than
t exclusively claim a specific part of the interval (t,E].
Minimal overlap rule (MO). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
(i) if ci ≥ E for some i ∈ N, then, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j < E},
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 + · · ·+
ci− ci−1
n− (i−1) ,
and, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j ≥ E},
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 + · · ·+
ck−1− ck−2
n− (k−2) +
E− ck−1
n− (k−1) ,
where k = min{ j ∈ N | c j ≥ E}; and
(ii) if ci < E for all i ∈ N, then, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j < t},
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 + · · ·+
ci− ci−1
n− (i−1) ,
and, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j ≥ t},
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 + · · ·+
ck−1− ck−2
n− (k−2) +
t− ck−1
n− (k−1) + ci− t,
where t solves ∑i∈{ j∈N|c j≥t} (ci− t) = E− t and k = min{ j ∈ N | c j ≥ t}.
In our analysis we make use also of several axioms. Order preservation re-
quires that if an individual has a higher claim than another, then she should get a
higher award and should carry a greater absolute loss.
Order preservation. For all (c,E)∈C and all i, j ∈N, if ci ≥ c j, then Ri(c,E)≥
R j(c,E) and ci−Ri(c,E)≥ c j−R j(c,E).
Resource monotonicity demands that if the estate increases, then all individu-
als should receive at least as much as they did initially.
Resource monotonicity. For all (c,E) ∈ C and for all E ′ ∈ R+, if C ≥ E ′ > E,
then R(c,E ′)≥ R(c,E).
Super-modularity requires that if the estate increases, then individuals with
higher claims should receive a greater part of the increment than those with lower
claims.
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Table 6.1. Satisfaction of Axioms
Axiom P CEA CEL T Pin CE A RA MO
Order preservation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Resource monotonicity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Super-modularity yes yes yes yes yes NO yes yes yes
Midpoint property yes NO NO yes yes yes yes yes NO
Super-modularity. For all (c,E) ∈ C , all E ′ ∈R+ and all i, j ∈ N, if C ≥ E ′ > E
and ci ≥ c j, then Ri(c,E ′)−Ri(c,E)≥ R j(c,E ′)−R j(c,E).
The midpoint property, finally, says that if the estate is equal to the sum of the
half-claims, then every individual should get its half-claim.
Midpoint property. For all (c,E) ∈ C such that E = 12C, we have R(c,E) = 12c.
Table 6.1 indicates which axioms are satisfied by each of the nine rules defined
in this section. The only results that are not well established in the literature, are
those saying that the midpoint property is satisfied by the adjusted proportional
rule and the random arrival rule. However, these results easily follow from the
fact that the adjusted proportional rule and the random arrival rule are self-dual—
self-duality requires that, for all (c,E) ∈ C , we have R(c,E) = c−R(c,C−E).9
If 2E = C, then we have 2R(c,E) = c for all self-dual rules, and hence all these
rules satisfy the midpoint property.
The objective of this chapter is to provide a description of the Lorenz domi-
nance relationships that hold between the nine rules defined above. In the litera-
ture on income inequality measurement, it is broadly accepted that if a vector x
Lorenz dominates a vector y, then x is less unequally distributed than y—if the
means and dimensions of x and y are equal, then x can be obtained from y by a
finite number of richer to poorer transfers (and permutations).10
For a formal definition of Lorenz dominance, take any x,y ∈ Rn+ such that
∑ni=1 xi = ∑ni=1 yi. We say that x Lorenz dominates y if and only if
k
∑
i=1
x(i) ≥
k
∑
i=1
y(i) for all k = 1,2, . . . ,n−1.
We say that x strictly Lorenz dominates y if and only if, moreover, at least one of
these inequalities holds strictly. Obviously, for any x,y ∈ Rn+ such that ∑ni=1 xi =
9This is well known for the random arrival rule. For the adjusted proportional rule, self-duality
can be easily checked using the rule’s relation to the proportional rule and Theorem 9 in Thomson
(2003).
10See, for instance, Cowell (2000) or Lambert (2001).
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∑ni=1 yi, if x Lorenz dominates y and (x(1),x(2), · · · ,x(n)) 6= (y(1),y(2), · · · ,y(n)),
then x strictly Lorenz dominates y.
In what follows, we frequently call a rule R more progressive than a rule R′
if and only if R(c,E) Lorenz dominates R′(c,E) for all (c,E) ∈ C . We call R
strictly more progressive than R′ if and only if, moreover, R(c,E) strictly Lorenz
dominates R′(c,E) for some (c,E)∈C . Similar statements will be used whenever
these Lorenz relationships hold only for all claims problems in a sub-domain ˆC ⊂
C .
To conclude this section, we consider a remark that describes two useful prop-
erties of the Lorenz dominance relation. The remark says that if a rule is more
progressive than another, then, for each claims problem, its awards vector has (i)
a greater minimal component and a smaller maximal component, and (ii) a lower
variance than the awards vector of the other rule. We do not provide a proof of the
remark as it is easily established.
Remark 6.1. Let R and R′ be two rules such that R(c,E) Lorenz dominates
R′(c,E) for all (c,E) ∈ ˆC ⊆ C . For all (c,E) ∈ ˆC , we have
(i) R1(c,E)≥ R′1(c,E) and Rn(c,E)≤ R′n(c,E) ; and
(ii) the variance is at least as low for R(c,E) as for R′(c,E).11
Of course, statement (i) in Remark 6.1 ensures that the range—defined as the
absolute difference between the minimal and maximal components of the vector
in question—is also always lower for the awards vectors of the more progressive
rule. Remark 6.1 will enable us to link two of our characterization results in the
next section to results of Schummer and Thomson (1997) and Chun, Schummer
and Thomson (2001).
6.3 Characterizations
The constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule, the con-
strained egalitarian rule, Piniles’ rule and the Talmud rule can be completely char-
acterized as the rules that are most or least progressive among all rules satisfying
particular axioms.
Not surprisingly, the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal
losses rule form the two extreme positions with respect to progressivity. The
former is most progressive among all rules.
Proposition 6.1. Let R be any rule. For all (c,E) ∈ C , CEA(c,E) Lorenz domi-
nates R(c,E).
11Statement (ii) holds for all inequality measures that are symmetric functions and satisfy the
transfer principle. See Chapter 2 for several examples besides the variance.
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Proposition 6.1 is related to two characterizations of the constrained equal
awards rule by Schummer and Thomson (1997, Propositions 3 and 4). Their two
results state that, for all claims problems, respectively the range and the variance
of the awards vector of the constrained equal awards rule are smaller than for all
other rules. Using Remark 6.1, it is easily seen that Proposition 6.1 generalizes
these results.
The constrained equal losses rule is the least progressive rule among all rules
satisfying order preservation. Remember that all rules that we have defined in the
previous section satisfy this axiom.
Proposition 6.2. Let R be any rule that satisfies order preservation. For all
(c,E) ∈ C , R(c,E) Lorenz dominates CEL(c,E).
The following characterization of the constrained egalitarian rule is equivalent
to a result proven by Chun, Schummer and Thomson (2001, Theorem 3). It says
that the constrained egalitarian rule is most progressive among all rules satisfying
resource monotonicity and the midpoint property. We state the result for the sake
of completeness and provide a significantly different proof.
Proposition 6.3. Let R be any rule that satisfies resource monotonicity and the
midpoint property. For all (c,E) ∈ C , CE(c,E) Lorenz dominates R(c,E).
Chun, Schummer and Thomson (2001, Theorems 1 and 2) also provide char-
acterization results for the constrained egalitarian rule in terms of the range and
the variance, analogous to those of Schummer and Thomson (1997) for the con-
strained equal awards rule mentioned above. Again, using Remark 6.1, it is easily
seen that Proposition 6.3 implies these alternative results.
From Proposition 6.3, it follows that the constrained egalitarian rule is more
progressive than Piniles’ rule. As mentioned in the previous section, the former
rule does not satisfy super-modularity whereas the latter does. The following
result shows that, if super-modularity is demanded in addition to resource mono-
tonicity and the midpoint property, then Piniles’ rule is the most progressive rule
available.
Proposition 6.4. Let R be any rule that satisfies the midpoint property.
(i) If R satisfies in addition resource monotonicity, then, for all (c,E)∈C such
that E ≤ 12C, Pin(c,E) Lorenz dominates R(c,E); and
(ii) if R satisfies in addition super-modularity, then, for all (c,E) ∈ C such that
E ≥ 12C, Pin(c,E) Lorenz dominates R(c,E).
Note that statement (i) in Proposition 6.4 immediately follows from Proposi-
tion 6.3.
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Since the Talmud rule is equivalent to the constrained egalitarian rule and
Piniles’ rule in the case where the estate is smaller than the sum of the half-claims,
it follows from Proposition 6.3 and 6.4 that the Talmud rule can be interpreted as
being rather egalitarian in that case. However, as the following result shows, the
Talmud rule goes to the other extreme whenever the estate exceeds the sum of
the half-claims. Among all rules satisfying order preservation, resource mono-
tonicity and the midpoint property, the Talmud rule is the most progressive rule in
the case where the estate is smaller than the sum of the half-claims, but the least
progressive rule in the other case.
Proposition 6.5. Let R be any rule that satisfies resource monotonicity and the
midpoint property.
(i) For all (c,E)∈C such that E ≤ 12C, T (c,E) Lorenz dominates R(c,E); and
(ii) if R satisfies in addition order preservation, then, for all (c,E) ∈ C such
that E ≥ 12C, R(c,E) Lorenz dominates T (c,E).
Again, statement (i) in Proposition 6.5 is an immediate corollary of Proposi-
tion 6.3.
Proposition 6.5 is the last of our characterization results. In the next section,
we consider several results that help to complete the picture with respect to the
Lorenz dominance relationships holding between the nine defined rules.
6.4 Rankings
Although the characterization results of the previous section allow us to rank quite
a few rules on the basis of Lorenz dominance, they do not allow us to rank all of
them. In this section, we first provide the additional results that are required to
complete the ranking, and then summarize all results in a number of diagrams.
First consider two lemmas.
Lemma 6.1. For all (c,E) ∈ C , if c1 + c2 + · · ·+ cn−1 ≤ E ≤ cn, then Ai(c,E) =
1
2ci for all i ∈ N \{n}.
Lemma 6.2. For all (c,E) ∈ C ,
(i) if ci ≥ E for some i ∈ N, then MOi(c,E) ≤ ci2 for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j < E};
and
(ii) if ci < E for all i∈N, then MOi(c,E)≤ ci2 for all i∈ { j ∈N | c j < t}, where
t solves ∑i∈{ j∈N|c j≥t} (ci− t) = E− t.
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The following proposition shows that the adjusted proportional rule is more
progressive than the proportional rule if the estate is smaller than the sum of the
half-claims, and less progressive otherwise.
Proposition 6.6. For all (c,E) ∈ C ,
(i) if E ≤ 12C, then A(c,E) Lorenz dominates P(c,E); and
(ii) if E ≥ 12C, then P(c,E) Lorenz dominates A(c,E).
The final three propositions deal with rankings of the minimal overlap rule
against other rules. The following result casts the minimal overlap rule as a rather
non-egalitarian rule whenever the estate is greater than the sum of the half-claims.
In that case, the minimal overlap rule is less progressive than each member of
the class of rules satisfying order preservation, resource monotonicity and the
midpoint property. Note that the minimal overlap rule does not itself satisfy the
midpoint property.
Proposition 6.7. Let R be any rule that satisfies order preservation, resource
monotonicity and the midpoint property. For all (c,E) ∈ C such that E ≥ 12C,
R(c,E) Lorenz dominates MO(c,E).
It follows immediately from Proposition 6.7 that the adjusted proportional rule
and the random arrival rule are more progressive than the minimal overlap rule
whenever the estate is greater than the sum of the half-claims. The following
result says that, for the adjusted proportional rule, this is also true whenever the
estate is smaller than the sum of the half-claims.
Proposition 6.8. For all (c,E) ∈ C such that E ≤ 12C, A(c,E) Lorenz dominates
MO(c,E).
Whenever the number of individuals is four or less, a similar result holds for
the random arrival rule.
Proposition 6.9. Let n≤ 4. For all (c,E) ∈ C such that E ≤ 12C, RA(c,E) Lorenz
dominates MO(c,E).
It is an open question whether it is possible to generalize this result to all sizes
of N.
To conclude, we present several diagrams which make use of Propositions 6.1
to 6.9. These diagrams summarize in detail the Lorenz relationships that hold
between the nine division rules considered in this chapter. As Figure 6.1 shows,
the Lorenz ranking is incomplete: there are several rules R and R′ such that neither
is R more progressive than R′, nor is R′ more progressive than R. Appendix 6.A
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CEA CE Pin
T
A
P
RA
MO CEL
*
An arrow from R to R′ indicates that, for all (c,E) ∈ C , R(c,E) Lorenz dominates
R′(c,E). The absence of an arrow indicates either that there is no Lorenz relationship,
or that a Lorenz relationship can be established using transitivity. The arrow with ∗
indicates a relationship that has only been established for n≤ 4.
Figure 6.1. Lorenz Rankings of Nine Division Rules
presents examples for the incomparabilities that cannot be established using the
propositions.
The Lorenz ranking is much less incomplete if attention is restricted to claims
problems where (a) the estate equals the sum of the half-claims, (b) the estate is
strictly smaller than the sum of the half-claims, or (c) the estate is strictly greater
than the half-claims. Figure 6.2 deals with these three sub-domains of C . In
case (a), several rules select the same awards vector due to the midpoint property.
Moreover, note that in this case all rules can be ranked on the basis of the Lorenz
dominance relation. With respect to case (b), note that there are only three cases
of incomparability. In case (c), there are only two cases of incomparability, both
involving the random arrival rule.
Finally, we note that, by Remark 6.1, the ranking results presented in Figures
6.1 and 6.2 can straightforwardly be used to compare rules with respect to the
sizes of the minimal and maximal components of their awards vectors, or with
respect to the variance of their awards vectors. For instance, it can be directly
seen from Figure 6.1 that, for each claims problem, say, the minimal component
of the awards vector of Piniles’ rule is greater than that of the Talmud rule, which
in turn is greater than that of the minimal overlap rule.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied the Lorenz dominance relationships that hold be-
tween nine well known division rules for claims problems. It was shown that the
constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule, the constrained
egalitarian rule, Piniles’ rule and the Talmud rule can be characterized as most
or least progressive among a class of rules satisfying certain axioms. We also
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CEA MO CELP = T = Pin = CE = A = RA
(a) (E = 12C)
CEA T = CE = Pin
A P
RA
MO CEL
*
(b) (E < 12C)
CEA CE Pin
P
RA
A
CELMOT
(c) (E > 12C)
An arrow from R to R′ indicates that, for all (c,E) ∈ C with either (a) E = 12C, (b)
E < 12C, or (c) E > 12C, R(c,E) Lorenz dominates R′(c,E). An equality sign between
R and R′ indicates equality of the awards vectors of R and R′ for the given restricted
domain. The absence of an arrow indicates either that there is no Lorenz relationship,
or that a Lorenz relationship can be established using transitivity. The arrow with ∗
indicates a relationship that has only been established for n≤ 4.
Figure 6.2. Lorenz Rankings of Nine Division Rules over Restricted Domains
provided results on Lorenz dominance rankings involving the other rules: the
proportional rule, the adjusted proportional rule, the random arrival rule and the
minimal overlap rule. The analysis revealed that, in describing the Lorenz dom-
inance relationships holding between the nine rules, it is interesting to consider
separately the sets of claims problems for which the estate is smaller than, equal
to, and greater than, the sum of the half-claims, respectively. Over each of these
three sub-domains, we obtained an almost complete Lorenz dominance ranking
of the considered rules.
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Appendix 6.A: Proofs
In all proofs except those of Propositions 6.1 to 6.5, we assume for convenience
that individuals are indexed such that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ·· · ≤ cn for all considered (c,E)∈
C . We can assume this without loss of generality because the proofs in question
only deal with symmetric rules.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Seeking a contradiction, let R be a rule and let (c,E)∈C
be such that CEA(c,E) does not Lorenz dominate R(c,E). From the definition of
the constrained equal awards rule, we have that there exist j ≥ 0 and µ > 0 such
that
CEA(i)(c,E) =
{
c(i) for all i = 1, . . . , j;
µ < c(i) for all i = j+1, . . . ,n.
Since CEA(c,E) does not Lorenz dominate R(c,E), it must be the case that there
exists a k ≥ 1 such that
R(1)(c,E)+R(2)(c,E)+ · · ·+R(k)(c,E)
>CEA(1)(c,E)+CEA(2)(c,E)+ · · ·+CEA(k)(c,E).
By consequence, for some ` ≤ k, we have R(`)(c,E) > CEA(`)(c,E). Obviously,
CEA(`)(c,E) = µ because otherwise R(`)(c,E) > c(`). Now, there must also be
an m > k such that R(m)(c,E) < CEA(m)(c,E) since we require ∑i∈N Ri(c,E) =
∑i∈N CEAi(c,E). However, because CEA(m)(c,E) = µ , R(`)(c,E) > R(m)(c,E)
while ` < m, and we have a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 6.2. Seeking a contradiction, let R be a rule that satisfies order
preservation and let (c,E) ∈ C be such that R(c,E) does not Lorenz dominate
CEL(c,E). From the definition of the constrained equal losses rule, we know that
there exist j ≥ 0 and µ > 0 such that
CEL(i)(c,E) =
{
0 for all i = 1, . . . , j;
c(i)−µ > 0 for all i = j+1, . . . ,n.
Because R(c,E) does not Lorenz dominate CEL(c,E), there must exist a k ≥ 1
such that
R(1)(c,E)+R(2)(c,E)+ · · ·+R(k)(c,E)
<CEL(1)(c,E)+CEL(2)(c,E)+ · · ·+CEL(k)(c,E).
So, R(`)(c,E) < CEL(`)(c,E) for some ` ≤ k. Note that it must be the case that
CEL(`)(c,E) = c(`)− µ because otherwise R(`)(c,E) < 0. Now, there is also an
m> k such that R(m)(c,E)>CEL(m)(c,E) since ∑i∈N Ri(c,E) =∑i∈N CELi(c,E).
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We also have CEL(m)(c,E) = c(m) − µ . Since c(`) − R(`)(c,E) > µ > c(m) −
R(m)(c,E) while c(m) ≥ c(`), R violates order preservation and we have a con-
tradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 6.3. Seeking a contradiction, let R be a rule that satisfies
resource monotonicity and the midpoint property and let (c,E) ∈ C be such that
CE(c,E) does not Lorenz dominate R(c,E).
Suppose first that E ≥ 12C. From the definition of the constrained egalitarian
rule, we have that there exist j ≥ 0, k ≥ j and µ > 0 such that
CE(i)(c,E) =

c(i) for all i = 1, . . . , j;
µ < c(i) for all i = j+1, . . . ,k;
c(i)
2 > µ for all i = k+1, . . . ,n.
Since CE(c,E) does not Lorenz dominate R(c,E), it must be the case that there
exists an `≥ 1 such that
R(1)(c,E)+R(2)(c,E)+ · · ·+R(`)(c,E)
>CE(1)(c,E)+CE(2)(c,E)+ · · ·+CE(`)(c,E).
By consequence, there exists an m ≤ ` such that R(m)(c,E) > CE(m)(c,E). It
must be the case that CE(m)(c,E) is equal either to µ or to
c(m)
2 because other-
wise R(m)(c,E)> c(m). Now, there must also exist a p > ` such that R(p)(c,E)<
CE(p)(c,E) since ∑i∈N Ri(c,E) = ∑i∈N CEi(c,E). If CE(p)(c,E) = µ , then also
CE(m)(c,E) = µ , so that R(m)(c,E)> R(p)(c,E) while m < p and we have a con-
tradiction. If CE(p)(c,E) =
c(p)
2 , then R(p)(c,E) <
c(p)
2 , which is excluded by thejoint use of resource monotonicity and the midpoint property, and again we have
a contradiction.
The proof for the case where E ≤ 12C uses lines of reasoning very similar to
those used in the proof for the case where E ≥ 12C and those used in the proof of
Proposition 6.1, and is therefore omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 6.4. We first consider part (ii). Seeking a contradiction,
let R be a rule that satisfies the midpoint property and super-modularity and let
(c,E) ∈ C be such that E ≥ 12C and such that Pin(c,E) does not Lorenz dominate
R(c,E).
From the definition of the Piniles’ rule, we know that there exist j ≥ 0, and
µ > 0 such that
Pin(i)(c,E) =
{
c(i) for all i = 1, . . . , j;
c(i)
2 +µ < c(i) for all i = j+1, . . . ,n;
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Since Pin(c,E) does not Lorenz dominate R(c,E), it must be the case that there
exists a k ≥ 1 such that
R(1)(c,E)+R(2)(c,E)+ · · ·+R(k)(c,E)
> Pin(1)(c,E)+Pin(2)(c,E)+ · · ·+Pin(k)(c,E).
So, there is an ` ≤ k such that R(`)(c,E) > Pin(`)(c,E). Note that Pin(`)(c,E) =
c(`)
2 + µ since otherwise R(`)(c,E) > c(`). There must also be an m > k such that
R(m)(c,E)< Pin(m)(c,E) because ∑i∈N Ri(c,E) = ∑i∈N Pini(c,E). Of course, we
also have Pin(m)(c,E) =
c(m)
2 +µ . The midpoint property implies that R(c,
1
2C) =
1
2c. Hence, we have R(`)(c,E)−R(`)(c, 12C)> µ and R(m)(c,E)−R(m)(c, 12C)< µ .
Since c(m)≥ c(`), we have a violation of super-modularity and thus a contradiction.
Part (i) deals with (c,E) ∈ C such that E ≤ 12C. Since, for all such (c,E) ∈ C ,
Pin(`)(c,E) =CE(`)(c,E), we refer to the proof of Proposition 6.3. 
Proof of Proposition 6.5. The proof uses ideas which are very similar to the ones
used in the proofs of Propositions 6.1 to 6.4 and is therefore omitted. 
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Take any (c,E) ∈ C such that c1 +c2 + · · ·+cn−1 ≤ E ≤ cn.
We consider only the case where there is some i ∈ N \{n} such that ci > 0 since
the result is trivially true for other cases.
Note that, since ci+cn ≤C for all i ∈ N \{n}, we have that ci ≤ E− (E−C+
cn) for all i ∈ N \{n}. The latter is equivalent to
ci−mi(c,E)≤ E−
n
∑
j=1
m j(c,E) for all i ∈ N \{n}, (6.1)
since cn ≥ E implies that mi(c,E) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ {n} and since mn(c,E) =
E−C+ cn > 0. Moreover, we have
cn−mn(c,E)≥ E−
n
∑
j=1
m j(c,E), (6.2)
since cn ≥ E. Given (6.1) and (6.2), the definition of the adjusted proportional
rule yields, for all i ∈ N \{n},
Ai(c,E) = Pi
(
(c1,c2, . . . ,cn−1,E−mn(c,E));E−mn(c,E)
)
=
E− (E−C+ cn)
∑i∈N\{n} ci +E− (E−C+ cn)
ci
=
C− cn
2(C− cn)ci
=
ci
2
. 
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Proof of Lemma 6.2. The proofs of parts (i) and (ii) are very similar. Therefore,
we only prove part (i).
Take any (c,E) ∈ C for which there is at least one i ∈ N for which ci ≥ E. For
all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j < E},
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 +
c3− c2
n−2 + · · ·+
ci−1− ci−2
n− (i−2) +
ci− ci−1
n− (i−1)
=
ci−ν
n− (i−1) ,
where
ν =
[
1− n−(i−1)
n−(i−2)
]
ci−1−
[
n−(i−1)
n−(i−3) −
n−(i−1)
n−(i−2)
]
ci−2−·· ·−
[
n−(i−1)
n−1 − n−(i−1)n
]
c1.
We have ν ≥ 0. Note, moreover, that i≤ n−1 for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j < E}. Hence,
we have that, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j < E},
ci−ν
ci
≤ n− (i−1)
2
.
From this it follows that, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j < E},
MOi(c,E) =
ci−ν
n− (i−1) ≤
ci
2
.

Proof of Proposition 6.6. We first prove part (i). Take any (c,E) ∈ C such that
E ≤ 12C.
We first consider the case where mn(c,E) = 0. In that case, mi(c,E) = 0 for all
i ∈ N. We then have A(c,E) = P((min{ci,E})i∈N ,E), which Lorenz dominates
P(c,E).
Second, we consider the case where mn(c,E)> 0. Since mn(c,E)> 0, we have
∑i∈N\{n} ci < E. Because C ≥ 2E, we have furthermore cn > E. So, by Lemma
6.1, we have Ai(c,E) = ci2 for all i ∈ N \{n}. Since if E ≤ 12C, then Pi(c,E)≤ ci2
for all i ∈ N \{n}, the result follows.
Now we consider part (ii). Take any (c,E) ∈ C such that E ≥ 12C.
Suppose first that mn(c,E) = 0. In this case we have ∑i∈N\{n} ci ≥ E, and so
cn ≤ E because also 2E ≥C. Since mi(c,E) = 0 and ci ≤ E for all i ∈ N, we have
that A(c,E) = P(c,E).
Suppose now that mn(c,E)> 0. Define the set S = {i ∈ N | mi(c,E)> 0} and
let r = minS. Since, for all i ∈ S, mi(c,E) = E−C+ ci,
ci−mi(c,E) =C−E for all i ∈ S. (6.3)
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Moreover, we show that if cn ≤ E, then
C−E ≤ E−
n
∑
j=1
m j(c,E). (6.4)
In the case where cn > E, Lemma 6.1 can be used (since also mn(c,E) > 0) to
see that P(c,E) Lorenz dominates A(c,E). Therefore, we only consider the case
cn ≤ E in what follows. Note that (6.4) holds if and only if
C−E ≤ E− (E−C+ cr)− (E−C+ cr+1)−·· ·− (E−C+ cn),
which can be rewritten as
0≤ ((n− r+1)−1)C− ((n− r+1)−2)E− cr− cr+1−·· ·− cn,
which, in turn, can be rewritten as
0≤ ((n− r+1)−2)(C−E)+C− cr− cr+1−·· ·− cn.
The latter expression indeed holds since C ≥ E ≥ cn. Note also that
ci ≤ E−
n
∑
j=1
m j(c,E) for all i ∈ N \S, (6.5)
since mi(c,E) = 0 implies E−C+ ci ≤ 0 and by (6.4).
So, using (6.3), (6.4) and (6.5), the definition of the adjusted proportional rule
yields
A(c,E) = (0,0, . . . ,0,mr(c,E),mr+1(c,E), . . . ,mn(c,E))
+P
((
c1,c2, . . . ,cr−1,C−E,C−E, . . . ,C−E
)
;E−
n
∑
j=1
m j(c,E)
)
.
Hence, we have
Ai(c,E) =

E−∑nj=1 m j(c,E)
C−∑nj=1 m j(c,E)ci for all i ∈ N \S;
(E−C+ ci)+ E−∑
n
j=1 m j(c,E)
C−∑nj=1 m j(c,E)(C−E) for all i ∈ S.
So, it follows that
Ai(c,E)<
E
C
ci = Pi(c,E) for all i ∈ N \S;
Ai(c,E) = ci−µ for all i ∈ S,
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for some µ ≥ 0. The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 6.2 and
is therefore omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 6.7. Given Proposition 6.5 (ii), it is sufficient to show that
T (c,E) Lorenz dominates MO(c,E) for all (c,E) ∈ C such that E ≥ 12C. Take
any (c,E) ∈ C such that E ≥ 12C.
Note that, there exist j ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0 such that
Ti(c,E) =
{
ci
2 for all i = 1, . . . , j;
ci−µ ≥ ci2 for all i = j+1, . . . ,n.
Suppose first that there exists an i ∈ N such that ci ≥ E. Because 2E ≥C, we
have cn−1 ≤ E. If cn−1 = E, then cn = E and ci = 0 for all i ∈ N \{n−1,n} since
2E ≥C. By consequence, MO(c,E) = T (c,E) = 12c in this case. If cn−1 < E, then
MOi(c,E) ≤ ci2 for all i ∈ N \ {n} by Lemma 6.2. It follows that T (c,E) Lorenz
dominates MO(c,E) in this case.
Suppose now that there exists no i ∈ N such that ci ≥ E. Seeking a contra-
diction, let (c,E) ∈ C be such that T (c,E) does not Lorenz dominate MO(c,E).
Using Lemma 2, there exist k ≥ 0 and ν > 0 such that
MOi(c,E)≤ ci2 for all i = 1, . . . ,k;
MOi(c,E) = ci−ν for all i = k+1, . . . ,n,
Since T (c,E) does not Lorenz dominate MO(c,E), it must be the case that there
exists an `≥ 1 such that
MO1(c,E)+MO2(c,E)+ · · ·+MO`(c,E)
> T1(c,E)+T2(c,E)+ · · ·+T`(c,E).
By consequence, there must exist an m ≤ ` such that MOm(c,E) > Tm(c,E). We
obviously have that MOm(c,E) = cm − ν . There must also exist a p > ` such
that MOp(c,E) < Tp(c,E) since ∑i∈N MOi(c,E) = ∑i∈N Ti(c,E). We also have
MOp(c,E) = cp−ν . Now, since cm−Tm(c,E)> ν > cp−Tp(c,E) while cm ≤ cp,
the Talmud rule violates order preservation and we have a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 6.8. Take any (c,E) ∈ C such that E ≤ 12C.
Suppose first that c1+c2+ · · ·+cn−1 ≤ E ≤ cn. We then have Ai(c,E) = ci2 for
all i ∈ N \ {n} by Lemma 6.1, and MOi(c,E) ≤ ci2 for all i ∈ N \ {n} by Lemma
6.2. By consequence, A(c,E) Lorenz dominates MO(c,E) in this case.
Suppose now that either (a) cn ≥ E, c1 + c2 + · · ·+ cn > E, and ci < E for
all i ∈ N \ {n}, (b) ci ≥ E for at least two i ∈ N, or (c) ci < E for all i ∈ N. Let
cˆ = (min{ci,E})i∈N and ˆC = ∑ni=1 cˆi. We have MO(c,E) = MO(cˆ,E). In case (a),
Lorenz Rankings of Nine Division Rules for Claims Problems 121
we have mn = 0, so that A(c,E) = P(cˆ,E) (see the proof of Proposition 6.6 (i)).
Since in both case (b) and case (c) we have E ≤ 12 ˆC, Proposition 6.6 (i) implies
that A(c,E) Lorenz dominates P(cˆ,E). Hence, it suffices to show that in cases (a),
(b) and (c), P(cˆ,E) Lorenz dominates MO(cˆ,E).
We first consider cases (a) and (b). For all i ∈ N,
MOi(cˆ,E) =
cˆ1
n
+
cˆ2− cˆ1
n−1 + · · ·+
cˆi− cˆi−1
n− (i−1) , (6.6)
and
Pi(cˆ,E) =
E
ˆC
cˆ1 +
E
ˆC
(cˆ2− cˆ1)+ · · ·+ E
ˆC
(cˆi− cˆi−1). (6.7)
Since E ≥ ˆC
n
, we have that P1(cˆ,E) ≥ MO1(cˆ,E). Now suppose that, for some
i ∈ N, we have MOi(cˆ,E) > Pi(cˆ,E). Using (6.6) and (6.7) it then follows that,
for some j ≤ i,
cˆ j− cˆ j−1
n− ( j−1) >
E
ˆC
(cˆ j− cˆ j−1),
or
ˆC
n− ( j−1) > E.
But, the latter implies that, for all k > j,
cˆk− cˆk−1
n− (k−1) >
E
ˆC
(cˆk− cˆk−1).
Hence, using (6.6) and (6.7), it follows that if MOi(cˆ,E)>Pi(cˆ,E) for some i∈N,
then MO j(cˆ,E) > Pj(cˆ,E) for all j > i. Consequently, it is clear that P(cˆ,E)
Lorenz dominates MO(cˆ,E).
The proof for case (b) is similar to that for case (a) and is therefore omitted.

Proof of Proposition 6.9. Take any (c,E) ∈ C such that E ≤ 12C.
Suppose there is an i ∈ N such that ci ≥ E. We first show that, for all i =
1,2 such that ci < E, RAi(c,E) ≥ MOi(c,E). For i = 1, this is immediate since
RA1(c,E) ≥ c1n = MO1(c,E) whenever c1 < E. If c2 < E, then RA2(c,E) is at
least as great as
c2
n
+
(n−2)!
n!
min{c2,E− c1}
=
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n
+
c2− c1
n(n−1) +
min{c1,E− c2}
n(n−1) . (6.8)
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Furthermore, if c2 < E, then
MO2(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 . (6.9)
We have that (6.8) is at least as great as (6.9), and, hence, RA2(c,E)≥MO2(c,E)
if c2 < E.
Suppose now there exists no i ∈ N such that ci ≥ E. Let t be such that it solves
∑i∈{ j∈N|c j≥t} (ci− t) = E− t. Using the same reasoning as above, we get that, for
all i = 1,2 such that ci < t, RAi(c,E)≥MOi(c,E).
In the case where n = 2, RA(c,E) = MO(c,E) for all (c,E) ∈ C . In what
follows, we only consider the case where n = 4 since the proof for the case where
n = 3 is very similar.
If there is some i ∈ N such that ci ≥ E, then there are four possible cases: (a)
c1 ≥ E, (b) c1 < E and c2 ≥ E, (c) ci < E for all i = 1,2 and c3 ≥ E, (d) ci < E
for all i = 1,2,3 and c4 ≥ E. In case (a), we clearly have RA(c,E) = MO(c,E). In
case (b), we have RA1(c,E)≥MO1(c,E) and, moreover, RA2(c,E)=RA3(c,E)=
RA4(c,E) and MO2(c,E) = MO3(c,E) = MO4(c,E). By consequence, RA(c,E)
Lorenz dominates MO(c,E). In case (c), we have RAi(c,E) ≥ MOi(c,E) for all
i = 1,2 and, furthermore, RA3(c,E) = RA4(c,E) and MO3(c,E) = MO4(c,E).
Again, it is clear that RA(c,E) Lorenz dominates MO(c,E). In case (d), we have
again RAi(c,E)≥MOi(c,E) for all i = 1,2. Seeking a contradiction, suppose that
RA(c,E) does not Lorenz dominate MO(c,E). We then have
MO1(c,E)+MO2(c,E)+MO3(c,E)> RA1(c,E)+RA2(c,E)+RA3(c,E).
By consequence, it must be the case that MO3(c,E) > RA3(c,E). It also fol-
lows that MO4(c,E)< RA4(c,E) since ∑i∈N RAi(c,E) = ∑i∈N MOi(c,E). Hence,
we have MO4(c,E)−MO3(c,E) < RA4(c,E)− RA3(c,E). However, we have
MO4(c,E)−MO3(c,E) = E−c3, while RA4(c,E)−RA3(c,E)≤ E−c3 by order
preservation, and we have a contradiction.
If there is no i ∈ N such that ci ≥ E, then there are three possible cases: (e)
c1 ≥ t, (f) c1 < t and c2 ≥ t, (g) ci < t for all i = 1,2 and c3 ≥ t. In case (e),
MO(c,E) = CEL(c,E), and the desired result follows from Proposition 6.2. In
case (f), RA1(c,E)≥MO1(c,E) and there is a µ > 0 such that MOi(c,E) = ci−µ
for i = 2,3,4. Seeking a contradiction, suppose that RA(c,E) does not Lorenz
dominate MO(c,E). Then we have MO j(c,E) > RA j(c,E) for some j = 2,3.
Note that MO j(c,E) = c j − µ . We also have MOk(c,E) < RAk(c,E) for some
k > j because ∑i∈N RAi(c,E) = ∑i∈N MOi(c,E). Also MOk(c,E) = ck− µ . So
we have c j−RA j(c,E)> µ > ck−RAk(c,E), while c j ≤ ck. We have a violation
of order preservation and hence a contradiction. The proof for case (g) is similar
as that for case (f) and therefore omitted. 
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Finally, we consider several examples to illustrate the Lorenz incomparabili-
ties between rules given in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. Examples for higher numbers of
individuals are obtained by simply adding individuals with claims equal to 0.
– The adjusted proportional rule and the random arrival rule are incompara-
ble if E < 12C: Consider the claims problems (c,E) = (10,10,10,20;20)
and (c′,E ′) = (10,20,30;20). Now, RA(c,E) ≈ (4.2,4.2,4.2,7.5) strictly
Lorenz dominates A(c,E) = (4,4,4,8), while A(c′,E ′) = (4,8,8) strictly
Lorenz dominates RA(c′,E ′)≈ (3.3,8.3,8.3).
– The adjusted proportional rule and the random arrival rule are incomparable
if E > 12C: Consider the claims problems (c,E) = (10,10,10,20;30) and
(c′,E ′) = (10,20,30;40). Now, A(c,E) = (6,6,6,12) strictly Lorenz dom-
inates RA(c,E) ≈ (5.8,5.8,5.8,12.5), while RA(c′,E ′) ≈ (6.7,11.7,21.7)
strictly Lorenz dominates A(c′,E ′) = (6,12,22).
– The proportional rule and the random arrival rule are incomparable when-
ever E < 12C: Consider (c,E) = (20,30;10) and (c
′,E ′) = (10,30,30;30).
We have that RA(c,E) = (5,5) strictly Lorenz dominates P(c,E) = (4,6),
while P(c′,E ′) ≈ (4.3,12.9,12.9) strictly Lorenz dominates RA(c′,E ′) ≈
(3.3,13.3,13.3).
– The proportional rule and the random arrival rule are incomparable when-
ever E > 12C: Consider the claims problems (c,E) = (20,30;40) and (c
′,E ′)
= (10,30,30;40). We have that P(c,E) = (16,24) strictly Lorenz dom-
inates RA(c,E) = (15,25), whereas RA(c′,E ′) ≈ (6.7,16.7,16.7) strictly
Lorenz dominates P(c′,E ′)≈ (5.7,17.1,17.1).
– The proportional rule and the minimal overlap rule are incomparable if
E < 12C: Consider the claims problems (c,E) = (20,30;10) and (c
′,E ′) =
(10,10,10,40;20). We have that MO(c,E) = (5,5) strictly Lorenz domi-
nates P(c,E) = (4,6), while P(c′,E ′) ≈ (2.9,2.9,2.9,11.4) strictly Lorenz
dominates MO(c′,E ′) = (2.5,2.5,2.5,12.5).
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Connection between Chapters 6 and 7: Chapter 6 studied Lorenz dominance com-
parisons between awards vectors of different rules for the same claims problem. A
possibly interesting path for further research is to broaden progressivity compar-
isons to intra-rule comparisons, i.e., Lorenz dominance comparisons of awards
vectors of the same rule for different claims problems. It could be examined, for
example, how the degree of progressivity of a rule varies as the estate changes
while the claims vector remains the same, or as the inequality level of the claims
vector changes while the estate remains the same. It is not obvious, however, how
to define the concept of progressivity for intra-rule comparisons. For instance,
while it seems natural to view the constrained equal awards rule as having a
constant degree of progressivity over all claims problems, the Lorenz dominance
relation would say that it has a varying degree of progressivity since the rule
does not always select perfectly equal awards vectors. It seems inappropriate,
therefore, to use Lorenz dominance directly for this purpose. In Chapter 7, which
presents the results of a questionnaire study on the claims problem, variations
of progressivity under changes of the characteristics of the claims problem are
defined using the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule and the
constrained equal losses rule as benchmark cases—see especially the discussion
in Subsection 7.4.3. The results of the questionnaire study reveal that a substantial
number of respondents vary their position with respect to progressivity in simple
ways under changes of the claims problem.
Chapter 7
Equality Preference in the Claims
Problem: A Questionnaire Study
This chapter is based on joint work with Erik Schokkaert.
7.1 Introduction
How ought an amount of money to be distributed among a group of individu-
als if these individuals have differing claims with respect to the money and the
amount available falls short of the sum of these claims? The study of this type of
distribution problem—referred to as the ‘claims problem’—is relevant in several
economic contexts such as taxation, bankruptcy and inheritance. The literature on
claims problems focuses to a large extent on the axiomatic examination of rules,
which associate with every claims problem a division of the amount of money
among the individuals.1
Many of the axioms used in the literature on claims problems have ethical
content, which implies that the rules they characterize are open to interpersonal
disagreement. The question thus arises to which degree the various proposed rules
are found attractive by empirical subjects in solving concrete claims problems.2
In the theoretical literature, any claims problem is completely given by two char-
acteristics, viz., the vector of claims and the amount to be distributed. However,
if rules are to be applied in practice, then the particular economic context is likely
to be important as well, as it influences the ethical status of the characteristics
of the claims problem. Therefore, from an empirical perspective, the following
two question appear to be of importance. (i) Within-context consistency: for a
1For overviews of this literature see Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003).
2There is an increasing interest in economics in the empirical study of the acceptance of theo-
ries of distributive justice. See Konow (2003) and Schokkaert (1999) for recent overviews.
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given economic context, to which degree do people use the same rule for differ-
ent claims problems, i.e., claims problems with different claims vectors and/or
available money amounts? (ii) Between-context uniformity: for a given claims
problem, to which degree do people propose the same division for different eco-
nomic contexts?
In the existing questionnaire studies on claims problems—Schokkaert and
Overlaet (1989), Be´hue (2003) and Ga¨chter and Riedl (2006)—the focus is largely
on the question of between-context uniformity, while within-context consistency
receives only modest attention. These studies consider only a small number of
claims problems and, moreover, only provide an analysis on the basis of aggre-
gate data. By ignoring the complete choice patterns of respondents over several
claims problems, the studies neglect the individual level analysis which is partic-
ularly important to asses within-context consistency.
In this chapter, we deal with both the question of between-context uniformity
and that of within-context consistency. The former question is tackled by con-
sideration of a wide variety of claims problems which are all presented to each
respondent and by giving special attention to individual level data. The question
of between-context uniformity is dealt with by using two versions of the ques-
tionnaire with the same claims problems—in the Firm version, three firm owners
have to distribute a loss, and in the Pensions version, a shortage in funds has
to be distributed over three pensioners. The consideration of a greater variety of
claims problems in our questionnaire also benefits the analysis of between-context
uniformity in terms of robustness. In the discussion of the results of the question-
naire, we focus especially on the question of how respondents vary tolerance for
inequality under variations of the characteristics of the claims problem and of the
economic context.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 7.2 we present several rules
and define the concept necessary for comparing divisions with respect to how
much tolerance for inequality they imply. Section 7.3 discusses the setup of our
questionnaire. In Section 7.4, the results of the questionnaire are presented and
discussed. Section 7.5 concludes.
7.2 Theory
A claims problem involves the allocation of an amount E ∈ R+, referred to as the
estate, among the members of a set N = {1,2, . . . ,n}who have claims adding up to
more than E. The claims vector is a vector (c1,c2 . . . ,cn)∈Rn+ where, for all i∈N,
ci denotes individual i’s claim. We let C = ∑i∈N ci. Formally, a claims problem is
a pair (c,E) ∈Rn+×R+ where C≥ E. The symbol C denotes the set of all claims
problems. The literature on claims problems focuses on rules which select for
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each claims problem a division of the estate between the individuals. Formally,
a rule is a function R which associates with each (c,E) ∈ C an element of Rn+,
referred to as an awards vector, such that ∑i∈N Ri(c,E) = E and 0≤ Ri(c,E)≤ ci
for all i ∈ N.
One of the objectives in the discussion of our questionnaire results will be to
compare various well known rules for solving claims problems with respect to
how well they explain the choices of the respondents.3 The three most promi-
nent rules that we consider are the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards
rule and the constrained equal losses rule. The proportional rule makes awards
proportional to claims.
Proportional rule (P). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have P(c,E) = λc where λ solves
∑i∈N λci = E.
The constrained equal awards rule proposes equal awards for all individuals,
conditionally on not exceeding anyone’s claim.
Constrained equal awards rule (CEA). For all (c,E)∈C and all i∈N, we have
CEAi(c,E) = min{ci,λ} where λ solves ∑i∈N min{ci,λ}= E.
The constrained equal losses rule divides the estate in such a way that all
individuals endure an equal loss (defined as the difference between claim and
award), under the restriction that no individual receive less than zero.
Constrained equal losses rule (CEL). For all (c,E) ∈ C and all i ∈ N, we have
CELi(c,E) = max{0,ci−λ} where λ solves ∑i∈N max{0,ci−λ}= E.
We shall consider also five other rules. The Talmud rule defines two regimes
depending on whether the estate is smaller or greater than the sum of the half-
claims. If the estate is smaller, then the formula of the constrained equal awards
rule is used, applied to the vector of half-claims instead of to the claims vector
itself. If the estate is greater, then the constrained equal losses rule formula is
used, again applied to the half-claims.
Talmud rule (T). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
(i) if E ≤ 12C, then T (c,E) =CEA(12c,E); and
(ii) if E ≥ 12C, then T (c,E) = 12c+CEL(12c,E− 12C).
The next two rules are equal to the Talmud rule in the case where the es-
tate is smaller than the sum of the half-claims, but different in the other case.
Piniles’ rule utilizes the constrained equal awards rule formula instead of that of
the constrained equal losses rule whenever the estate is greater than the sum of the
half-claims.
3For a thorough discussion of all the rules considered in this section, see Thomson (2003).
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Piniles’ rule (Pin). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
(i) if E ≤ 12C, then Pin(c,E) =CEA(12c,E); and
(ii) if E ≥ 12C, then Pin(c,E) = 12c+CEA(12c,E− 12C).
Like Pinile’s rule, the constrained egalitarian rule uses an egalitarian procedure
if the estate exceeds the sum of the half-claims.
Constrained egalitarian rule (CE). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
(i) if E ≤ 12C, then CE(c,E) =CEA(12c,E); and
(ii) if E ≥ 12C, then, for all i ∈ N, CEi(c,E) = max{ ci2 ,min{ci,λ}} where λ
solves ∑i∈N max{ ci2 ,min{ci,λ}}= E.
To define the random arrival rule, assume the individuals arrive one at a time
and receive full compensations until the estate runs out. The random arrival rule
proposes as a division the average over all orders of arrival of the awards vectors
obtained in this way. Let ΠN denote the class of all bijections that map N onto
itself.
Random arrival rule (RA). For all (c,E) ∈ C and all i ∈ N, we have
RAi(c,E) =
1
n! ∑pi∈ΠN min{ci,max{E− ∑j∈N,pi( j)<pi(i)c j,0}}.
For defining the minimal overlap rule, we assume, without loss of generality,
that the members of N are indexed such that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ·· · ≤ cn. To understand the
minimal overlap rule, individuals have to be seen as claiming specific parts of the
interval [0,E]. Each part of the interval is distributed equally among all individ-
uals claiming it. For instance, the interval [0,c1] is claimed by everyone, and so
everyone gets c1
n
. The interval (c1,c2] is claimed by everyone except individual 1,
and so each member of N \ {1} receives in addition c2−c1
n−1 . This process goes on
until the entire interval [0,E] is covered. In the case where there are individuals
who have claims higher than the estate, the claims of these individuals are trun-
cated by the estate. In the case where there are no individuals who have claims
higher than the estate, a scalar t is sought such that all individuals with claims
higher than t exclusively claim a specific part of the interval (t,E].
Minimal overlap rule (MO). For all (c,E) ∈ C , we have
(i) if ci ≥ E for some i ∈ N, then, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j < E},
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 + · · ·+
ci− ci−1
n− (i−1) ,
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and, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j ≥ E},
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 + · · ·+
ck−1− ck−2
n− (k−2) +
E− ck−1
n− (k−1) ,
where k = min{ j ∈ N | c j ≥ E}; and
(ii) if ci < E for all i ∈ N, then, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j < t},
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 + · · ·+
ci− ci−1
n− (i−1) ,
and, for all i ∈ { j ∈ N | c j ≥ t},
MOi(c,E) =
c1
n
+
c2− c1
n−1 + · · ·+
ck−1− ck−2
n− (k−2) +
t− ck−1
n− (k−1) + ci− t,
where t solves ∑i∈{ j∈N|c j≥t} (ci− t) = E− t and k = min{ j ∈ N | c j ≥ t}.
The various rules imply different attitudes to inequality, an aspect we shall pay
special attention to in discussing the results of the questionnaire. In order to make
inequality comparisons, we define the concept standardly used in the literature on
inequality measurement, viz., the Lorenz dominance relation.4 Take any x,y∈Rn+
and let (x(1),x(2), · · · ,x(n)) and (y(1),y(2), · · · ,y(n)) denote permutations of x and y,
respectively, such that x(1) ≤ x(2) ≤ ·· · ≤ x(n) and y(1) ≤ y(2) ≤ ·· · ≤ y(n). We say
that x Lorenz dominates y if and only if
k
∑
i=1
x(i)
1
n ∑ni=1 xi
≥
k
∑
i=1
y(i)
1
n ∑ni=1 yi
for all k = 1, . . . ,n.
We say that x strictly Lorenz dominates y if and only if, moreover, at least one
of these inequalities holds strictly. Of two awards vectors proposed for the same
claims problem, one is referred to as less unequal than the other if it Lorenz dom-
inates the other. The rule (or respondent) that proposed the less unequal awards
vector, will be referred to as more progressive for the given claims problem than
the one that proposed the more unequal awards vector. The general Lorenz domi-
nance relationships that hold between the rules are described in Chapter 6.
The three prominent rules constitute benchmark cases with respect to progres-
sivity: they imply a uniform attitude in terms of progressivity irrespective of the
specific characteristics of the claims problem at hand. The proportional rule is
neutral with respect to progressivity in the sense that it chooses from the available
awards vectors the (only) one which is Lorenz equivalent to the claims vector. The
4See Cowell (2000) and Lambert (2001) for recent overviews of this literature.
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constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule are extreme
cases. The former always selects the least unequal awards vector available, while
the latter always selects the most unequal one. In contrast to these three promi-
nent rules, the behaviour of the other five with respect to progressivity is not so
clear-cut—as the solutions of the various rules for the claims problems used in
our questionnaire show (see Subsection 7.4.1), it is not the case that these rules
behave in the same way with regard to progressivity for all claims problems.
7.3 The Setup of the Questionnaire
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to state their preferred awards vec-
tor for nine different claims problems which are presented in Table 7.1. Each of
the nine claims problems is a combination of one of three possible claims vec-
tors and one of three possible estates. The three possible claims vectors have the
same sum of claims, but differ in terms of inequality (in the Lorenz sense). We
mention the claims vectors in order of increasing inequality: (1500,2000,2500),
(1000,2000,3000) and (500,2000,3500). The three possible estates, 4500, 3000
and 1500, are greater than, equal to, and smaller than the sum of the half-claims,
respectively. By using all nine combinations of these claims vectors and estates
in our questionnaire, we obtain data for a wide variety of claims problems. The
questionnaire design allows us to analyze the effect on responses of a change in
estate for a given claims vector (questions 1, 2 and 3; questions 4, 5 and 6; ques-
tions 7, 8, and 9), as well as the effect of a change in claims inequality for a
given estate (questions 1, 4 and 7; questions 2, 5 and 8; questions 3, 6, and 9).
For each of the nine questions, respondents were presented with a list of alter-
native awards vectors to choose from—these lists of alternatives will be given in
the next section where we discuss the results of the questionnaire. To be able to
examine within-context consistency, i.e., the degree to which respondents use the
same rule for different claims problems, the awards vectors selected by each of
the rules defined in the previous section are included in the lists of alternatives for
every question.
In order to allow us to tackle the question of between-context uniformity, i.e.,
the question of how the economic context in which the claims problems are pre-
sented affects responses, we consider two versions of the questionnaire with the
same nine claims problems, but with different background stories. The questions
in the ‘Firm’ version are formulated as follows (here we consider question 1):
Persons A, B and C own a firm together. A, B and C contribute to
the activities of the firm in different degrees, and for this reason they
have agreed that their salaries differ. They receive monthly e1,500,
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Table 7.1. The Questions, All Amounts in Euros
Question 1 c = (1500, 2000, 2500) E = 4500
Question 2 c = (1500, 2000, 2500) E = 3000
Question 3 c = (1500, 2000, 2500) E = 1500
Question 4 c = (1000, 2000, 3000) E = 4500
Question 5 c = (1000, 2000, 3000) E = 3000
Question 6 c = (1000, 2000, 3000) E = 1500
Question 7 c = (500, 2000, 3500) E = 4500
Question 8 c = (500, 2000, 3500) E = 3000
Question 9 c = (500, 2000, 3500) E = 1500
e2,000 and e2,500, respectively. Each of the three persons have still
other sources of income. Due to an unexpected deterioration of the
economic circumstances, the part of the revenue of the firm that can
be used for salaries in a certain month amounts to only e4,500, not
enough to compensate the three firm directors. What is in your view
the most just distribution of the sum of e4,500 between persons A, B
and C?
In the ‘Pensions’ version, the questions were formulated as follows (here we again
consider question 1):
Persons A, B and C go on retirement. On the basis of the contribu-
tions they have paid during their active career, they are entitled to a
monthly pension of e1,500, e2,000 and e2,500, respectively. Due
to the demographic ageing, these pension amounts can no longer be
paid. The government only has e4,500 monthly to spend on the pen-
sions of A, B and C. What is in your view the most just distribution
of the sum of e4,500 between persons A, B and C?
The two versions of the questionnaire differ, explicitly or implicitly, in several
respects. First, the status of the differences between the claims of the three indi-
viduals is different. In the Firm version, these differences are agreed upon by the
three firm owners, while in the Pensions version they are explained by contribu-
tions in the past of the three pensioners and hence by wage differences during the
active career. Therefore, in the Firm version respondents are likely to interpret the
differences between claims to be caused more by desert and less by talent than
in the Pensions version. Second, the two versions of the questionnaire differ with
respect to the relation between the claims or awards and the ultimate outcomes rel-
evant to the three individuals. In the Firm version it is specified that the individuals
have also other sources of income. In the Pensions version on the other hand, it
is likely that respondents view the pension amounts as very important, perhaps
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even the only, sources of income of the three individuals. Finally, the scope of the
decision is different in the two versions of the questionnaire. Whereas in the Firm
version awards pertain only to one monthly pay, in the Pensions version payments
are implied to be determined by the decision for much longer.
Questions were presented in series of three: with the long introductions given
above for the first of the three questions and shorter introductions for the second
and third. After each series of three questions, respondents were encouraged to
provide written comments on their choices. The questionnaire was anonymous. In
order to test for order effects, we used several variants of the questionnaire with
different orders of the questions and different orders of the alternatives. There
were no significant differences between these alternative variants, and we there-
fore pooled all the data.
The questionnaire was conducted among the first year undergraduate eco-
nomics students and business students of the Catholic University of Leuven in
May 2005. At that time, the students had not been exposed to the theory of claims
problems in their study programs. In the course of one week, the questionnaires
were filled in by the students at the start of several exercise sessions on ‘Bank-
ing and Finance.’ In each session, roughly half of the students participated in the
Firm version of the questionnaire, and the other half in the Pensions version. The
sample sizes are 123 respondents and 118 respondents for the Firm version and
the Pensions version, respectively.
7.4 Results
7.4.1 A First Look
Tables 7.2 to 7.10 report the percentages of the respondents who chose each of
the alternative awards vectors in questions 1 to 9, respectively. The awards vec-
tors presented to the respondents appear in sequence of increasing inequality (in
the sense of the Lorenz criterion). For convenience of exposition, we have dis-
tinguished three sets of alternatives in the tables. First, the neutral awards vector
is the one consistent with the proportional rule—it is referred to as neutral be-
cause it is Lorenz equivalent to the claims vector. Second, the awards vectors
that Lorenz dominate the neutral solution are referred to as egalitarian. Third,
the anti-egalitarian awards vectors are the ones that are Lorenz dominated by the
neutral solution. The tables also report which rules are consistent with each of the
alternative awards vectors.
We first focus on the question of between-context uniformity, i.e., on the dif-
ferences between the results obtained with the two versions of the questionnaire.
Overall, the evidence suggests that responses are less egalitarian in the Firm ver-
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Table 7.2. Question 1, c = (1500,2000,2500) and E = 4500
Rule Awards vector Firm Pensions
Egalitarian: CEA, CE (1500, 1500, 1500) 4 4
Pin (1250, 1500, 1750) 12 21
Total 16 25
Neutral: P (1125, 1500, 1875) 55 46
Anti-egalitarian: (1050, 1500, 1950) 2 7
CEL, T, RA, MO (1000, 1500, 2000) 27 22
Total 29 29
Table 7.3. Question 2, c = (1500,2000,2500) and E = 3000
Rule Awards vector Firm Pensions
Egalitarian: CEA (1000, 1000, 1000) 2 5
(850, 1000, 1150) 14 22
Total 16 27
Neutral: P, T, CE, Pin, RA (750, 1000, 1250) 58 47
Anti-egalitarian: (650, 1000, 1350) 7 12
CEL, MO (500, 1000, 1500) 20 14
Total 27 26
Table 7.4. Question 3, c = (1500,2000,2500) and E = 1500
Rule Awards vector Firm Pensions
Egalitarian: CEA, T, CE, Pin, RA, MO (500, 500, 500) 9 11
(450, 500, 550) 9 24
Total 18 36
Neutral: P (375, 500, 625) 59 44
Anti-egalitarian: (250, 500, 750) 20 16
CEL (0, 500, 1000) 2 3
Total 22 19
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Table 7.5. Question 4, c = (1000,2000,3000) and E = 4500
Rule Awards vector Firm Pensions
Egalitarian: CEA, CE (1000, 1750, 1750) 1 0
Pin (1000, 1500, 2000) 11 17
Total 12 17
Neutral: P (750, 1500, 2250) 73 64
Anti-egalitarian: RA (666, 1416, 2416) 4 5
CEL, T, MO (500, 1500, 2500) 11 14
Total 15 19
Table 7.6. Question 5, c = (1000,2000,3000) and E = 3000
Rule Awards vector Firm Pensions
Egalitarian: CEA (1000, 1000, 1000) 2 3
(700, 1000, 1300) 14 24
Total 16 27
Neutral:
P, T, CE, Pin, RA (500, 1000, 1500) 73 61
Anti-egalitarian: MO (333, 833, 1833) 9 9
CEL (0, 1000, 2000) 2 3
Total 11 12
Table 7.7. Question 6, c = (1000,2000,3000) and E = 1500
Rule Awards vector Firm Pensions
Egalitarian: CEA, T, CE, Pin (500, 500, 500) 11 14
MO, RA (333, 583, 583) 4 17
Total 15 31
Neutral:
P (250, 500, 750) 70 58
Anti-egalitarian: (150, 500, 850) 12 8
CEL (0, 250, 1250) 3 2
Total 15 10
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Table 7.8. Question 7, c = (500,2000,3500) and E = 4500
Rule Awards vector Firm Pensions
Egalitarian: CEA, CE (500, 2000, 2000) 3 5
Pin (500, 1625, 2375) 10 18
(450, 1600, 2450) 2 12
(400, 1500, 2600) 12 13
Total 27 48
Neutral: P (375, 1500, 2625) 48 34
Anti-egalitarian: RA (333, 1333, 2833) 3 7
T (250, 1375, 2875) 12 6
MO (166, 1416, 2916) 7 2
CEL (0, 1500, 3000) 4 2
Total 26 17
Table 7.9. Question 8, c = (500,2000,3500) and E = 3000
Rule Awards vector Firm Pensions
Egalitarian: CEA (500, 1250, 1250) 6 17
(350, 1100, 1550) 13 30
Total 19 47
Neutral: P, T, CE, Pin, RA (250, 1000, 1750) 67 44
Anti-egalitarian: MO (166, 916, 1916) 9 4
CEL (0, 750, 2250) 3 2
Total 12 6
Table 7.10. Question 9, c = (500,2000,3500) and E = 1500
Rule Awards vector Firm Pensions
Egalitarian: CEA (500, 500, 500) 4 17
T, CE, Pin (250, 625, 625) 6 16
MO, RA (166, 666, 666) 5 3
Total 15 36
Neutral: P (125, 500, 875) 62 46
Anti-egalitarian: (100, 450, 950) 9 6
(50, 450, 1000) 8 3
CEL (0, 0, 1500) 4 3
Total 21 12
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Table 7.11. Chi-Square Tests for Homogeneity of Firm and Pensions Versions
Question Test Statistic p-Value
1 2.778 0.249
2 3.980 0.137
3 8.404 0.015
4 1.924 0.382
5 3.932 0.140
6 7.685 0.021
7 10.135 0.006
8 18.640 0.000
9 13.394 0.001
All Questions 70.873 0.000
sion than in the Pensions version. In all nine questions, the percentage of the re-
spondents that chose egalitarian awards vectors is lower in the Firm version than
in the Pensions version, and in six out of nine questions the percentage that chose
anti-egalitarian awards vectors is higher in the Firm version than in the Pensions
version. The chi-square test statistics given in the first nine lines of Table 7.11 test
for each question separately the null hypothesis that the population proportions
for the categories egalitarian, neutral and anti-egalitarian, respectively, are equal
for the two questionnaire versions. The test statistic given in the last row does the
same for the complete set of questions, i.e., for 27 (3×9) categories. Table 7.11
confirms that responses are significantly different for the two different versions.
The evidence that respondents chose less egalitarian alternatives in the Firm ver-
sion than in the Pensions version is particularly strong in the case of questions 3,
6, 7, 8 and 9. Note that in each of these questions the majority of the alternative
award vectors feature incomes lower thane500, an amount close to the minimally
guaranteed income in Belgium. The fact that respondents in the Pensions version
are especially egalitarian in these cases, suggests that they may have some con-
cern for a minimum level of income being respected—in fact, this concern was
expressed explicitly by several respondents in the comments box of the question-
naire. Put differently, for especially low awards, considerations with respect to
needs appear to override considerations with respect to claims. It is interesting
to note that the evidence suggests that the reason why respondents choose more
egalitarian alternatives in the Pensions version is not because they favour equal-
ity in itself but rather because they want to make sure individuals get a sufficient
amount of income.
The aggregate data given in Tables 7.2 to 7.10 is not completely suitable for
examining within-context consistency, i.e., for evaluating rules with respect to
how well they describe the choices of the respondents. It is inherent in the defini-
tion of a rule that it proposes an awards vector for every claims problem. Hence,
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to evaluate them we need to look at the entire response pattern of respondents,
not just at aggregates. However, one first impression on the basis of the aggregate
data is worth mentioning. The awards vectors consistent with the proportional
rule perform very well in explaining responses: they are convincingly most popu-
lar in every question. Although this is true for both versions of the questionnaire,
the awards vectors of the proportional rule are clearly more popular in the Firm
version than in the Pensions version. Note that, both for the Firm version and for
the Pensions version, the proportional rule is especially popular in questions 4,
5 and 6 where the claims are (1000,2000,3000). It is hard to find an economic
explanation for this observation—perhaps it is simply due to the fact that, for the
given claims vector, the awards vectors of the proportional rule are particularly
easy to calculate.
In the next subsection, we will provide a more robust analysis based on in-
dividual level data to compare the empirical performance of the various rules.
Before moving on, however, we discuss two basic intuitions of the respondents
that are revealed in the aggregate data for both versions of the questionnaire: con-
cerns for strict order preservation and nonzero awards. Both of these concerns
were also stated explicitly in comments by several respondents.
Respondents in both questionnaire versions seem to want the order in claims
to be preserved strictly in awards. Alternatives in which individuals with different
claims get the same award only appear in the sets of egalitarian awards vectors of
the questions. For all questions in which alternatives are available in the set of
egalitarian awards vectors that respect strict order preservation (this is the case in
all questions except 6 and 9), the awards vector that violates strict order preserva-
tion is almost always least popular among the egalitarian awards vectors for both
questionnaire versions (the only exception being question 7 in the Firm version).
Since the constrained equal awards rule never respects strict order preservation,
its awards vectors perform rather badly in describing respondents’ choices.
There seems to be a reluctance among respondents in both questionnaire ver-
sions to give an individual a zero award. Awards vectors in which an individ-
ual gets a zero award only appear as the least egalitarian alternative in the set of
anti-egalitarian awards vectors of the questions. In almost all questions in which
such an alternative is present (all questions except 1, 2 and 4), it is least popular
among the anti-egalitarian awards vectors for both versions of the questionnaire
(the only exception being question 7 in the Firm version). Since the constrained
equal losses rule always selects awards vectors with zero awards if they are con-
sistent with the definition of a rule, it does badly in the cases in which such awards
vectors are among the alternatives. At the same time, it should be mentioned that
in the questions in which the constrained equal losses rule gives everyone strictly
more than zero (questions 1, 2 and 4), its awards vectors are most popular in the
set of anti-egalitarian solutions.
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Table 7.12. Distances to Award Vectors of Rules
Rule Firm Pensions
Average Ranked 1st Average Ranked 1st
Egalitarian: CEA 7149 2 6344 4
CE 4859 1 4685 0
Pin 3209 6 3062 23
Neutral or unclear: P 1391 75 1919 58
T 3055 2 3285 2
RA 2727 6 2989 5
MO 3999 6 4384 6
Anti-egalitarian: CEL 6974 2 7824 3
7.4.2 A Comparison of Rules
Strictly speaking, a respondent is consistent with a rule only if she chooses the
awards vectors implied by the rule in all questions. Due to the relatively high
number of questions in the questionnaire, this test is, however, rather stringent.
Nevertheless, 38% of the respondents were consistent with the proportional rule in
all nine questions in the Firm version and 20% in the Pensions version. Given this
good performance, it is not surprising that it was often mentioned by respondents
in their comments that they were applying a proportional procedure throughout the
questionnaire. The only other rule that respondents have chosen consistently with
in all nine questions is the constrained equal losses rule: however, this is the case
only for 2% of the respondents in each of the two versions of the questionnaire.
A less stringent way for comparing the performance of the various rules in de-
scribing respondents’ choices can be obtained by making use of the following con-
cept of ‘distance.’ Let (c`,E`) be the claims problem used in question `= 1, . . . ,9
and denote the awards vector chosen by respondent k in question ` by Ak(c`,E`).
We define the ‘distance’ between the set of awards vectors chosen by k and the set
of awards vectors implied by rule R as ∑9`=1 ∑3i=1 |Aki (c`,E`)−Ri(c`,E`)|, i.e., as
the total money amount that respondent k deviates from what is prescribed by rule
R. The calculated distances can be used to compare the empirical performance of
the different rules: the lower the distance, the better the performance of the rule
in describing the choices of the given respondent.
Table 7.12 presents the average over all respondents of the distance of the re-
sponse pattern implied by each of the rules to the response pattern chosen by each
respondent. Also reported, for each rule, are the percentages of the respondents
for whom the rule is ranked first, i.e., for whom the distance to the given rule is
lower than that to each other rule. The categories egalitarian, anti-egalitarian and
neutral are defined similarly as in Tables 7.2 to 7.10. A rule is categorized as un-
clear if it does not belong to any of the three other categories for all questions. For
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the Firm version, the proportional rule clearly performs best, while all other rules
pale in comparison. For the Pensions version, the proportional rule also comes
out first, but less overwhelmingly so: Piniles’ rule apparently picks up on the more
egalitarian responses for this version and comes out as a convincing second. It is
remarkable that Piniles’ rule outperforms the prominent constrained equal awards
and constrained equal losses rules. Table 7.12 also confirms the conclusion with
respect to the differences between the two questionnaire versions that was stated
in the previous subsection: egalitarian rules do better in the Pensions version.
7.4.3 Variations in Degree of Egalitarianism
In the previous subsection, we studied the question of within-context consistency,
i.e., whether responses use the same rule for each claims problem. Here, we con-
sider a similar question but in terms of progressivity. We examine whether respon-
dents take, for each claims problem, the same position with respect to progressiv-
ity, or whether they vary their position in a straightforward manner depending on
the characteristics of the claims problem at hand. Specifically, we analyze how
responses vary under two basic variations of the claims problem: (a) a decrease of
the estate while the claims remain the same, and (b) an increase in the inequality
of the claims vector while the estate remains the same.
In Table 7.13, the response patterns over the combinations of questions rele-
vant for question (a) are summarized (in percentages). The category same covers
the response patterns consistent with the proportional rule, the constrained equal
awards rule or the constrained equal losses rule, i.e., the patterns in which the
degree of progressivity remains unchanged. The other four categories—decrease,
increase, decrease-increase and increase-decrease—describe simple variations in
progressivity, and are also defined using the three prominent rules as benchmark
cases. To give an example: a response pattern over questions 1, 2 and 3 which
is consistent with the constrained equal awards rule in question 1, consistent with
the proportional rule in question 2 and consistent with the constrained equal losses
rule in question 3, would be categorized under decrease.5 A complete description
5The reason why the Lorenz dominance relation was not used to define the categories, is that
this relation is not appropriate for making progressivity comparisons between awards vectors pro-
posed for different claims problems. To illustrate this point, suppose a respondent chooses the
awards vectors consistent with the constrained equal awards rule in both questions 4 and 5. The
Lorenz dominance relation would in that case say that the respondent is less progressive in ques-
tion 4 than in question 5, while it seems more natural to conclude instead that the respondent takes
the same position with respect to progressivity in the two question, viz., the extremely egalitarian
one. The problem with the Lorenz dominance relation is that it does not take into account the re-
strictions standardly imposed in the literature on claims problems—in the case of the illustration,
it fails to recognize that an individual should never receive an award greater than her claim.
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Table 7.13. Evolution of Progressivity as Estate Decreases
Quest. Context Same Decrease Increase Decrease- Increase-
P CEA CEL Increase Decrease
1, 2, 3 Firm 45 2 2 3 (0.998) 22 (0.000) 9 (0.923) 4 (1.000)
Pensions 29 2 2 9 (0.872) 26 (0.000) 6 (1.000) 3 (1.000)
4, 5, 6 Firm 55 0 2 8 (0.471) 16 (0.000) 2 (1.000) 7 (0.962)
Pensions 39 0 2 6 (0.978) 21 (0.000) 2 (1.000) 5 (1.000)
7, 8, 9 Firm 43 1 2 11 (0.106) 10 (0.179) 2 (1.000) 10 (0.952)
Pensions 25 3 2 7 (0.881) 15 (0.025) 4 (1.000) 11 (0.990)
of the response patterns belonging to each of the categories is given in Appendix
7.A.
The category same performs best empirically, a result that can be ascribed to
to the popularity of the proportional rule response patterns. It is interesting to
examine how the various other categories perform in describing the choices of
those respondents not consistent with the same category. Therefore, Table 7.13
provides p-values for the null hypothesis that the population proportions for each
of the given categories is equal to what it would be if choices of respondents not
consistent with the same category were completely random.6 Obviously, only
if the evidence allows this hypothesis to be rejected, the category is useful in
explaining non-same consistent responses. We find that, for both versions of the
questionnaire, the category increase, describing an increase in progressivity as
the estate decreases, performs well empirically, whereas all other categories fail.
The popularity of the increase category is consistent with the observation made in
Subsection 7.4.1 that respondents seem to attribute importance to minimal income
needs. What is interesting is that this pattern appears to be present not only for
the Pensions version of the questionnaire, but also for the Firm version, albeit in
a somewhat weaker form.
Table 7.14 presents similar results as Table 7.13 but for question (b). Again,
the same consistent patterns perform very well. The question again arises how the
other categories perform in describing the choices of the respondents who are not
consistent with this category. The table shows that, for both the Firm version and
the Pensions version, the increase category, describing an increase in progressivity
as claims inequality increases, performs very well empirically, whereas all other
categories fail. It is not immediately clear how this pattern can be given economic
meaning. However, it is interesting to note that the same pattern was also found
by Ga¨chter and Riedl (2006) in a study on the basis of aggregate results for two
questions.
6The p-values are for the one sided exact test based on the binomial distribution.
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Table 7.14. Evolution of Progressivity as Claims Inequality Increases
Quest. Context Same Decrease Increase Decrease- Increase-
P CEA CEL Increase Decrease
1, 4, 7 Firm 42 0 2 11 (0.242) 22 (0.000) 8 (0.988) 7 (0.998)
Pensions 21 0 2 8 (0.908) 34 (0.000) 13 (0.983) 3 (1.000)
2, 5, 8 Firm 49 2 2 3 (0.996) 17 (0.001) 2 (1.000) 7 (0.966)
Pensions 30 1 2 3 (1.000) 26 (0.000) 9 (0.994) 2 (1.000)
3, 6, 9 Firm 48 4 2 11 (0.106) 8 (0.414) 2 (1.000) 7 (0.957)
Pensions 34 8 2 5 (0.972) 18 (0.002) 5 (1.000) 3 (1.000)
7.5 Conclusion
We discussed in this chapter the results of a questionnaire concerning claims prob-
lems that was held among Belgian students. Two versions of the questionnaire
were considered—the Firm version and the Pensions version—in which the same
claims problems were presented in different economic contexts. The question-
naire setup allowed us to consider (i) the question of within-context consistency,
i.e., the degree to which respondents apply the same rule for different claims prob-
lems in the same economic context, and (ii) the question of between-context uni-
formity, i.e., the degree to which respondents propose the same awards vector for
the same claims problem in different economic contexts.
With regard to the question of within-context consistency, we found that the
proportional rule performed very well in describing the choices of the respondents
in both versions of the questionnaire, this in stark contrast to the other two rules
that play a prominent role in the literature, viz., the constrained equal awards rule
and the constrained equal losses rule. These latter two rules fail to capture basic in-
tuitions of the respondents. The constrained equal awards rule in many cases gives
equal awards to individuals with different claims, whereas respondents seemed to
prefer to respect these differences in the choice of the awards vector. Respondents
also appeared to be reluctant to give a zero award to an individual with a nonzero
claim, an intuition typically violated by the constrained equal losses rule.
As for the question of between-context uniformity: responses were clearly
more egalitarian in the Pensions version of the questionnaire than in the Firm ver-
sion, a phenomenon we suggested could be due to the fact that the given context
induced respondents to give more weight to respect for basic needs in the choice
of awards vectors. As a consequence, in a comparison of the empirical perfor-
mance of all rules, the egalitarian Piniles’ rule came in as a relatively convincing
second to the proportional rule. In the Firm version, on the other hand, no rule
distinguished itself as a serious competitor for the proportional rule.
We also considered the question of within-context consistency from the in-
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equality perspective. The questionnaire design allowed us to examine variations
in the tolerance of inequality of the respondents under simple changes of the char-
acteristics of the claims problem. We found that, for those respondents who were
not consistent with a uniform attitude towards inequality in all claims problems,
response patterns describing an increase in progressivity as the estate decreases
other things equal and as inequality of the claims vector increases other things
equal performed well empirically. It is interesting to note as a suggestion for new
lines of research that although, as we have shown, simple ideas stated in terms of
inequality are useful in organizing empirical intuitions concerning claims prob-
lems, such ideas have remained largely unexamined in the theoretical literature.
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Appendix 7.A: Description of Categories
Over two questions, the response patterns belonging to the categories same, de-
crease and increase can be defined using the proportional rule, the constrained
equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule as benchmarks.
1. Same progressivity in question x and question y:
(a) Consistent with the constrained equal awards rule in question x and in
question y.
(b) Consistent with the proportional rule in question x and in question y.
(c) Consistent with the constrained equal losses rule in question x and in
question y.
2. Decrease of progressivity from question x to question y:
(a) Consistent with the constrained equal awards rule in question x and
less progressive than the constrained equal awards rule in question y.
(b) More progressive than the proportional rule in question x and at most
as progressive as the proportional rule in question y.
(c) Consistent with the proportional rule in question x and less progressive
than the proportional rule in question y.
(d) Less progressive than the proportional rule but not consistent with the
constrained equal losses rule in question x and consistent with the con-
strained equal losses rule in question y.
3. Increase of progressivity from question x to question y:
(a) Consistent with the constrained equal losses rule in question x and
more progressive than the constrained equal losses rule in question y.
(b) Less progressive than the proportional rule in question x and at least
as progressive as the proportional rule in question y.
(c) Consistent with the proportional rule in question x and more progres-
sive than the proportional rule in question y.
(d) More progressive than the proportional rule but not consistent with
the constrained equal awards rule in question x and consistent with the
constrained equal awards rule in question y.
Over three questions, the five categories same, decrease, increase, decrease-
increase and increase-decrease are defined as follows.
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1. Same progressivity over questions x,y,z: Same in x and y and same in y and
z.
2. Decrease of progressivity over questions x,y,z:
(a) Decrease from x to y and decrease from y to z.
(b) Decrease from x to y and same from y to z.
(c) Same from x to y and decrease from y to z.
3. Increase of progressivity over questions x,y,z:
(a) Increase from x to y and increase from y to z.
(b) Increase from x to y and same from y to z.
(c) Same from x to y and increase from y to z.
4. Decrease-increase of progressivity over questions x,y,z: Decrease from x
to y and increase from y to z.
5. Increase-decrease of progressivity over questions x,y,z: Increase from x to
y and decrease from y to z.
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